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Summary of Argument. 
CHAPTER I. The Interest and Importance of Feuerbach 
in view of the present attitude of many to Religion. 
Reviewing the present situation as it is depicted in many 
books, e.g. "The Nineteen Twenties ",by A.C.',iard, the works of 
Jung, Freud, Julian Huxley etc. we find two causes of the re- 
volt against religion. Through the new study of Psychology 
and the popularisation of its ideas, religion is not denied 
but explained away as a function of human nature (Julian Huxley) 
or regression to infantile ideas of the individual or t-he race 
(Freud, Jung). Religious thought and practices,Huxley says, 
may be retained if transposed into a new key. Religion may now 
give subjective satisfaction but it has no objective reality. 
Balmforth points out that this attack from psychology is the 
third wave of the scientific challenge to religious faith and 
it is probably the most difficult to meet. 
Again,there are special circumstances in the post -war world 
which favour this subjective view of religion, the success in 
the development of the medical treatment of nervous troubles, 
the general disintegration of the conventional sanctions and 
even the foundations of life, the love of slogans and the human 
interest of the new psychological terms, the wide- spread emphas- 
is on the material gains of science and civilization. "We are 
living matter "; "Man is the highest of all concrete realities 
and there is nothing above him but his own ideals." These ideas 
are prevalent among the younger as well as among the older races 
of/ 
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of the world. 
The books of Krutch and Lippmann suggest that all is not 
so well as is thought and a critical reconsideration is re- 
quired. There is a distrust of the new freedom, for "the cos- 
mic consciousness has collapsed upon a great void ". 
Under these circumstances there is gain in looking back to 
a period and a personality which reflect many ofour problems 
and some of our solutions. Feuerbach, the Father of Illusionisam, 
" Theology is 
laid down the principle, (Anthropology " and so touches the 
nerve of the great question,'What is the validity of religious 
experience ?' He anticipates not only the modern problem in 
general but even anticipates some of the terms current in modern 
psychology. It is part of his interest also that he is in line 
with or in reaction against a great philosophic tradition . 
Q,uotations from many notable writers show that they apprec- 
iate the importance of Feuerbach...This is to be expected from 
and Leuba / 
sympathetic followers such as Bolin, Jodl, Carl Beyr, Kohut, / 
but the more critical Staucke considers he is a 'key -man',while 
Hoffding calls him ' an energetic thinker richly endowed'. Von 
Hugel, Wobbermin, and Karl Barth each emphasise his striking 
contribution to the question at issue. Friend and critic agree 
that his work is marked both by virtuosity and by incompleteness 
and Merz points out that he has a place with the political and 
feuilleton writers who appealed to the people and set the prob- 
lems which the professors in the universities had to answer. 
A short account of the political and intellectraal conditions 
of his time is therefore necessary. 
Chapter II. 
Summary of Argument 
o, 
The political and philosophical movements in the 
first half of the XIXth century az a necessary background 
for our subject. 
These movements throw light upon and sharply define the problem 
and character of Feuerbach. I/ It was a 'Post -jar Epoch', but 
was not attended by a'bloodless revolution'. After the downfall 
of Napoleon came the offer and withdrawal of constitutions for 
the various German states, accompanied by repression and police - 
supervision. Two events marked the dissatisfaction and unrest, 
Festival in Jena 
the students' bonfire at the Wartburg /on the 18th Oct,l917,and 
the assassination of Kotzebue by a student at Mannheim,Iarch 
23rd,1819. Commissioners appointed to visit the universities 
and supervise the instruction given. Hegel, though called the 
'official philosopher', also suspect. 
Two upheavals revealed the mood of the age, lst,the French 
Revolution of July 1830, and again in 1848,1eading to wider 
movements of revolt against Absolutism in Germany and Austria. 
The Convocation of a great National Congress of representatives 
of the German people led only to disappointment. Feuerbach's 
abstention is defended by him on the ground that the movement 
had no reality, but trusted in words only.The time of the worst 
reaction lay between 1850 - 60 and was mitigated by efficient 
administration on the part of the government and by an indust- 
ial and scientific advance which itself gave material to Feuer - 
bach's argument that Christianity with its supernatural ideas 
had long vanished not only from the reason but from the life 
of mankind. 
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II / The philosophical and theological situation was one of 
activity 
intellectual NX, as strong as the political was weak, and 
Feuerbach's reaction to it is naturally most conspicuous in his 
writings. Romanticism succeeds Rationalism and carries us for- 
ward into the midst of the great system- makers of the XIXth 
century. Kant's three Kritiques, especially the first, providE 
both a quarry and a battleground. How is the dualism of sense 
and Understanding to be overcome is the question among others 
which Fichte, Schelling and Hegel endeavour to answer. Feuer - 
bach's own references to and criticism of this idealistic devel 
opment are of much value. 
In his criticism of current theology Feuerbach is much leE 
sympathetic, showing toward it scorn and contempt while profesE 
ing respect forthe'chaste monastic cell' which he considers is 
the true representative of Christianity. Yet the age was not 
so barren as he alleged. Pietism had a good and a wide influenc 
Professor Hastie gives a more favourable judgment in his Intro- 
duction to Lichtenber s book on German Theology in the XIXth 
century. 
Yet there was unrest in Church circles. Rationalism persis4 
ed and Fuerbach though critical of it is yet himself under its 
spell. But the two commanding influences were Hegel and Schleif 
macher. 
Viewed as a whole, it was an age strained and dissatisfied, 
resentful of the Absolutism which pressed heavily in State and 
University and Church upon its desire for ampler life. 
Chapter III. 
Summary of Argument 
The personal history, experience and activity 
of Feuerbach as interpretative of his theory of Religion. 
It will be found that there is a development through a sharp 
antagonism to an effort at a positive statement. 
His father and the family of eight children all display mark 
ed ability; in the father romantic tendencies are curbed by 
practical necessities: 'My will and my reason curb the passions 
Ludwig born 28th July 1804 at Landshut in Bavaria died on the 
13th September 1872 at Reckenberg. His character has been call. 
ed mysterious,and it is possible to discuss the influence of 
these personal disppointments upon his doctrine of religion as 
a dream and the vanity of human wishes. He was certainly an 
'introvert', and the'resignation'to which Starcke refers was 
not only philosophical but practical. The question is interest 
zing but speculative and the result inconclusive. 
His early interest in religion as schoolboy and student is 
unquestioned and his reading shows a wide variety in theologica 
as well as general literature. All through he was interested in 
the practical side of theology. In 1823 he went to Heidelberg 
and showed himself a very diligent theological student. Critic 
al of Paulus, the leader of theological rationalism, he is more 
pleased for a time with D_.aub who pointed beyond himself to the 
genius of Hegel. But his desire to go to Berlin grew very latN 
strong (where he might study philosophy, "Palestine is too 
narrow for me ". He seeks Nature and the complete man. Reluct- 
antly his father agrees, and Berlin fascinates him despite his 
abstemious/ 
Summary of Argument 
abstemious life as a student. Schleiermacher and Neander fail 
to please him as he had anticipated, but the name of the former 
is bound up with the happy recollections of the capital of Pruss 
;ia, 'my second, my spiritual, my true fatherland.' 
Dissatisfaction with the teaching of Hegel appears already in 
1827 -8, for he began to ask what was the relation of Denken and 
Sein, of Logic and NatureTere there no Nature, never would the 
immaculate virgin Logic produce one from herself.'' 
In 1828 he presented his Doctor -dissection to Erlangen Univer 
sity under the title, "De ratione, una, universali, infinita." 
There is to be observed an enthusiasm for Reason, a sphere where 
individuality does not count, while Christianity is criticised 
as neither the perfect nor the absolute religion in so far as 
it is the religion of the pure self, of the person as exalted 
spirit; Nature is left out and Reason is not yet free. 
The pleasure of his father with the dissertation was destroy- 
ed by the publication of "Gedanken wines Denker uber Tod and 
Unsterblichkeit" in 1830 which though published annonymously 
was generally attributed to Feuerbach. The Bavarian police 
laid hold upon it and it exercised a fatal power upon all his 
scholastic aspirations. In its psychological explanation of th 
belief in immortality it anticipates his later treatment of rell 
ion as founded in the desire of the individual, and the theme 
appears constantly in his other works. 
He continues his literary work, counting'his failure his free 
:dom.' In 1833 appeared his History of Modern Philosophy and in 
1834 "Mika Abaelard and Heloise, or The Writer and the Man." 
Summary of Argument 
He desires to go to Paris, or to Zurich, or to America but 
fails to get encouragement for his plans. In 1833 his father 
died and in 1835 he became engaged to Bertha Löwe whom he mar- 
ried in 1837, settling down at Schloss Bruckberg. 
His 'Leibnitz'appeared in 1836 and was intended to be an ex- 
tension of his History of Modern Philosophy which had been well 
received by the public. ' terre Bayle', a contribution to the 
History of Philosophy and modern Culture, but more a study in 
the relation of reason and faith was written in 1838,'to ins - 
struct and shame an infatuated and exasperated people', the re- 
ference being to # recent outbrea- of religious strife in Bavar, 
is between Protestants and Roman Catholics. 
31,a.rcke mentions three stages in the development of our au- 
thor, 1. to 'Leibnitz,1836, 2nd, from Bayle,1838 to 1843 when 
the 'Grundstze' appeared, and 3rd. from 1844 on, from the pub- 
lication of 'Luther', where the philosopher passes completely 
into the man and reason is bound close to the sensible reality. 
Our chief interest lies in the four works on Religion,'Das 
Wesen des Christentums',1641, 3rd edition,1848- 9;'Das Wesen der 
Religion', 1845; 'Vorlesungen über das Vesen der Religion,1851: 
'Theogonie', the most prized by Feuerbach,1857 ;(details later). 
The collected edition which runs to ten volumes was begun 
in 1846. 
Trials and hardships marked his later days,due partly to 
the bankruptcy of the porcelain- factory at $loss Bruckberg .To 
leave this home was like the parting of soul, and body, he says 
Friendly assistance was given him in 1862 and again in 1871. 
A 
6 
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A great concourse assembled at his funeral,arranged by the Soc- 
ial Democrat Labour Party with which he had been associated as 
a member since 1870. This in part explains the use made of his 
name and teaching by the school of economic materialism. Some 
quotations are given from speeches at the funeral and from oth- 
er tributes. It is difficult to say howwide his influence 
really was, but a Gesellschaft bearing his name was founded by 
'iliiam Bolin of Helsingfors,and a revised edition of his works 
has appeared edited by Bolin and Friedrich Jodl. Certainly his 
name 11XXXMAKXAM is recurring with strange persistence for one 
who has suffered much neglect. 
Chapter IV. 
Summary of Argument 
Summary and Survey of the principal works of 
Feuerbach dealing with Religion. 
Feuerbach never compiled an autobiography, but reveals him- 
self in many of his writings, especially 
V W R ch.lw2. and Pre- 
face to g; J where he humourously admits the dust oft-he past 
may act as fertiliser for the future. M.enscheit. 
Pierre Bayle: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie und 
': ;' 1038, is of importance as a revelation of the ration- 
alism which coloured more of his later writing than he would act 
mit. We notice the bias against txxxpli miracle, and the em- 
phasis upon the crimes of religion. A strong plea is made for 
the independence of Science, Art, Morality, and the question is 
riised whether Nature and Reason can be equated. It is not so° 
much an exposition of Bayle as a medium for the expression of 
his own views, for the conflict between Faith and Reason, heli 
ion and Morality still continued. 
The root of the trouble lies in the exag4erated dualism of the 
religious interpretation of life, which finds scope in Protest - 
antism as well as in Catholicism, though in the case of the for- 
mer the ascetic otherworldliness is thedetical and not practical 
The conflict between Theology and Science, or Philosophy, 
which alone represents the idea of science absolutely, is one 
between particularity and universality. The mere 'Dass' 
or statement suffices for religious consideration, but the 'Wie' 
or 'Wodurch' is the kernel of the study of Nature, an interests. 
statement of scientific method. IIe criticises the argument 
from adaptation and declares that no direct view of Nature can 
be/ 
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be obtained since the idea of an external God acts as interven- 
ing barrier. Theology has succumbed completely to the marvell- 
ous, its metaphysical principle is 'Creation out of nothing'. 
Christianity has a natural beginning and religion is an ess- 
ential form of the human spirit as Volksgeist. Miracle is a 
form of representation in popular religion and not in Christian 
ity alone. Belief in Miracle depreciates Nature and the belief 
is itself the essence of %KM miracle. He defines a fact as 
that which in the moment it happens shuts out the possibility o 
being otherwise. 
In chap 4 he argues for the independence of Morality from Re- 
ligion, defending Atheism as compatible with morality, and crit- 
icising religion on three grounds,l/ Holiness is not an origin- 
al conception, for only the true is holy; 2/ Religion becomes 
of necessity positive, an affair of the state; 3/ Religion 
tears up Ethics by the roots,setting the Good beyond Man. 
Reason in chap 5 is defined as a clear and lively light, 
self -evidencing in character, and the tett of truth is not to be 
found in the witness of the senses. Reason not revelation decid 
;es between different lawgivers. In the Categorical Imperative 
Kant was the first to write a Grammer of Ethics in contrast to 
what had previously been only doctrines of happiness. 
Ethics is the rational religion, the self- evidenced, over 
against the phantasy and symbols of the orthodox. It may be 
abstract but it is not a glorified self -seeking as the other is. 
Chap 6 and 7 continue the description of Reason as found in 
3ayle and in the theologians, in the course of which he emphas- 
Summary of Argument. 
/l. 
ices the necessity of philosophy. Over against mediated facts 
i.e. facts which have been coloured by ideas or imagination he 
sets the immediate fact which is just,e.g. a historical fact 
and not a divine truth. 
It is admitted that mystery remains, there is a necessity 
which belongs to the passions,serving the race more than the 
individual,yet science means freedom from oneself,objectivity. 
In the concluding chapters Feuerbach shows his skill as a por- 
trayer of characLiardeclaring that Bayle excites the appetite 
for philosophy but does not satisfy it, he gives us salt rather 
than food. He sways between Empiricism and Metaphysics. 
We note that the 'theogonic wish' has not yet appeared in de- 
finite form, but that the fatal thing in religion is that it is 
personal subjective utilitarian, whereas philosophy and science 
are unbiased impartial. Nature is not a dead machine and 
Reason is a clear and lively light. 
I Z r 
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Chap. 1V,( continued) The Principal works of r'euerbach... 
2/ 
'Das esen des Christentums.' 1841,3rd edit.1848 -9.- 
It made a great sensation when published, the reception being 
partly appreciative and partly hostile, the'foundation of the 
only possible religious philosophy' and the total demolition df 
religion. The English Translation,1854, by George Lliot. 
summarising of the author's previous occasional thoughts con- 
cerning religion and Christianity, theology and speculative 
philosophy, it contained the elements and only the critical 
elements of a philosophy of positive religion. ±eliR, ion is 
essentially dramatic. Religion and Philosophy are not to be 
identified. His method is objective, analytical, historical. 
The history of Dogma is a criticism of Dogma and proves that 
theology is anthropology. 
The Preface to the second Edition gives a succinct and trentr 
'chant account of his opponents and declares that the whole beia 
of the time is 'Schein',appearance. Criticising the philosoph- 
ers and theologians'who pluck out their eyes that they may see 
better', he defines the principle of his philosophy to be no 
merely conceptual being, but the true 'Ens realissimum', Man. 
The two parts of his book, the positive and the negative, are 
complementary and both are necessary, for he claims that he ex- 
alts anthropology to theology instead of the reverse and de- 
clares that the anthropomorphism of the Incarnation is a worthy 
idea. "I change the object as it is in the imagination into 
the object as it is in reality. 
In/ 
13. 
Summary of Argument. 
In addition to the two main sections, there is a very im- 
portant chapter, dealing 1/ with the essential Nature of Man, 
and 2/ with the essential nature of Religion,and the ap.?endix t 
important. 
Three propositions dealing. with man are noted and also the 
threefold description of man as Reason, ill, and Love. The 
proposition that "Consciousness of the infinite is nothing else 
than the consciousness of the infinity of consciousness" may be 
Aid to strike the key -note of Feuerbach's philosophy. Schleier 
macher 's theory of religion as feeling is criticised and he is 
condemned for being'too cowardly to confess a theology without 
a God.' 
'The essence of jeligion considered generally' is treated 
in the same abstract fashion. "It is our task to show that the 
I, 
antithesis of divine and human is altogether illusory, for the 
measure of the Race or Species is the absolute measure law and 
criterion of man. The develorment of religion shows the identit 
_y of subject and predicate, for man abstracts more and more from 
God and attributes more and more to himself. Religion has no 
material exclusively its own. Apart from man the infinite ful- 
ness of various predicates is a concept without reality, for in 
religion the predicate is thê true subject. Pan's self- abaseft 
ment is really the assertion of his ideal under the safer cus- 
tody of the divine, and occurs through the process of project- 
ion by which he projects hts being into objectivity and then ag- 
ain makes himself an object to this projected image of 4imself 
thus converted into a subject. Projection is the mystery of Re- 
Summary of Argument. 
ligion and is as involuntary and necessary as Art or speech. 
Parts I & II show thé application of the first principles 
of his philosophy of religion to the various doctrines of the 
partly 
Church. The God of the schoolmen,Rationalism(and Kant)is no- 
thing but the objective nature of the understanding. The object 
of religion should be distinct from man yet must also have hum - 
an attributes, Luther being quoted here as frequently elsewhere 
to support the second statment . 
The Incarnation is not a purely empirical fact, but a con 
elusion which rests on a very comprehensible premiss. It is 
not altogether different from the incarnations of heathen deit- 
ies, though there are differences admitted, specified in . .úß.I, 
article,1844. 
Christianity is the religion of suffering, to suffer for 
others is divine. The mystery of the suffering God is there- 
fore the mystery dit feeling . The cosmological thought in God 
is nothing else than the act of thought in its simplest form 
made objective, the mystic paraphrase of a psychological pro- 
cess. 
The need of a personal God rests on the fact that only in 
the attribute of personality does the personal man meet with 
himself, and it is linked with the doctrine of Creation out of 
nothing and man's attempt to dominate the world of Nature. 
Prayer the simplest act of religion revêals the ultimate 
essence of religion, the omnipotence of feeling, the confidence 
that its wishes will be fulfilled; while faith is the infinite 
self -certainty of man that his own subjective. being is the ob- 
jective absolute being. The miraculous Redeemer is nothing 
else/ 
lJ. 
Summary of Argument 
else the realised wish of feeling to be free from the lawsof 
morality. Christianity may be justly called the absolute re- 
ligion for in it the heart is joined to and restrains the imag- 
ination. Belief in Christ satisfies the longing for unity and 
for reality, seeing that touch is the last criterion of reality. 
Celibacy and monachism are necessary consequents of the beef 
lief in heaven promised by ' hristianity, and personal immortal- 
ity is the final doctrine of religion, for God is the guarantee 
of my future. But seeing that existence without quality is a 
chimera, and no one knows the qualities of the future life,faitk 
present 
in it is only faith in the true life of the XXXXVX . 
Zarlier he had written, "Our task is to show that theology is 
nothing else than an unconscious esoteric pathology, anthropoloa 
psychology ", and at the close of the first Part he concludes, 
" We have reduced the supermundane, supernatural and superhuman 
nature of God to the elements of human nature as its fundament- 
al elements... The beginning, middle, and end of religion is Man 
The 2nd Part is negative and destructive with little new in 
it. 7e have a contradiction between Religion or God and Nat- 
ure which runs through the whole history of Christianity, and 
with regard to the existence of God,rdligion separates God from 
man and yet unites him to man, God is a matter of experience and 
yet in reality no object of experience,i.e. of the senses. Proof 
:s of the existence of God aim at making the internal external, 
though the Ontological proof is the most interesting as it pro- 
ceeds from within. The idea of God is linked up with that of 
revelation/ 
Summary of Argument 
revelation and through it with that of personality ;rhich as 
since ethical definitions are accidents to it. 
usual is attacked,/ Hegel's speculative doctrine of God as 
well as that of Böhme is criticised, because in them dod and m 
are separated with inevitaole contradictions. 
It is characteri;fte of religion that it turns what is natur- 
ally active into the passive. Christ is nothing but an image 
under which the unity of the species has impressed itself on 
the popular consciousness. 
The concluding replication in ch 27 makes an appeal to rise 
above the standpoint of Christianity and religion, and if one 
asks, To what? the answer seems to be, To see that life as a 
whole is divine. Unite Man with Nature, and yet Man as separat 
is to be grateful to 'Holy Nature'. This separation shows it- 
self in the two sacra_nents, the human bread and wine, and the 
divine water. The reference to Nature suggests a point of con- 
tact with his next work, "Das Wesen der Religion ". 
Feuerbach's elan is`imply\ stated to be),the destruction of an 
illusion and the inversion of the religious relation,exalting 
that into the primary which is subordinate in religion. But 
this inversion is itself the substitution of theories for facts 
and is so far itself an illusion. 
Sum:nary of Argument 
)) ) 
chap. IV. (continued) The Principal Works of Feuerbach... 
3/ 'Das Wesen der Religion', 1845 , had as its aim the pre- 
sentation of Religion so far as Nature is her object, thus sup - 
plementing W.t. where God was considered as in ïan and not in 
nature, but there is no real endeavour to reconcile the two 
works. It is preceded in &.'a. vol I,at p361, by valuable Sup- 
plements and Explanations which emphasise Necessity, Phantasy, 
and. Egoism. 
The feeling of absolute dependence in man is the ground 
of religion and the object of religion is originally nothing 
more than Nature. Three explanations of varieties of religion 
are given. Nature is only a general word and is not the result 
of the activity of a spiritual being. She is defined as 'the 
unconscious God', not purposeful, but with her own way like to 
instinct, not blind not dead not casual. Necessity seems to be 
greater than Nature but while it has both natural and human re- 
ferences it is not clearly defined. 
We notice all through his opposition to Hegelianism and to 
Theism, and he will have nothing to do with the deduction or 
the derivation of the world from God by creation out of nothing. 
God is not the First Cause, and disregarding a sense of un- 
ity he emphasises the individuality of things. 
Man is both honoured and depreciated, for Nature is the 
ground of religion but Man is its aim. The feeling of absolute 
dependence expresses itself in sacrifice, the essential act of 
natural religion, but sacrifice itself pave -s the way to Self - 
assertion, to 'Egoismus'. 
Summary of Argument 
The Wish is the origin and essence of religion, as 
wishes vary so do religions, for the gods are realised. wishe4 
"God is a religious word" WW1 but Feuerbach gives as 
fluctuating conceptions of God.. Nature, Aecessity, the living 
Ideals of man, and his fanciful ideas. Man can be moral but 
not blessed without God. 
Two smaller points with regard to what Feuerbach says of 
'utility' are of interest. 
Summary; in seeking to secure a place for Religion apart fro 
Philosophy he follows the teaching-of Schleier :acher in assert- 
ing the natural implanted and inevitable feeling of absolute 
dependence, but he does not give it the place it ought to have 
in any larger consideration of religion and its significance 
for the universe as well as for man. Detailed criticism is 
to be 
/ /found latee. 
Summary of Argument 
Chap. IV.( continued) 
The Principal Works of r'euerbach. 
4/ 
'Vorlesungen uber das Wesen der Religion, delivered in 
the town of Heidelberg in the winter of 1848-- -9, and published 
in 1851, have a three -fold interest, political, literary, and 
expository, and declare that a new religion is required for a 
new age. This religion is founded on Nature and Man, and is 
different from Culture, though religion is the oldest Culture 
and Culture ought to be perfected religion. 
His declared aim is a positive one, 'To change men from 
friends of God to friends of men.. from candidates of the future 
life to students of this, from Christians who in.consequence of 
their own creed are half animal, half angel, into complete men. 
He Ids discovered the principle of':Sinnlichkeit in religion 
which later seems to become 'Man', 'Lgoismus', and 'Nature' as 
organism. His doctrine may be named Religion or Philosophy as 
you please. 
Basing his lectures on his W.R. he seeks to show that God 
is not only as in Christianity the Good, the Cause of moral 
beings, but the deified and personified being of Nature. Lect- 
ure 10 and lecture 20 are transition passages. The main pos- 
itions have already been indicated but there are interesting 
and useful expansions and additions. 
The feeling of absolute dependence includes both the posit- 
ive and the negative ground of the explanation of the origin of 
religion, 
t 
thanks for dependence on that objedt through which I 
am something as well as fear because dependent upon that throulga 
which/ 
Su°ima,ry of Argument 
which I am nothing.' The feeling of need is practical, teleo- 
logical, the feeling of gratitude is poetic, aesthetic. 
forking toward his futher development of religion as Egoismus 
he declares the feeling of absolute dependence is not the whole 
of religion, only its origin and basis, and is itself only an 
indirect or negative feeling of self mediated by the object up- 
on which I am dependent. le notice the admission of the realit 
of the object in religion,though$l its power is passive, a con- 
sequence of the power of my need. 
Both self- sacrifice and self -realisation, whose co- existence 
constitutes the paradox of religion are both subject to the 
fundamental wish for Blessedness, the heavenly life with God. 
This Egoismus which we have reached as the last subjective 
ground of religion is not selfish, but is moral as well as meta 
physical, the impulse of self -preservation and the instinct of 
reason. 
Nature is defined as the unconscious, underived, eternal,first 
in time though not in rank, self -subsistent, not God, but the 
essence of all sensible powers, but what Feuerbach never decid- 
es is whether Ian is in or out of Nature.ature is a republic 
and so the monarchical yod of Deisia must be set aside. 
Jesus as presented in the Bible is a religious but not a histox 
;ical figure, for religion is the realm of wishes, which are 
marked as religious because unlike ordinary wishes they do not 
accept the limits of Nature and Reason. '`+e should concentrate 
on real and rational wishes, not on the longing for eternal life 
guaranteed by God who is an object of love and admiration but iE 
not a world -cause or a natural power. "Apart from earth I am a 
phantom. I am essentially a being of earth." 
6umrnary of Argument 
Chap. IV. (continued) The Principal 'hlorks of Feuerbach. 
5/ 
"Theogonie ", nach den uellen des classischen, hebraisch- 
en and christlichen Altertums." 1857. 
This was intended to be Feuerbach's swan -song and recapitulate 
ion of his whole spiritual life, and is praised by Bolin as the 
simplest completest and most mature of all his writings. Though 
especially to Homer, 
the references to literature are many, the interest is theologic 
al or philosophical. 
Nature plays a conspicuous part in his theorisings and is e- 
quated with deity in one place but so also are God and ian. 
The gods are the representatives of human wishes, but the 
question arises how are there not only wish-denying and wish- 
affirming deities but also some which are absolutely wish -deny- 
ing. The answer lies not only in the wavering nature of man's 
wishes, but in the fact that the gods are not only god.s,i.e., 
wishes, but also Nature- beings. This shows the difficulty of 
detaching man and his wishes from the objective world to which 
he refers them. The object of desire is prior to the wish and 
is active as well as passive. 
Various explanations are given of the origin of Monotheism 
but they are not reconciled. 
Rightly asserting that religion is a warm personal relation- 
ship, he objects to the proofs of the existence of God which 
treat the deities as external things, but he affirms that the 
idea of God is really derived from the senses seeing that the 
wishes spring from the senses. The theogonic Wish is discussed 
and/ 
Summary of Argument 
and the wish is defined as the expression of a want, a slave 
with the will of freedom and the desire for happiness. From 
this point of view intellectualism in religion and rigorism in 
morals are to be attacked. Religion would appear to be innate 
in man as the feeling of absolute dependence and as the desire 
evidencing. 
for happiness for these are inevitable and self-Mtn-EA-MX 
Happiness is discussed at length, and it seems that religion 
has a universal reference since happiness is cosmic in its 
claim and requires God the Creator as the ground of its satisPe. 
faction. 
Conscience and Right are also discussed generally from the 
empirical standpoint. Conscience does not require a God for 
man wills that there be amoral order. The idea of a Social 
Contract is rejected, for religion and social history goes back 
to Nature and the family. 
Seeking to discredit anthropomorphism he asserts that the 
Symbol is also the thing, and in any case it is pantheistic and 
not theistic. Religion is distinguished from morality by the 
difference of prayer from action and of wish from work. 
In conclusion we may say the book shows a sharpening of de- 
finitions without much real progress. The feeling of absolute 
dependence has almost disappeared, the Glückseligkeitstreb&b tak 
its place, but Nature remains still inexorable. 
Feuerbach's confession that his works are fragmentary re- 




Summary of Argument 
Critical Examination of Feuerbach's Argument. 
Section 1/ 
Introductory; the influence of his personäity 
and of contemporary politics and thought; his desire for real- 
ity and his anti -Hegelianism. 
Many elements are involved in Feuerbach's argument and re- 
quire separate consideration so that an outline of topics to be 
dealt with is given. We notice here (1) his personal de- 
sire for reality and his interest in religion and religious 
literature. He denies that he is an atheist, and while refut- 
ing Stirner's charge of giving us only a theological deliver- 
ance from religion seems not averse to the designation 'pious'. 
The positive part of W.C. is for him the most important part, 
for he desires to retain the ethical elements in religion. His 
search for reality threw him back to Nature and Sensibility and 
to Man as a creature of earth, but in abandoning the reference 
to a transcendental object he no longer deals with religion. 
(2) His reaction from Hegel is mentioned by him as the clip 
to his theory, for he battles against the abstract inhumanity 
of philosophy, but his Realism which had a religious as well as 
a philosophical motive at the beginning passes into naturalism. 
Sinnlichleit'represents reality aga1 t thought, but is not to b 
taken abstractly so as to form a dualism over against Spirit. 
Although it passes over into the larger conception of Man, and 
man is separate from the animals by reason of his self -consciou 
ness, the emphasis continues to lie on sense- experience. 
He/ 
Summary of Argument. 
He puzzles his friends as much as his enemies by his assert- 
ion that he is not a materialist, for he is pledged to self - 
consciousness and morality, but his review of Moleschott's book 
is friendly and he criticises the 'spiritualist' position. It 
is claimed that he anticipated 'psycho -physical parallelism' in 
his theory of 'Organismus'. The problem is left unsolved but 
in favour of sensibility. 
Section 2/. empirical, inductive, 
His Method psychological and analytical. 
His method is dictated by his realistic impulse, the desir( 
Go get away from the oriental language of imagery and self -suf- 
ficient speculation. Consequently he is somewhat apologetic 
about the philosophic material and the theological atmosphere 
in his book, W.C. Over against Bauer and Strauss he deals with 
Christianity as it appears in Christian men, not as dogma or 
doctrine. Hence his quotations from Luther and Augustine. 
But can history and analysis give us the essence of Christ. 
ianity ? Leese,p5,quotes Troeltsch and Hegel to the contrary. 
A personal decision is necessary, yet history has its own wit - 
nes' =. for the open mind. Further, Feuerbach claiming to be 
historical is not so. His enquiry is more psychological than 
historical, determined by an analysis of human activities, of 
which a Schema is given in Section 3/. We have really an a 
priori construction, not an induction. His task, he says, is tc 
solve a psychological riddle, unnecessary because history has 
already/ 
Summary of Argument 
Z6, 
already - solved it. Jodl explains the new thing in ieuerbach 
to be his understanding of the practical,passive, not to say 
pathological character of religion, but the emphasis is more on 
the latter than on the former. 
Leuba as the modern Feuerbach quoted by Wobbermin proves 
the religious belief in God to be an indefensible illusion, 
since empirical psychology is the appropriate scientific dis- 
cipline in the case. 
Section 3/ 
(A) Feuerbach's Psychological Schema of the 
human powers, involvOing his theory of Man, Nature, and God.: 
and (B) the Stages by which the transition is made from 
Nature to Man as the object of religion. 
0A) Man consisting of mind affection and will, a well -balanced 
Schema shows season with Science,Nature, Law, Morality, and the 
Race over against Feeling, Imagination, the Heart, God,rraith, 
and individual Immortality. The decisive contrast is between 
Reason and Feeling, Nature and God. 
Reason is not distinguished from Understanding and is the 
scientific and unbribable part of our nature, linked to Nature 
which is not so easily defined and haunts Feuerbach to the end. 
Challenged as to his interpretation of Nature, he declares she 
the divinity of Nature 
is not God, yet AM/is the basis of all religion as man is the 
aim. The relation between basis and aim is neuer satisfactor- 
ily dealt with. There appear to be three meanings given to Nat 
ure/ 
Summary of trgument . 
sense 
ure,l. sense -material or1objects : 2. the realm of scienee: 
3. the eternal uncomprehended unconscious Power behind all. 
The other side of the Schema presents us with a view of 
Feeling and Imagination joined to the idea of God and develop- 
ed through a criticism of Jacobi and Schleiermacher. .with re- 
, 
gard to the latter the criticism touches the Reden more than the 
larger "Der 6hristliche Glaube" and is unfair to the wider doct. 
rine of feeling which the latter book develops. The feeling 
of absolute dependence does refer beyond itself, though the re- 
lation indicated is only of the slightest fashion. There are 
for Schleiermacher three grades of eonsciousness, of which the 
feeling of absolute dependence i2 the highest, no longer the 
psychological 'feeling' co- ordinate with 'knowing'and 'willing' 
but the form of rationality in man corresponding to the object- 
ive rational principle, God, the supreme causality and unity. 
It is to be admitted that the richness of Sc ,leiermacher's 
thought, a speculative and romantic monism combined with a his- 
torical teleology, leads to difficulties for himself and for his 
commentators. There are damaging suggestions of subjectivity 
but he means us to see in religious experience an objective re- 
ference and a genuine validity. 
It is important to notice that .,euerbach recognises an ob- 
jective reference in the feeling of absolute dependence, but 
as Nature is both despised and exalted and as the relation be- 
tween Nature and Man is never satisfactorily decided, absolute 
dependence giving place to original dependence, we are left wit 
three/ 
Summary of Argument. 
three theories of religion not related finally to one another, 
1. where Nature is the object of this feeling of absolute de 
pendence : 2.where God is a phantasy, a cmature of the theogon- 
ic wish: 3. where the dace is the true divine reality. 
(B ) 
The transition from Nature to ï)Ian as the object of Re- 
ligion is marked by three stages: 
al,. by the distinction between the basis and aim of religion, 
Nature and Man respectively, though it is alleged that Christ- 
ianity ignores Nature;and in religion the above distinction 
aim falls away in so far as man's higher aims constitute the 
basis of his life as man. 
2. by a change in the interpretation of the feeling of ab- 
solute dependence so that it becomes 'Egoismus'. The change is 
effected through his doctrine of Need, not Wish only. Man 
seeks an instrument against that upon which he is dependent. 
Against the earlier atheists and pantheists he says that not 
fear only but joy gratitude reverence are the grounds of relig- 
ion. The primitive feeling of dependence is enlarged so that 
man's desires are brought actively and not merely passively in- 
:to relation with Nature. He thus isolates Man from Nature, 
which he censures Theism for doing, without recognising that he 
his idea of 
has changed /Nature . This Egoismus is unselfish, social and 
has even cosmic relations. 
420.7 UJL c;,,, W.0 
3. by anAexplanationnof the origin of religion in the self - 
conscious nature of Man which constitutes an essential differ- 
ence/ 
Summary of ftrgument. 2g 
ence between man and the brute, by which a man separates him- 
self from himself, and also from his species. religion is and 
can be nothing else than the consciousness of the infinite 
which man has of his own not limited and finite but infinite 
nature. This consciousness of the infinite is nothing else 
than the consciousness of the infinity of consciousness. 
By definition therefore man is shut up within the circle of 
his own nature, regarded not as individual but as social, for 
the individual may not transfer his limitations to the Race. He 
can rise above himself as an individual but not above the Race 
which constitutes his infinite because he cannot be aware of its 
limitations as he can of his own. 
The antithesis and human is therefore illusory, 
nothing else than the antithesis between human nature in gener- 
:al and the human individual. Theology is therefore anthropology, 
But this account of the knowledge of the infinite requires 
further consideration. 
Summary of Argument. 
Chap V. continued. ( criticism ) 
Section 4. 
29. 
Consciousness of the infinite as infiniVy of 
consciousness, and the Religious Phenomenalism of Feuerbach. 
Summary of previous argument. The aim of Feuerbach is to 
keep the infinite of which man is undoubtedly conscious within 
the limits of the Race, by the limitation of knowledge to hum- 
an or sense- perceived objects, by a statement of the relation 
of predicate to subject which denies the existence of the sub- 
ject when reference is made to God, and by emphasis upon the 
varieties of religion. The result is Phenomenalism in all our 
knowledge. 
We may admit that the idea of God varies with changes in 
human conditions and ideas, but hold that an objective reference 
is always implied and that the idea of God is never exhausted b; 
such experiences, while theological ór religious ideas have in- 
fluenced social ideas as well as vice versa. 
The relation of subject to predicate and of knowledge to 
reality takes us into the history dif the discussion carried on 
by Locke Berkeley and Hume, to the dualism of Cartesianism, 
Hume's sceptical distinction between 'impressions' and 'ideas', 
and Kant's enquiry as to the a priori elements in experience. 
Kant's doctrine of the 'thing -in- itself' and Phenomenalism was 
a bad legacy. He attacks the Ontological argument for the ex- 
istence of God especially and with his doctrine of 'Ideas' he 
destroys the 'illusion'of previous theology.. Being is not a 
real predicate. The test of reality belongs entirely to the 
field of experience. 
We/ 
Summary of Argument So. 
We must however remember Kant's important qualifications, room 
is left for experience other than sensible, he wishes to abol- 
ish knowledge to make room for belief. The 'Ideas' of God,free- 
dom and immortality are retained and reinstated in the Critique 
of Practical Reason. He looks beyond the division of theoretic- 
al and Practical Reason to a systematic unity of ends. 
But Feuerbach will not accept this extension of Reason to 
the noumenal world. God is not unknown, but known as the Race. 
Nor will he accept Hegel's critical restatement of the Onto- 
logical argument and the leap of thought into the supersensible. 
He is a n®minalist, for whom Reason is analytic not synthetic, 
and thus dissolves the subject into the predicate, leaving us 
with a Phenomenalism which extends to all knowledge and over- 
throws his original naive Realism. Human agreement becomes the 
first criterion of truth. 
But Hegel is right when he points out that thinking is not 
a barrier but a bridge to reality and that self- consciousness 
is not self- contained. Feuerbach's references to 'objectivity' 
really take us to sensibility and to ' sense- objects' and do not 
really save him from Phenomenalism. Both subject and accident 
fall within the sphere of sensibility (v Grundsátze). 
Sensibility is understood in a larger sense than usual in 
what he calls the new philosophy, as the mother of all knowledg( 
the true and divine, being certain immediately through itself. 
Bolin and Jodl defend Feuerbach from the charge of being a 
vulgar sensualist of the pre -Kantian school,referring to para- 
graph 48 Grundsátze for a fresh and significant account of the 
relation/ 
Summary of rgument . 
relation of perception to thought. apart from semsibility we 
have only the criterion of truth of the speculative philosophy, 
non -contradiction which does not give any decision whether the 
truth conceived is also truth in reality. In consequence also 
by thinking 
it is impossible to rationalise reality wholly /because reality 
is broken into individuals by perception. 
But feuerbach admits that self- consciousness is real, does 
not decide the relation of thought to sense, while it has to be 
perception 
pointed out that sense-XXO4NTANAA is only one part of exper- 
ience, that immediacy of feeling is claimed for religion, that 
a completed system is made difficult not by sense -experience 
only but by moral and religious experience also and that despit 
this difficulty we may find and employ ruling principles to 
give the coherence which philosophy and religion bath seek. 
Summary: because of his narrow empiricism, self -consciousfte 
ness in his theory is out of touch with the transcendental, God 
the divine subject is exhausted in his predicates, is simply 
human nature universalised, or the realised wish of the heart, 
and belief in his existence is an illusion. But like Bayle 
Feuerbach is deficient in metaphysical persistence and prefers 
the valleys of empiricism. 
Summary of Argument. 
Chap. V, continued; ( Criticism ) 
Section 5/ 
32 
The Theogonic Wish: its definite but re- 
stricted form: the cognate doctrine of Projection: and the 
argument from Need to the reality of the object. 
The 2bogonic Wish is closely associated with other elements 
in Feuerbach's subjective theory. 
1. 
Four points will be emphasised in the argument, his restrict 
2. 3. 
ed views of Wish in religion and of Projection: there is an 
argument from need to reality justifiable under certain circum- 
4. 
stances, but metaphysics and not psychology must decide. 
(I) Contact with modern psychology is evident, for the so -call- 
ed ',''ish, says Holt (The Freudian Wish) is now the unit of psych- 
ology replacing the older unit,sensation, and Feuerbach would 
agree,with rationalistic reservations,that life as a whole is 
dynamic, but he would reject Holt's view of Wish as cognitive. 
His restricted use of Wish in religion is due to his distinct,- 
ion between necessary and unnecessary wishes determined by Nat- 
ure and Reason, the foes of religion. His argument therefore a 
'petitio principii'. Examplesof his application of the prin- 
ciple of the Theogonic Wish show that he himself is the victim 
of phantasy. He does not do justice to its admitted force and 
inevitability, though he recognises that if religion be abolish- 
ed something must be substituted. Culture and. Science will sup- 
ply all necessary means to happiness in the end. Mill follows 
the same line, but this solution is unsatisfactory. 
He is also unjust to Affection or Feeling which though an 
essential/ 
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essential is not a co- ordinate principle of man's nature. Yet 
the imagination is not so wild but that it is controlled by the 
Heart and by Christ; of this an eloquent illustration is given. 
The heart with its necessity and power is not clearly defined 
nor is a satisfactory answer given to the question why Jesus 
should be the norm for the imagination... only that religion 
tends to unity and Jesus is or was seen and touched, thus satisl 
fying'the last criterion of reality.' Doubtless the moral qual' 
ities of Christ are in the background, but he accepts the myth 
theory of his person and decides the question by his first prier, 
ciples. We are further entitled task whether this necessity of 
feeling is a part of Nature and so entitled to its say. Hence 
a larger theory is needed than the one which Feuerbach offers. 
( II) The Mechanism by which the Theogonic Wish operates is 
Projection,'the mystery of religion', which is variously de- 
scribed. 
Six characteristics of Projection are;: mentioned, but these 
represent views too narrow in the light of modern Psychology, 
which exhibits points of agreement and difference with Feuer - 
bach. It is no great mystery and its extended use is illus. 
trated by quotations from Hadfield and Tansley, while Leuba 
says it creates an unreal personal order whose existence has a 
survival value for us. Feuerbach is uncertain in his state- 
ments whether any object is really there to be idealised. 
Further Psychology cannot decide upon the validity or truth 
of the projection, nor does the claim that psycho -analysis re- 
veals/ 
Summary of hrgument 
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'l 
veals facts as well as processeS justify itself in view If the 
personal experience of W.Brown that the purifying work of anal 
ysis leaves religion stronger. Alio its arguments in explanat- 
ion of religion are too much pre -occupied with the pathoiogica1 
and for this 's obbermin and. Brown criticise r'reud. 
Yet it is granted that wishes and imagination have played a 
large part in religion though not the essence of it, and herein 
a danger exists as H.N.Wieman shows. But three things qualify 
this admission: other forces in society also provide illusions, 
religion craves reality and condemns falseness, and religion is 
not to be traced to the pleasure -principle. R.H.Huttm in an 
essay on the influence of the wish declares it affects the san- 
guine but not the pessimistic nor the man who has forced his 
mind to weigh all contrary evidence. Also Christianity sets 
forth Christ as the truth, religion according to Whitehead is 
adaptation to facts, and the religious feeling does not always 
express itself in anthropomorphises,( with Otto as Otherness,or 
the Numinous, with Pratt as dïana' ) but emphasises the unlike- 
ness as well as the likeness between God and man. 
( III ) 
Art and Science as well as religion employ Pro- 
jection. That the truth of Science is pictorial and,human is 
shown by quotations from Needham, Eddington etc. ' by its se- 
lection of values the mind may be said to have created its 
physical environment.' Science is also Anthropology. 
In religion as in science the use of human experience does 
not prevent us from beiflg in touch with reality and there are 
tests/ 
ùummary of Argument 35. 
tests within human experience to save us from error. 
The 'complex' of the scientist leads him to seek harmony in 
a simplified scheme and project a unity upon the details of ex- 
istence illuminative of himself as well as of reality. But 
Psychology is not to be confused with Epistemology. 
( IV ) 
Feuerbach gives no satisfactory examination of the 
Wishes,Desires,and Needs of men, but the Rev W.L.Davidson's 
Burnett Lectures take up this question and argue from the ex- 
istence of a need to the existence of God. Want for the latter 
is desire as an index of reality because organic to a system of 
satisfactions. The Theogonic Wish would seem to have its place 
among the permanent personal and insatiable longings he describ. 
es, giving a kind of Ontological Argument. Feuerbach would 
say this gives no more than a God by hypothesis or a means to 
satisfaction. 
Using the term 'Instinct' current today, we may place his 
theory in relation to the four fundamental Instincts described 
by Professor Paterson in his Gifford Lectures, self -affirmation 
self -abnegation, the tender emotion, and curiosity; and in the 
last we discover a deficiency in Feuerbach, for it would make 
religion cosmic and universal. 
According to modern scholars these instincts refer beyond 
themselves and survive because successful in obtaining satisfac 
zion. Emphasis is given to this conclusion by the saying of 
Kant that the world is not providentially fitted for man. Yet 
man discovers new needs to be satisfied in Art and Religion. 
These/ 
Summary of Argument. 36. 
These instincts, being in man, are of more than biological 
significance and three points of criticism are made against a 
'Psychology of Instincts', but this biological treatment is 
suggestive and helpful. 
Our interest is specially in man's longing for Unity and 
in its religious origin (Ritschl & Oman), which Feuerbach would 
not deny though his idealism AlAWNAXAKIX is subordinated to his 
docttine of Feeling. Reason is conative as well as cognitive. 
Psychoanalysis as well as philosophy and religion is in 
terested in this urge to unity harmony and health. Prof. Alex- 
ander declares the passion for God is a real appetite¡ but the 
guarantee of the validity of these satisfactions is a matter 
for Philosophy. 
Summary; Feuerbach's treatment is limited but opens up 
large problems of the reality of experience gener- 
ally,the discussion of which indicates that there 
is a longing after God which is cognitive of an 
actual existence. 
7 
Summary of Argument. 
Chap. V.continued. (riticism) 
Section 6/ 
Religion as anthropocentric because pkractical :Morality 
as the truth and reality of Religion. 
By a negative criticism Feuerbach seeks to prove the above 
statement, and our problem is to consider if this criticism 
applies only to an external relationship of the two or whether 
an organic relationship can be found to preserve both Religion 
and Morality. 
'Bayle'opens the attack:'Theology tears up Ethics by the roots 
But the strife of religion clan be explained if not defended and 
it suggests that Religion and Morality are really different, 
though Feuerbach has his explanation of the difference by means 
of imagination etc. Three things give plausibility to 
the position of Feuerbach. 
To the 'Reward -- Theology' as stated by Paley Spinoza's dictum 
is justified,'Blessedness is virtue itself', though historically 
something can be said for a 'Reward -Theology'. Fichte also makes 
protest against this doctrine and the story of Heine's conver- 
sation with Hegel illustrates the same. 
The 'Postulate- Theology' of Kant is mentioned with reference 
to 'Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason', K.R.V., K.P.V. 
the analysis of a rational will and the three forms of the Cate- 
gorical Imperative. The synthetic connection between Virtue and 
Happiness requires a further ground to render the connection in- 
telligible. Does Kant therefore justify Feuerbach ? Some con- siderations/ 
Summary of Argument. Chap V. Sect.6/ 
R. as pract. 
siderations to the contrary are given. Kant's discussion of 
a ..n ethical 'Want'. Is it subjective ? The problem of the right- 
eous but non -believing man is illustrated from 'The Critique of 
Judgment'. Kierkegaard_'s three stages from worldliness to re- 
ligion are mentioned, and Kant's three suggestions for an escape 
from subjectivity, especially through a 'Kingdom of Ends'. 
The theological successors of Kant arecriticised by Leese, 
because their doctrine of the value - judgment shows them to be 
infected with the virus of Feuerbach, and the demand is made for 
a Christian world -view dealing with the fundailental traits of all 
reality. Four points are mentioned where the Ritschlian Theo- 
logy gives hostages to Feuerbach, and Garvie's Ritschlian Theo- 
logy" is quoted for and against. Ritschl himself has a refer- 
ence to Feuerbach (vol.111,206 J & R ). 
Criticism of an external association of Religion with Morality 
is justified, and a 'Postulate- Theology' is contrary to the spirit 
of Christian humility. 
The appeal to Revelation may be said to leave us in the circle 
of human valuations only if we regard human experience as phen- 
omenal and all our values to be invented not discovered. 
There must be an organic relation between Religion and Morality 
for it is so unsatisfactory to isolate the Categorical Imperative, 
Feuerbach himself slips back into'psychological utilitarianism', 
and there is ambiguity in the use of the word'desire'. Hegel's 
criticism of 'Moralism' is given (Phenomen. 1,369). 
Though organically related Religion and -Morality are not 
identical/ 
Summary of Argument. Chap.V Sect.6/ 
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identical. The 'Holy' has also ethical characters. Jodl's 
remarks on Fichte's doctrine of the harmony between the individ- 
ual and the universal self show us the need of some unity, and 
Fichte's statement of religion as rooted in the one fundamental 
life is quoted. 
Religion is practical, but as the Practice of the Presence o 
God alike in duty and in faith. 
Summary of }argument 40. 
Chap. V, continued; ( Criticism ) 
Section 7. 
Society as divine the true object of Religion 
with reference to Durkheim and others. 
Feuerbach' social theory of religion is related to other 
parts of his teaching and the principle that Theology is Anthro 
apology involves emphasis on the social nature of man and the 
importance of society. The individual shares with others the 
infinite consciousness and practically also Feuerbach claims 
to be 'Gemein- Tensch', Communist. In his doctrine of Tu -ism, 
(VWR 4 he declaresnmy fellow -man is my objective conscience, 
but he is too contemptuous of common opinion and too great an 
individualist to be consistent. Also, anxious to retain the 
Categorical Imperative he rests it,with 'das natürliche Ober', 
on the cosmic powers of Nature and of the Ideal, contrasting 
his position favourably with that of Theists. Stirner says 
he splits the individual into two parts, essential and non -esr- 
sential, and Feuerbach certainly leaves the sense of obligat- 
ion like self- consciousness in the air. 
He uses great licence in stating the theological implic- 
ations of his theory. "Man with man, the unity of I and Thou, 
is God." In this unity is the mystery of the Trinity and the 
highest and last principle of philosophy. "God is nothing else 
than the species invested with a mystical form." 
Distasteful to many, this view has attracted others, like 
Mill and Comte. Mill's Three Essays on Religion give a qualif- 
ied recommendation and Comte elaborates his theory of the three 
stages/ 
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stages of human development ( both independent of Feuerbach). 
Lange mentions two points in which Feuerbach differs from Comt.i 
The Marxian economists, as well as Leuba, accept the theory, 
Engels denying religion because associated with servitude and 
Lenin because it is the opium of the people, Grüppe's theory 
on similar lines is quoted as stated and criticised by !Vobberm 
Feuerbach seems to have most affinity with Durkheim,whosE 
work, "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life ", is dealt will 
more closely. Religion is presented as real, with its roots 
in man's dual nature, as practical, the expression of a need, 
and with cosmological aspects, yet merely human. But the sur- 
vival of an institution implies that it is founded in the naturE 
of things, an argument directed against Comte and Ty$b r. Also 
if the origin of religion be popular, it cannot be mere illus- 
ion. Like every human institution religion did not commence 
anywhere, yet a two -fold origin of religion is stated without 
being harmonised, Ian's dual nature and the need for support. 
and shelter 
Society can both discipline /the individual. Yet there is a 
larger setting, for while Society has all that is necessary to 
arouse the sensation of the divine and its authority is due to 
venerable respect', are there not additional non -social ele- 
ments here? And it is durely incongruous to assert as Durk- 
heim does that religlon,a pupil and creature of Society,is also 
the mother of social institutions, or that the moral conscience 
always uses religious symbols: nor can the French Revolution 
with its deification of Society be considered a normal time. 
Like Feuerbach he uses imagination and projection to ex- 
plain/ 
4e. 
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p,iain the objectivity of religion, the sacred qualities being 
added to the object, any object, This may suit his theory of 
Totemism, but why is the projection so inevitable, continuous, 
and selective ? If, as explained, social action is circuitous3 
and obscure, will enlightenment end religion, or will new grounds 
for belief be sought ? 
According to Durkheim, logical concepts as well as relig- 
ious ideas have a social origin. The empiricism of Hume de- 
prives them of their characteristic properties of universality 
and necessity. Reason has a supreme and irremovable authority. 
The categories because social are not only social,i.e., are not 
without foundation if the nature of things, 
Like Feuerbach but with less confidence he confuses social 
agreement with the ideal of truth. But the relation of truth 
to reality is primary and to society secondarily. Hence in 
truth and in religion there is a reference to something object- 
ive. his method of naturalism is at fault. Resentful of the 
dogmatic claims of religion to knowledge, he reminds us like 
Leuba that religion itself is the subject of science. The em- 
phasis upon the practical side of religion in this theory is so 
great that the intellectual contribution it makes is neglected. 
To sum up, religion is something superimposed on reality, yet 
it has an authority of its own although the reality it express- 
es may be different from our ideas. 
Two questions emerge from the discussion, ( A ) Will relig- 
ion survive ? or,Is it only a primitive and passing phase of 
Culture ? According to Feuerbach, it is possessed of personal 
interest/ 
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interest and a personal relation to Nature as a whole, hence it 
may co -exist with other states of mind, and the changes ofoc- 
iety which take place within the larger circle of Nature. But 
Nature may end both religion and man. Feuerbach is ambiguous 
as to man's dendence on or superiority to î:ature. He speaks 
of Necessity in human lifemeaning human nature and its laws, 
but his 'natürliche Über' resting on cosmic powers constitutes 
another Necessity. Man cannot be our last thought, therefore 
religion constitutes a permanent element in life distinct from 
the social. 
(B) Is the religion of divine Society sufficient ? 
No doubt =OM religious and social development interact, yet 
religion with independent authority helps to form and to destroy 
social judgments,surviving the hate and the help of states. 
Also, Society has limitations intellectual and practical which 
refute its claims here. It is an imperfect infinite. Nature 
heeds not our cries. The desire for unity remains unsatidfied 
Religion, Feuerbach admits, is not just morality. 
If theology is to become anthropology, there are limitat- 
ions and losses to be accepted, and this is not so easy as some 
think. Man wants the 'absolute' in religion, some final deal- 
ing in relation to forgiveness and immortality. The failure of 
Society as divine to satisfy men is at least a negative argu- 
ment against the illusoriness of religion. 
Summary of Argument 
Chap. V, continued. 
Section 8. 
( C;riticism ) 
`tY 
The recent attack on Humanism by Karl Barth 
and Brunner. 
The powerful criticism of Barth and Brunner in their two 
books, 'The Word of God' and 'The Word and the World' respect - 
ively,are in purpose constructive,asserting the reality of God 
and to consider themover against the doctrine of Feuerbach is 
instructive. They are engaged largely with similar problems 
and even employ similar terms. 
Though professedly only a view -point Barth's theory is very 
comprehensive and he is influenced by the many movements of the 
day to which he says our final wow- should not be surprise or 
opposition. His varied qualifications are mentioned and the 
picture of contempory life, with the four corner -stones of the 
prison in which we all live,is described. 
Brunner's greater lucidity is welcome. Even in his religions 
he says,man wants autonomy, and he castigates 'Scientists', not 
Science but the idea that Science has spoken the ultimate truth, 
and behind it the 'Titanism' or self -sufficiency of man. But 
it is difficult to grasp the relation in his theory of Faith or 
revelation to Reason or metaphysics. His reference to Schleier 
macher,' whose combination of idealism and humanism runs out in- 
to a colossal self -deception' is unsympathetic. More accurate 
is his criticism of the religious subjectivism where truth is 
experience and revelation religious thought. 
To escape from immanental theories Revelation is absolutely 
necessary/ 
/5. 
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necessary. Luther is quoted with approval though Lutheranism 
is rebuked for misrepresenting Christian truth, but it is ad- 
mitted that changes are taking place. Lutheranism is however 
`sib)to the German soul. given Zwingli and Calvin are challeng -'j 
ed by Barth, and a quotation is given summarising the differ- 
ence between the Reformed and the Lutheran schools. The dis- 
cussion is more than a provincial quarrel. 
Brunner denies the similarity between Christian and non - 
Christian Revelation. The latter is only the natural fruitage 
of man and genius is a quantitative not a qualitative concept- 
ion. If Christianity is only a modification of general relig- 
and 
ious /metaphysical knowledge, it is an illusion. The truths 
of re%on which he analyses have their source and content in man 
and stand over against the action of God. 
He seems to consider all modern theologians as 'Humanists'. 
Two definitions of Humanism, by Lippman ánd Potter, show how it 
is commonly understood. The truths of reason, he saya, are a 
monologue, but God interrupts this monologue as Subject not as 
experienced Object. But to -day revelation becomes the discov- 
ery of a new depth in my world. On the contrary,before God 
speaks, he as personality is absolute mystery. 
Any natural revelation of God is denied and man's way to God 
is barred. If asked,How do we receive revelation ?, these 
writers reply that it comes indirectly, in an antithegtical and 
dialectical manner, by contradiction between two sets of ideas, 
God and Man, grace and responsibility etc. Barth declares this 




ation can be given of the 8entre. A good deal of ingenious 
AXAM used to show that the method is through para- 
anf n 
al:ne. 
ha.:-monious balancing. The synthesis is in God 
criticism f Kant's Ethics Barth shows the great need 
of man to possess the true word. How in the theory of Kant is 
the moral n connected with the actual world and whence his 
newer ? he wholly unable to realise the demand upon his na' 
=al will exce-ct a still more amazing act of faith. The quel 
the good I.tltes tie cuestion how it is to be realised. 
Feuertacn. Earth seeks reality and to present man as he 
really is/and bot' hold to this present world, but their con- il 
ception of an and of God differ. Summary of the teaching of 
the Hartntan Sc-no.:l here. 7 lrner asserts that God is the com- 
piste anf man acquires a truly personal 
existence ny aa ne receives it rtn the hand of God. God is 
not to be fes:ribef b.:7 the abstract terms of metaphyslcs,such 
as,'the -otlf bund°. He iz the Creator, and alone has the 
initiative, et the =ecret of the lord is that he wills to havE 
communion 7ith sinful men. At t'ne same time he is not the ser- 
vant of man anf he has greater 71,rk to do than saving souls, AIM 
enE the Son LE n:t in -7 Le.La-_:r but the mediator for the 
loes this thea77 s::.-,e ;'ebarn problem of man's 
imprisonment -,T1'n ? a0Me sugested crit- 
iciam4, as from Feuerbsch are, tnat be would have welcomed this 
frank statement _e,-upernaturalism as 
a 111 ore 
accurate 
stat ment/ 
Summary of Argument. Barth etc. 
statement than usual, but the doctrine of God takes us back to 
Scholasticism with its 'aseity' and theological ethics. Sin, 
repentence etc can have no moral but only a theological content,' 
Like Hegelianism it is Absolutism, though of will and not of 
thought. further, religion here as elsewhere has its origin 
in XX a need and its nature is practical and even pathological 
Finally the doctrine of Revelation, here so prominent, is the 
characteristic illusion of religion. 
The reply of the school would probably be. The Transcend- 
ence of God is not unrelated to man, and the separation between' 
God and man is not meant to be ultimate, but restoration comes 
through the divine initiative only, bringing with it not only 
reunion but revival of life. 
The situation is clarified by Brunner's reference to God as 
the pure Subject, as Action, as Personality. Against Feuerbachs'. 
phenomenalism he asserts personality to be both exclusive and 
inclusive and to have its secrets and reserve. Can we deny to 
God what we allow to man, a right to his own life ? Because ofl 
this reserve there is a way fy,IIm'there' to 'here'. Besides 
people 
countless assert that this revelation has actually taken place. 
Religion is not the creation of a need, for the quality of 
the need is such that it could not create it. The fundamental 
difference with regard to sin is what separates Feuerbach and 
this school. Feuerbach's is an intellectual euem mathematical 
interpretation, whereas sin is theological first and social only 
second. Also,psychology and autosuggestion do not carry us 
down into the real consciousness of sin. 
The/ 
ary of Argument. Earth etc. 
43. 
The proof ,,y_tEtence is asimitt by Brun-her to be 
di.ff'4cult, for faith is a personal decision carrying its own 
aertainty, and 1f this dangerously subjective he anneals 
to the witn,asa ;.lr't, where men are taloen beyond the 
common distinotton of ah aritati7e or heteronomous and individ- 
7 =ne ,ord of the Spirit never becomes, our 
wor7; ad so " 4s hatrevealed by psychological analysis. He 
the i5rna,Tre-7:g.KI;ai by attacking the psychological method 
and its claims, for it dissolves all norms of truth and validity 
even sfic 
ta 
Crisis offers a real and useful 
give us a. 'sure word', and rids us 
of --e_er_Eph's E -:n:=. phrases. Religion is practical for 
a for _an. It is his affair as well as ours. 
There are defects an limitations, the excessive dualism, 
the treatment af our ennerience as subjective because ours, a 
ret-urn to The reserve of God may endanger moral 
Issues and 1_ e E:-eal of the Saviour be lost in the louder toneE 
of e :12dge-and Creator. There is ambiguity as to the content 
of reTelt-on,t_e 'Tord of By the emphasis upon the super. 
atural there is a danger :f extolling the irrational in relig 
ion, on::-' , to the :etter of the school. 
corrective of Humanism, it is "r-,1=ITA itself in need of 
correction but the principle of the cectivity as against the 
illusio of religion is at the heart of it and profoundly true. 
Summary of Argument 
chap. V. continued; ( briticism) 
Section 9. 
49 
Feuerbach's appeal to Luther unjustifiable. 
In his writings Feuerbach mattes frequent appeal to Luther 
for support for his subjective theory of religion. Of an Ar- 
ticle, entitled 'Das : resen des Glaubens im Sinne Luther's',1844 
S.W. I.p259, he says it constituted a turning point in his 
thinking, for the philosopher becomes the man. Like Luther he 
enjoyed a transforming experience and plays a reformer's part. 
Greedily he utilises what Luther has to say of personal relige 
ion, and the close relation between human need and the divine 
response, so that ' it was Protestantism which first drew from 
this relativity of God its true result the absoluteness of man. 
ie note his view of the Reformation that it marked the abatOF 
donment of the otherworldliness of the Church and the entrance 
of secular existence upon its rights, as well as the separation 
of supernatural religion from supernatural morality. here in- 
deed is the source of modern Materialism. 
But in reply it must be pointed out that Luther did not leavE 
the 'natural man' to be ruled by his own desires. 'The Liberty 
of the Christian man' implies a sacred vocation from God, and XI 
the same is true in his address to the Nobility of the German 
Nation. In the'Smaller Catechism' we read,'The Commandments 
imply that we should fear and love God', while the Augsburg Con' 
fesston, Art.XX, enjoins the performance of good works but says 
that man is too weak to do good works without faith and out of 
Christ. 
Of/ 
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Of greater interest is the question whether Luther's theol :A 
is humanistic as Feuerbach affirms. It is true that Luther em- 
phasises our need and our personal appropriation,using homely 
illustrations. Eut Feuerbach admits Luther retains the idea of 
God for and in himself and that his doctrine seems contrary to 
his own. This however is only at the beginning, and by the ap- 
lication of the 'theogonic wish' he draws the conclusion that 
faith and God are correlatives and God the satisfied self -love 
of the Christian man. 
As for Luther's belief in Revelation, revelation depends on 
human capacity, it appeals to objective fact, i.e. sense- exper- 
ience, and not argument, and it exhibits the characteristic il- 
lusion of the religious consciousness. 
Reconciliation is only with the anger of God not with his 
being and it is through Jesus, the real force. The Incarnation 
is at the root of theological ideas and contradictions. 
In reply, Luther emphasises the personal aspect of religion 
but not as Feuerbach understands it, and in this he is not a- 
part from the Church Catholic; also, for Luther Eavelation is 
the Word of God and as professor he expounds it, his conservat- 
ism and even literalism are evident at the Marburg Colloquy 
and in his attitude to the Enthusiasts; in reference to mir- 
acles he is content to say,'God has said it'. 
It is true that Luther is not content with an external 
authority, but he found peace in the verse,'The just shall live 
by faith' and declared that amid freedom of interpretation of 
Scripture the Spirit is the guide, and Christ is the touchstone 
of/ 
Summary of Argument 
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of divine truth. 
For Luther Christ is no mere man, though he ha,d a new under- 
standing of the human side of our Lord and seems to ascribe to 
the Christian man unique and divine qualities. But it is fund 
mental to his theology that Christ became man . There is no 
deification of Christ for he is already divine. In Jesus the 
unique Son of God we lay hold of God who is able and willing t 
make himself known. 
The two men differ fundamentally in their idea of God and 
their view of the practical nature of religion. The satisfact 
ion which came to Luther was a religious and not a moral one. 
He had tried human machinery. 
There are not only Christian but mystical and mediaeval 
elements in Luther's idea of God and he did not mean that God 
is lost in the revelation Christ brings as his representative. 
Yet God does not contradict himself, as no Scripture uan contr 
:diet the doctrine of justifying faith. 
Feuerbach simply denies that Revelation is possible but ad- 
mits that Christians worship the human individual as God un- 
consciously, for this quality constitutes the illusion of the 
religious principle. 
To sum up, for Luther faith is receiving and man is recon- 
ciled to God only so far as he does not achieve it by himself 
or by man; Feuerbach's interpretation is governed by his own 
subjective views. Strauss in hesitating to write a biography 
of Luther for lack of sympathetic understanding of his con- 
sciousness of sin and salvation is wiser than his contemporary 
52. 
Summary. Chap.V. Section. 10. 
Religion as immediate Experience. 
Feuerbach claims that reality must be made the test of relig- 
ion and today there is a special desire for this. But by reality 
Feuerbach means 'Sinnlichkeit' or 'Ilan'. The criticism of R.H. 
Hutton is therefore justified, and corporeality is not of the 
essence of personality. h larger criterionof independent ex- 
istence is required. 
Some declare that they have an experience of the Divine as 
real as any sensation. Hume's Dialogues quoted in support of 
this and also Farmer's 'Experience of God' where he dwells on 
the 'coercive' element in religion. 
Leuba severely criticises this 'Mystic claim'. He takes three 
types, the ,,ualter's proclamation of an experience,( but does im- 
meidacy carry with it objectivity ?): the value- judgments of the 
Ritschlians, which require the services of psychology: Professor 
Henri Bois, who makes discriminating reference to the 'mystic 
claim', but with whom the metaphysical induction from the facts 
of religious experience becomes a perception. 
Leuba attempts to overwhelm the theologians with his criticism: 
the characteristic qualities of religious experience can be pro- 
duced by drugs etc.: the neglect of Psychology by theologians is 
a scandal: and they do not see that in appealing to inner exper- 
ience they have surrendered their case. 
In more philosophic fashion Leuba criticises the theories of 
James and Hocking. they leave us a mere 'That' or a theory 
elaborated by the intellect and the imagiation. Thouless also 
though friendly to religion disparages great emphasis being laid 
upon/ - 
tummar,y; dha ,V. Section 10. 
(contd 
R. as immed.Exper. 
upon 'givenness' in religion experience, for it is possible to 
say with Delacroix, 'Where the mystic postulates God, the psych- 
ologist need only postulate the subconscious'. Prof. Knudson 
also warns us against the claim of an Impirical intuition of God. 
pith these warnings and criticisms in mind we consider Prof. 
Hocking's theory as given in his book 'The Meaning of God in Hum- 
an Experience. Religion,}ie says, is more primitive than knowled- 
-gE 
Religion is immediate while lift is long. He seems in danger of 
the criticisms of Leuba and Feuerbach, for he admits that relig- 
ion is the product of desire and projection and is most suitably 
expressed in 'Feeling'. But on the other hand ge decLares that 
religion is not subjective and has always concerned itself with 
metaphysical objedts. There is a dilemma in religious knowledge, 
but 'feeling' is itself still idea. Religious feeling deals 
with some conception of the'whole'of things which is crammed with 
fulness and may be called a 'sensation', marling the line of our 
limitations but containing the soil of the future. In 'sensat- 
ion' or 'experience' God is found, for experience is essentially 
metaphysical. Nature points beyond herself, and we have also a 
sense of the reality of other !Alves, which is found to involve 
the conception of 'Other Mind'. 
Hocking's reply to Leuba would be,l/ that reality is known 
from the beginning as living Subject, and God is not an attribute 
As Bagehot said there is at ime when it is more important that 
there should be law than that there should be good law, so of the 
idea of God. We can wait for details and the correction of ex- 
perience/ 
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(contd) 
R. as Immed. Exper. 
54. 
experience in the usual objective processes of the mind. Rep= 
ligion is the parent of the Arts but always younger than the yot-- 
est. 2/ As for man' constructive activity here, (a) Man is 
first passive before he is active , (b) the will -to- believe is 
not the same as the will -to- make -believe, and religion is ineffedk 
tive unless dealing with reality, (c) some regions of reality 
are unfini -shed and there is room for activity. 
If it is said there is a circle in using knowledge of the value 
and works of religion as guide to knowledge of its nature,science 
uses the same method and knowledge here as elsewhere corrects it -' 
self. Hocking approves Schleiermacher's Fe''ling of absolute de- 
pendence but says that beyond this is the impulse to worship and 
a sense of reality and worth. 
Professor Kemp Smith's argument in his British Academy Lecture 
is now considered. Setting aside misunderstandings about relig- 
ion and certain arguments for it he concludes that the Divine 
Existence is immediately experienced and increasingly so through 
the discipline of the religions. The non- creatureli4ness of 
God is fundamental. Inference or analogy from the creaturely in 
Nature or Man is insufficient, and so far the negative criticism 
of Hume and Kant against the argument to design is unanswerable. 
Yet both these confess to an overwhelming impression of design. 
Sir Arthur Keith also admits this. 
de have therefore an obstinate 'awareness' of God in which 
mystery from the first is a chief element, though only later ex- 
piscated by 1XI reflection. This awareness is not so much 
in/ 
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R. as Im.ined. Exger. 
in feeling as in emotion (i.e. a definite situation). 
We note this awareness is not subjective but cognitive, and 
the divine attributes are theomorphic, not anthropomorphic,be- 
cause no mere enlargement of human powers. This presupposes 
the independently established existence of a Divine Being, not 
as a hypothesis but as an original metaphysical intuition, an 
a priori or ultimate. 
This experience is illustrated by our experience of other 
selves, not based on inference but direct. This Otherness of 
God is not isolated from what is other to itself and indeed re- 
quires this to a certain eattent. Religion and Morality are dis- 
tinct in origin and content. Only in connection with the cosmic 
setting of our human life do we experience the Divine. 
Hocking and Smith thus arrive at similar conclusions, but it 
may be asked if Smith allows, as he ought to do, that man is more 
than creaturely, He allows that the Divine must possess other 
attributes but even these are divine as belonging to the Divine 
Being. 
We can now briefly give a reply to Leuba. He is a psycholog- 
ist and not a metaphysician, and does not go deep enough. He 
works with an out -of -date theory of inowledge and in religion 
makes the Non +Ego passive only. Amid necessary interpretation 
of experience in religion the original quality remains, as a 
sense of the 'Whole' or 'Otherness'. Hume is ready to support 
'the adorable mysteriousness of the Divine Nature'. 
Feuerbach also rectives his answer, for this 'feeling' is cog- 
nitive/ 
Summary: Chap. V. 
contd. 
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R. as Immed. Exper. 
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nitive and in touch with reality. 
Intuititn is not opposed to Faith, as Leuba said. A will- 
attitude is necessary but is presented to us by the situation 
itself. Immediacy does not carry with it objectivity but there 
are criteria to be found to test objectivity, as Thouless points 
out. But our aim has been not to deal with the criteria, but with 
the Fact revealed in religious experience, which is no mere 'Ur- 
grand' or neurosis. 
Feuerbach's own test is applicable here. That has the charact 
er of Necessity has for me the character of objectivity. 
Summary. (contd). Section 11. 57 
Conclusions. 
Feuerbach has been shown to be a 'key -man', representatirve of 
many contemporary influences and also anticipating the psycho- 
logical interpretation of religion. 
He presents us with a Metaphysic of Naturalism, a Mechanism of 
Projection, and a Method genetic and psychological. But there 
are many loose threads and contradictions in his theory. Self - 
consciousness is not reconciled with itself or with Nature, nor 
the moral imperative with natural desire. The genetic Method 
is insufficient even for Feuerbach, for he is teleological and 
dogmatic when it suits him. Hence he gives no satisfactory 
account of religion or Christianity. The recurrence of the 
phrase 'nothing else than' is suspicious. If Christianity be 
not an illusion, the remarkable qualities it is admitted to poss- 
ess go far to prove its reality. 
In addition to these contradictions there are positive ele- 
ments in his theory which are contrary to his thesis and support 
the reality of religion, e.g. 
1/ The urge to Unity, which is not a merely intellectual argument, 
2/ The feeling of absolute dependence, which has an objective 
reference,is no mere subjective feeling satisfied with its own 
certainty, while man's freedom is in Christianity a gracious 
privil age within not against the larger sphere of dependence. 
3/ The Categorical Imperative, if dissociated from the larger 
noumenal world, does not gain but loses in authority. 
4/ The quasi -biological argument is helpful if not perfect. 
Culture as a substitute for religion is a poor thing, and Strauss 
is/ 
Summary . (contd), Section 11. 513 
Conclusions. 
is quoted. Critics of religion do not wish to abandon the name 
'religion'. 
The dilemma of religious knowledge and conduct is not soly -'' 
ed by Feuerbach because of his phenomenalism and his one -sided 
criticism of Hegel. Man though sensible and finite and evil is 
yet in touch with the infinite both intellectually and spiritual 
ly. 
Revelation is not to be set aside, for God is the Living 
Subject, and it is necessary because of the folly and sin of the 
human heart. Hume's appeal to revelation was not insincere, but 
revelation should not be based on scepticism o± irrationalism. 
Religion is synthetic integrating wholesome, as is seen in 
the contrasted experiences of George Eliot and of Livingstone. 
Psychology is limited in its explanations and usefulness, and 
the religious 'feeling' is not merely one of 'pleasure- pain'. 
Feuerbach's service to Theo1®gy is notable as well as negat- 
ive. In religion as in all moral questions the intellect is not 
enough, but a personal decision is necessary, yet this should not 
be considered as a'bolt from the blue'. 
Like his 'theogonic wish', Feuerbach's career was that of a 
slave with the will of a free -man. But there is a religious faith 
which finds rest in a Power which is other than a projection. 
1 
C H A u T}s R. I. 
The Interest and Importance of Feuerbach in relation 
to some Interpretations of Religion To -day. 
" It is come, I know hot how to be taken for granted by 
many persons, that Christianity is not so much a subject 
of enquiry; but that it is now at length discovered to be 
fictitious. And accordingly they treat it, as if, in the 
present age, this were an agreed point among all people of 
discernment; and nothing remained, but to set it up as a 
principal subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way 
of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleas- 
ures of the world." 
But er: Adv. to Analogy, Iviay, 1736 
( against the sufficiency of Natural 
Religion ) 
"Human nature, not much to its credit, is more ready 
to believe that a system denies God than that it denies 
the world. A denial of God seems so much more intelligible 
than a denial of the world. U 
Hegel, Logic. 
( of Spinoza's doctrine as acosmism 
and not atheism. 
/ 
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The Interest and Importance of Feuerbach in relation to some 
interpretationsof Religion today. 
If anyone doubted of the importance of Religion in human 
life and thought, it might be a profitable though preliminary 
argument to point out to him the never -ceasing and everchanging 
discussion which it has provoked. Surely a matter which thrusts 
itself so inevitably and so continuously before the attention 
of men cannot be either unsubstantial or without advantage. 
The quality of persistence it displays carries with it at 
least some claim to reality. 
Yet the doubt is as great today as it has ever been. Mr 
A.C. Ward in his concise and Agent review of English Literature 
"The Nineteen Twenties" writes, "At no time has Christianity 
been so seriously shaken as in the years since the War ", and 
his account of the various books that have been published and 
the mood which they express and apparently satisfy is an 
impressive document in his case. The circumstances, even 
viewed more favourably than he feels himself compelled to do, 
warrant us in going back to one whose arguments and attitude are 
representative of much in our world today. The writings of 
Ludwig Feuerbach have indeed a present interest, recognised as 
we shall see by many who do not in any way share his views. 
The attack on Religion is due partly to the special conditions 
of our time, the Post-war Disillusionment, "The Bloodless War 
between the Contents and the Non- Contents ", "The Silent Revolution ", 
Champter 1. 
as they have been variously described, partly to the new study 
of Psychology and the popularisation of its ideas. 
To consider the la..st first. Jung, Freud and others have 
given a new explanation to and interpretation of Religion, 
which is at once a very ingenious and a most insidious attack 
upon it. 
The fact of Religion is not denied. Historically it has 
its roots in the most primitive peoples. No longer is it so 
widely and confidently declared, with the approval of expert 
investigators, that races are to be found without any trace 
of religious experience, ritual or belief. On the contrary 
the early experience of mankind persists and manifests itself 
in curious survivals, taboos fears restraints illustrative of 
the resurgence of the childlike and primitive in the most 
modern age. The fraud of priest and their desire fom power 
have contributed to the continuence of religion, but do not 
explain its origin or its nature. Myth and legend, again, 
are not so much causes as effects, the fruit of imagination in 
the deep soil of the human heart. 
Religion has only to be understood and explained in the 
light of its origins, and at once it falls into its proper 
place as the product of our human faculties. As Julian Huxley 
says in his Conway Memorial Lectur9, Oct, 1930," Religion in 
the light of psychological and anthropological science, is seen 
not as a divine revelation, but as a function of human nature. 
It is a very peculiar and a very complicated function of human 
nature¡ 
3 
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nature, sometimes noble, sometimes valuable, sometimes a bar 
to individual or social progress. But it is no more and no 
less a function of human nature than fighting or falling 
in love, than law or literature ". 
Huxley who is more serious in his views of religion than 
many another and has taken the trouble to work out in detail 
how the new faith may emplpy the phrases and images of the old 
tells us in the same lecture, p.64. "Almost without exception 
the elements and practices of the existing world- religions could 
be utilised by a religion which, abandoning the interpretation 
in term of God, had adopted the scientific outlook as basis 
for its theology. But they would, of course, have to be 
transposed, as it were, into a new key, translated into new 
terms, in accordance with the new outlook. Vicarious sacrifice, 
atonementoselfdenial, and asceticism, the sense of inspiration 
or possession, the ecstatic or even orgia &tic liberation from 
the bondage of sin of self or of convention, temporary of 
permanent retreat from the world, participation in inspiring 
ritual -- these and many other things have their place in life, 
but will not find their right place unless they are helped to 
it by an organised religious system." 
Religion accordingly may give a subjective satisfaction and 
for Huxley should do so, but it touches no objective reality. 
Religion is religious experience with the emphasis on experience 
and an interpretation of that experience which boldly asserts 
it is without value as a Proof of the existence of God or the 
unseen 
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unseen world which lies beyond our senses. 
The position is well summed up in the excellent book 
published in 1923 by Henry Balmforth, entitled, " Is Christian 
Experience an Illusion ? ". In Chapter 4 he writes, 
"Modern Psychology finds everywhere in eligion the phantasy, 
a subconscious or unconscious withdrawal into the easy 
satisfaction of unfulfilled desires or impulses by means of 
image- making uncontrolled by fact or reality." 
And this he points out is the third wave of the scientific 
challenge to religious faith and it is probably the most 
difficult to meet, Physics and geology have spent their strength, 
biology not yet entirely overcome or reconciled, 
psychology is the most searching and is ttill gathering strength 
among the multitudeL4 Ruth Rouse and H. Crichton Miller, M.D., 
"Christman Experience and Psychological Processes, p.3. 1917 C.i4.1 
l? S.12, between afIA 
4Leuba. p.211. -- "The conflict /rte- religion science which broke 
out first in the field of cosmology, then of biology and. the 
historical sciences is now carried into the field of psychology. 
Further as we have mentioned there were outward and special 
conditions of the War and Post -War years which favoured this 
presentation of religion and gave it a wide appeal. Surprising 
developments took place during that period in the technique for 
the treatment of shell- shock, neurosis, hysteria and similar 
complaints. Prior to that ;illiam James and others had centred 
attention upon varied types of religious experience, more 
especially/ 
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especially the extreme types or the unstable conditions of 
temperament or character. 
The general movement of disintegration in religious and 
moral standards and sanctions which had been proceeding for 
many years was undoubtedly hastened by the war which shook as 
with an earthquake the foundations of the home especially and 
sent out sheltered lives into the riot of a world where primitive 
passion was.called into the service of moral principle and 
sometimes destroyed its master. 
An age eager for slogans, for phrases which explain everything 
and themselves require no explanation found in the New Psycholog 
;friend and counsellor after its own heart. The language employe 
had just sufficient of technical terms to give vividness and 
colour to it, but its strength lay in the fact that it was not 
so much theological or philosophical as personal and human. Who 
does not know the meaning of sex or instinct or dreams,who has 
not felt the urge of the crowd or the spell of the Mass -Mind? 
This is not set down by way of depreciation of those 
investigators whostnames are so familiar, but rather to make cleat 
the way in which their work has corresponded with the mood of 
the age. The study of the human spirit need not have destroyed 
the worth of that spirit or the reality of the object of its 
trust. But as a matter of fact the tendency has been along 
these lines. 
Our interest has been too much absorbed in the material gains 
that civilisation has brought. Invention and machinery have 
harnessed/ 
Chapter 1. F. 
6; 
-present day. 
harnessed the wonderful powers in the universe. Man is 
the great High- priest of Nature and Science is the rod of paver 
which brings a living water from the Rock. If some draw 
attention to the spiritual side of man's life, they are told, 
as we have seen, that it is a product, in some cases, a by- 
product of the material. We are living matter, says Julian 
Huxley, (p.74). Religion is an infantile survival or an illusion, 
a mistaken interpretation of our own desires and thoughts. Should 
the old reproach of materialism be cast up and even atheism be 
mentioned,it is pointed out that we have also with us a 
benevolent and cultured and progressive Humanism, and what more 
do we want. "Man is the highest of all concrete realities and 
there is nothing above him but his own ideals" (Horton, Theism 
and the Modern Mooa. S.C.M.) "It is we who create value, 
and our desires which confer value. In this realm we are kings 
and we debase our kinship if we bow down to Nature." (Bertrand 
Russell.) 
From what is told us by those who know well the recently 
awakened countries or citizens of China India or Japan, this 
Humanistic outlook has been wdedely adopted there and is 
considered the inevitable outcome of the latest scientific thought.' 
Voices indeed come to us, especially from America where the 
malady has spread far, bidding us pause and consider the "Para- 
dox of Humanism" and "The Disillution of the Laboratory ". I 
refer to the book by Joseph Wood Krutch entitled "The Modern 
Temperi93o, and also "A Preface to Morals" by Walter Lippmann, 
x.929./ 
7 
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1929. The former is more pessimistic, the latter more 
constructive. Both are candid in the ac:noefledgement that 
something is seriously wrong with the world in theory as well 
as in practice. 
Not only the supernatural in religion is gone, but the 
higher elements of morality, also. ',+e have witnessed ' the 
Life and Death of a Value' in the reduction of Love to a 
physiological process. "All cultures," says Krutch, "have 
inevitably collapsed and human life has always persisted because 
of the rude barbarians who have entered into the place of power. 
Despair must inevitably ripen again. An irresolvable discord is 
the fundamental fact of the world. 
And Lippmann braver in his theory than the other is 
constrained to admit, "What most distinguishes the generation 
which has approached maturity since the debacle of idealism at 
the end of the war is not their rebellion against the religious 
and moral code of their 01 arents, but their disillusion with 
their own rebellion. It is common for young men and women 
to rebel, but that they should rebel sadly and without faith 
in their own rebellion, that they should distruct the new freedom 
no less than the old certainties -- this is something of a novelty:: 
When the philosophers are moved to such notes of despondency, 
we need not be surprised that a man of literature and art like 
D. 
. La.aence is constrained to say," Ehe love of humanity 
le gone leaving a great gap. The cosmic consciousness has 
collapsed upon a ;great void. The egoist sits grinning furtively 
r 
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in the triumph of his own emptiness; "( quoted in A.C. Ward, 
the Nineteen Twenties). Exaggerated and overstrained as these 
utterances may be, forgetful of the seven thousand who have 
not bowed the knee to Daal, 'die Stille im Lande', they 
represent a situation of grave urgency. If in any way, 
directly or indirectly, we can lighten the strain and point 
toward the shining light, it will be a task worth whilt. 
There is at least a gain in composure and a sense of 
disinterestedness in looking back to a period and a personality 
which reflect many of our problems and some of our solutions. 
In a measure these, we may say, have been anticipated by the 
experience and theories of the subject of this sketch. 
Lange, (vol 2,p.246, Eng. Trans.) in his 'History of 
Materialism' discusses the title 'The Father of Materialism' 
and decides that Ludwig Anselm Feuerbach rather than David 
Frederich Strauss has the right to claim it. In view, however, 
of Feuerbach's denial that he was a materialist and in the 
light of present -day thinking, it is better to call him "The 
Father of Illusionism in Religion ", dm "A pioneer of Humanism ". 
It was he who laid down definitely the principle,'Theology 
is Anthropology' and in this saying we touch the nerve of the 
great qu.stion, ;shat is the validity of religious experience? 
Does this experience bring us into touch with anything more 
than our own human aspirations, a convenient even necessary help 
to a worthier life, as Huxlwy would allow, but only the product 
of social custom or individual longing? 
While/ 
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titi!hìlb it is not to be expected that Feuerbach would be 
found using the technical terms of present -day psychology, 
it is remarkable that 'imagination', Phantasy,Emotion, and 
above all projection" should have so large a place in his 
vocabulary as in that of modern writers. Researches in Anthrop- 
ology also occupied his attention though we may not unjustly 
say that they represented to him less material for independent 
investigation than aids for the illustration of arguments already 
arrived at. His terminology has not indeed attained the 
precision to which we are accustomed but this does not diminish 
the penetrating acuteness of his analysis. Moreover, his 
philosophic interest and power show him to be in line with 
a great tradition of thought upon the fundamental issues of life. 
Seeing that he has been so long forgotten, let me gntte some 
tributes from notable dlen to illustrate the real importance of 
his placo in the development of theological opinion. 
To those who advocate the cause of Humanism or Naturalism, 
such as Bolin, Jodl, Carl Beyer, etc. Feuerbach is a hero, 
whoseprowess can only be exhibited in a wondrous collection of 
historical parallels. He is the David who slew the giant of 
Hegelianism, the Aristotle who turned away from the Platonic 
world of ideas to seek the real principle of life in life itself, 
a Copernicus who has changed the centre of destiny for the human 
universe. "The beginning, middle, and end of Religion is 
"All theology is anthropology ". "Religion is the dream of the 
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did this doughty writer assail and overwhelm his opponents, 
and his disciples are using them still. 
One of his latest biographers, Adolph Kohut, (L.F. Sein Leben 
and seine Werke, u.s.w. Leipzig 1909), in a most readable book 
declares that no creative account of Feuerbach's life has yet 
been written, though many sketches exist, and he essays this 
task for the benefit of the laity, using as new material 
hitherto unprinted letters of Feuerbach and his father. Feuerbach, 
he declares,is by no means down and out (abgetan is the favourite 
word used by the friends of our author here only to be contempt- 
uously dented.) The centenary celebrations of 1904 in so many 
places amply demonstrate this. He is a man for the present who, 
hastening in advance of his time, has stated in final and 
id,eas 
fundamental form" . /which will continue to influence our successors 
and whose worth and importance our present generation are in a 
peculiar position to recognise and appreciate very highly. 
With more academic calm C.N. Starcke (L.F. Stuttgart, 1885) 
says he is a "key- man ". His interest in him is due to this 
fact. He is one who showed what most interested his age and he 
is the kernel from which the future breaks forth. "The realism 
of our time is a shell, a medium, the kernel on the contrary is 
idealistic, (p vi. vorrede)..Feuerbach is indeed the original 
sketch for this idealistic time under the mantle of realism. If 
we would seek a time that was realistic at heart, then it was the 
previous century, i.e. the XVIII th... Ideals found no development 
beyond where it was possible to have them transformed into 
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hard cash. In literal sense Egoism had been made the 
principle of morals .... before the eyes of this Medusa 
the moral ideal was changed to stone." 
A powerful explosion and not a quiet advance made a 
way for the ideal thr.ugh Bousseau and, his emphasis on 
feeling. As yet however it had no form. In the 
Revolution of 1789 meh seoke of the Rights of Man, but 
all was undetermined, 'nur Redensart'. Freedom, as 
also Feeling, must have its bounds determined. What had 
man a right to? How was he related to the Society of 
which he was a part.? 
"The Holy Alliance understood perfectly how to $Wirl 
about for long such a ode of speech until it became a 
most bloody irony. Under the pressure of this irony 
fell the 7=th of Feuerbach..." (p VII )" As the people 
became oery aware that the sense of reality had failed 
them, then the ]:terialism of Moleschott and Vogt became 
for a time t 4it e flag w.dich they followed: but the difference 
between this and the Itumanism (Menschentum) has been sufficient 
ly set forth by the latter himself." 
far this is an F.7=ste survey of the position of 
OUT s'2,tr.. ire sh411 be to see later. It is time to 
psEE ("rt:ts1 estimates employing terms of distinct 
EGffding, e.g. in his "History of Modern Philospph? 
aNys that F uervzch's contribution to the elucidation of 
the/ 
/2, 
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the religious problem is one of the most important 
offered in the course of the following decade. "He occupies 
the first place, an energetic thinker richly endowed, as 
a critic of the whole Romantic philosophy associated 
chiefly with the name of Hegel but found also in Schelling, 
Fichte and Schleiermacher." But he adds," He so exhausted 
himself in getting beyond the speculative philosophy that 
he had no energy desire or leisure for the positive and 
scientific working out of his new point of view." 
To come to writers of the present -day, we find Von Hugel 
A 
de.-voting several pages of his Essays and Addresses on 
the Philosophy of Religion to our author. On p. 29 he 
writes "I want to take the problem, not according to any 
formulation of my own, but in the combination of remarkable 
psychological penetration, of rare knowledge throughout large 
reaches of the religious consciousness and of sceptical 
assumptions and passion presented by Ludwig Feuerbach in 
by far his greatest work'; Das Wesen des Christentums". 
"There earlier positions of Feuerbach", he continues," 
even where they have ceased to be axiomatic for professed 
philosophers, are still in secondary forms and in semi- 
conscious ways most certainly operative in various 
sceptical works. The vein of doctrinaire violence that 
undoubtedly runs through the book does not prevent the 
work remaining to this hour the most probing and thorough 
account/ 
Chapter 1. F. & present day. 
account of the certain or even the simply arguable 
contributions made by man to religion, - -- of the resonance 
of man's mind and heart in response to religion; and there 
has not been, I think, since Feuerbach any mind of a 
calibre equal to his own that has argued with so unflagging 
a conviction for the sheer illusioh and mischievousness 
of all religion." 
G. Wobbermin, in his book, (1921) "Das : Mesen der Religion, 
Systematic Theologie nach religionsppy%chologie Methode," 
vol 2 chap xi, writes "Feuerbach is historically the most 
significant and influential representative of Illusionism. 
He proceeds from his conception of the Nature of Religion 
to this precise and sharp statement of the question of 
truth, which again is dependent upon his penetrating 
the 
insight intopsychólogical structure of the religious 
consciousness." And again, p. 401, he points out how 
attempts have been made in the lest fifty years to 
supplement Feuerbach's theory with facts from medical 
materialism, religious and sex aberration and psycho- analysis. 
Leubay Jo much akin in mnagay ways,writes p. 38 P.S.Ref. 
"No one before Feuerbach had seen so clearly as he the 
creative roll of desire in the making of uods and religions, 
or, at any rate, no one had attempted to explain so fully 
the Christian religion as entirely the product of man's 
instinct for happiness. 
And finally, not to overload the pages with these 
citations,/ 
/!. 
Chapter 1. F. & present day. 
citations, I will mention the very important discussion 
by Karl Barth in his book," Die ri'heolor ie and die Kirke 
(Vol 2, Essay on Feuerbach) . 1928. QTinchen. ) 
He defends his introduction of apaper on Feuerbach in 
his history of recent theology on three grounds, 1st, 
that there is no one so intensively and exclusively 
occupied with the problem of Religion, or 2nd, so 
Church 
equipped with his extraordinary knowledge of the /Fathers 
and of Luther, or 3rd, with such a grasp of the theological 
situation. 
"His anti -theological statement shows one most important 
possibility within the problem of the New Theology which 
sharply lightens up all their other possibilities, so 
that we would lose sorAhing definite if we did not let 
him have part in our conversations." 
One feels of course that Barth is very glad to include 
such an awful example in his review that he may warn off 
any who indulge in subjectivity or plead the difficulty 
of relating his Siniatic thunderbolts to the plain 
experience of men. Feuerbach is a splendid stick with 
which to thrash the theologians of 'religious experience' 
and the adherents of the Schleiermacher tradition. If 
the transcentental dialectic fail to persuade, this 
threat of Humanism will certainly make the pilgrim stop 
and consider his path. At the same time-it is as valuable 
as any statement or appreciation I have read and illustrates 
the/ 
/5, 
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the power and sympathy of t3arth. 
It is quite clear from such quotations that we have to 
do with a remarkable man, whose name may be forgotten t f 
whose thought and spirit continue. Varied as are the 
judgments upon his doctrine all are agreed as to his 
virtuosity. Friend and foe agree also that his work 
is incomplete, that "it is not a system but a development ", 
(Starcke ), The style is "Aphoristic and unsystematic ", 
more that of an essayist than that of a philosopher. Feuer- 
bach confesses that his aim is to reach the people, though 
in the first edition of Das W.C. he says he does not 
expect so wide an interest in it. Wit, humour, satire these 
he will employ, he says,especially in the earlier writings 
but always in the service of truth. 
Merz, in his History of European thought, vol, 4, 
points out that Feuerbach has a place with the political 
and feuilleton writers whose method of pungent diatribe 
was carried over into the realm of science and Philosophy... 
Appealing to the people, it was they who set the problems 
which the professors in the Universities had to answer, 
when presumably they would have been happier developing 
their own themes and carrying on the old traditions. There 
was gain in the public interest invoked, but the dust of 
the makilibt- place, the quick passions of uneducated people 
and the polemic of rival hucksters did not conduce to the 
single- minded discovery of truth or the willing- hearted 
acceptance/ 
I6 
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acceptance of its supreme claims. 
However that may be, certainly Feuerbach's spirit 
and outlook were fashioned and coloured by ,1movernents 
and atmosphere of his time, both political and 
intellectual, and it is necessary to enter upon a 
short account of these that we may understand him aright. 
C H A P T E R : II. 
THE POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS 
IN THE FIRST HALF 
OF THE NINT ENTH. CENTURY 
AS A iTECE3SARY BACKGROUND FOR OUR SUBJECT. 
"Oppression makes the wise man mad." 
Browning 
i7. 
" The men of the first generation of nineteenth century 
Europe grew to maturity under the shadow of a great dis- 
illusionment -- the fathers had eaten sour grapes and the 
children's teeth were set on edge." 
Hernsh2..w. 
Stay still, don't move; do what you have been accustomed 
o do, and consult your grandmother upon everything." 
Popular Saying of the Day. 
dg. 
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The Political Philosophical, and Theological Movements 
during the first half of the XIX th Century. 
It is generally supposed that philosophers live apart 
from common men and affairs in a world of their own. 
The supposition is largely untrue and it is specially 
untrue of those who lived in the opening years of the 
nineteenth century. íoethe alone of the writers of the 
time achieved the olympian calm with which men of his 
class are credited and that was due partly to his distinctive 
personality and ,)a.rtly to the favourable circumstances in 
which he found himself at the Court of Weimar. In lesser 
measure Immauel _ant, 1724 -1804, shared this spirit of 
detachment, but he can scarcely be said to belong to the 
epoch under consideration. Yet Kant himself had 
experience of the wider world - for he had a peculiar 
interest in both travel and politics, following the course 
of the Revolution in N. America and in France eagerly. 
(Hóffding vol. 2.Hist. of Phil.). The abbreviated 
termination of Heel's "Phenomenology" was due in part 
at least to the -presence of Napoleon and the disorder of 
gar. Feuerbach e.nd his contemporaries were surging 
in a. great upheaval of human affairs scarcely less critical 
than that through which our generation has passed or is 
passing. it was a Post -gar epoch but it was no bloodless 
or silent Revolution. Its cries and blows echo through 
the pages of our author. 
people/ 
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struggle of the people for political liberty, the slow 
unbending of authority, and how the new claims of science 
and commerce begin. to affect the intellectual and 
practical affairs of the people.. 
In the record he had given us of his fa.tner, publidhed 
1851, certain aspects of the life and character of that 
earlier time are portrayed, while his own experiences 
brought him into touch with its political as well as its 
intellectual movements. These were all the more deeply 
engraves on his memory because they were so much antagonistic 
to his ambitions and a cause of his failure. 
Briefly let us set down some of the salient facts. 
Germany in the beginning of the XIX th century had not yet 
found political unity. The hamiier of Napoleon rendered cruel 
service to that end. It stashed the old Empire with its 
loose fragments of some three hundred states and prepared 
the way for the new. In the Rhenish Confederation formed 
under the protection of Itap )goleon the German princes were 
taught some of the lessons of closer co- operation. Thus when 
freedom came in 1815 the German Confederation was ready under 
the direction of the great rowers to reorganise the Diet and 
to introduce a larger national spirit. 
The opportunity was unique." Not since the Reformation had 
the people been so profoundly moved." Great hopes were 
entertained of a progressive movement which would work in 
close harmony with representatives of all classes. In 





would be granted to the people in their several states, 
and the Duke of leimar boldly fulfilled his ?ledge to the 
surprise and resentment of many of his titled neighbours. 
The issue kas not however to be settled so easily or 
so soon. In the Cambridge Modern nistory, vol. X p. 346, 
we read, "The original draft of the Federal Act had pledged 
every member of the Confederation to grant his suojects a 
representative constitution within a year. But this power 
had been emasculated by the omission of the time limit and 
the substitution of 'will' for 'shall'; the clause became 
a prophecy and not a command; and,as Gorres complained, 
it was mangled and maimed until it guaranteed to the German 
people no more than 'an unlimited right of expectation'. 
The evil spirit of Prince Metternich had been at work 
and Absolutism gained the day. To the forceful leadership 
of the Austrian steteman must be added as contributing to 
the down -fall of popular hopes the hesitations and sAlfishness 
of the German princes, the receding of the tide of national 
feeling into the creeks and channels of narrow particularism 
and even in places thereal effectiveness of local 
administration in the hands of the bureauocrats. 
The situation was not without its contradictions. It 
is surprising to find that Prussia is regarded as the centre 
of Liberalism and the Emperor of Russia as a Jacobin with- 
standing the anti- popular machinations of Austria. Later the 




J.ome lay, took the lead in the movement for representation 
and liberty, while Russia drew back to its former fears of the 
people, and Prussia became once again the land of authority. 
Such reaction and absolutism inevitable led to the 
exercise of a strict Police supervision extending from the 
Universities to the organs of the Press. The liberty granted 
to the latter is not so recent or assured that we can think 
strange the frequent suppression of magazines and newspapers 
critical of the Government. But it is a little strange to 
find respectable professors under surveillance, as when 
Schleiermacher's sermons and hymn -book were brought before 
the censor for examination. Yet earlier,Ka.nt for a time 
was favoured by the unwelcome attentions of the Authority 
entrusted in the care of education and religion and the three 
theologians who had been formed into a College of censors 
paid special attention to his book "Religion within the bounds 
of pure Reason ", 1idith the death of Fred. William II. the& 
came a return to the more favourable conditions of liberty 
granted to him by Frederick the Great and Zeidlit; his minister. 
The students of course might well be expected to have a hand 
in whatever trouble was brewing and they received their due 
share of attention. 
?o doubt there was reason enou1.,h for all this. Unrest was 
in the air and must find leaders and a voice. Professors 
spoke courageously; in 1837 seven of them in Gottingen 
protested against the repudiation of the Liberal constitution. 
De/ 
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De Wette, 'the Nathanael of Modern Theology' was dismissed 
from his chair at Berlin because of a letter he wrote. When 
politicians were silent, secret societies carried on their 
plotting and propaganda, and many of the student Corps and 
Verbindingungen of the present day trace their history back 
to these stormy times. Fries, when professor at Jena, although 
no friend to Secret Societies, made no concealment of his 
sympathy with the formation of a General German Studentenbtkn.d 
whereby the bonds formed in the common struggle against 
Napoleon "the world conqueror" could be sustained.("Hoff. II.243) 
Two incidents are so remarkable as to merit further mention 
and will illustrate the above statements. In 1817, Oct, 18th, 
the University town of Jena witnessed a strange sight that 
occasioned more alarm than was really intended. At the Wartbur 
festival the students commemorated both the Reformation and 
the Battle of Leipzig, when Napoleon was overthrown. "There 
were prayers and sermons, then a dinner and toasts to 
Luther and the Grand Duke, and finally a bonfire. In 
Maasman, the master of fke revels, co,n»+.&eoL -ta e f /a; t5 
imitation of the Reformation,) /of reaction militarism and 
mblem 
French fashions -- Schmalz's pamphlet, Kotzebue's German 
History and other obnoxious works, a corporal's came, a pigtail 
and a corset. It was for the most part a youth -fui 
indiscretion, but when professors like Keiser could say that 
for general significance the demonstration had never been 
surpassed, there was perhaps some excuse for the alarm of 
Courts and Cabinets ". (Cambridge liodern History, vol. X, p.3557) 
¡Wore/ 
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More serious was the assassination of Kotzebue, poet, 
playwritertsatirist of Romanticists and students alike, and 
the au ent of the Emperor of Russia. On March 23rd, 1819 he 
was stabbed by a student of Jena University when at Mannheim. 
As illustrative of the way in which such an act could be 
viewed we may turn to the letter written to the mother of the 
lad By Professor De Wette who had come into touch with him 
during a holiday. He condemns the wrong done, "evil can 
never be overcome by evil, the end never sanctifies the means "; 
but there is this significant sentence, "Taken in itself this 
act, performed by a pure and pious young man with the 
conviction and confidence which animated it, is a beautiful 
sign of the time." A sign of the time certainly,as those 
in authority also thought, but far from beautiful in any time. 
It is not surprising that De 'iette fell into disgrace. 
(Lichtenberger #. 40). For the part which he took in this 
celebration of 1817 of the sequel of 1819 Fries was forced 
to resign the Professor ship of Philosophy which he held. The 
patronage of Karl August was not sufficient to 'protect him 
from the angry denunciation of Prussia and Austria. A via mediae 
was discovered by transferring him to the chair of Physics 
and Mathematics. (Hoffding History of Philosophy II. 343.4.) 
The Universities now received special attention. It was 
decided to send Commissioners to visit them. file education 
of youth must be strictly supervised and alone the lines laid 
down by the State. "He who serves me must teach what I 
coma.nd/ 
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command," said Francis II of Austria to the staff of the 
Lerbach Lyceum, (dam iui.kí.X 357).Lange (Hist of Mat. II 246) 
tells us that in 1824 August 21 a circular rescript from 
the Ministry of Education in Prussia was issued and ran as 
follows," The Royal Science Examination Commission is 
invited at the same time to have a strict regard to the 
thoroughness and inward content of Philosophy and its study, 
in order that the shallow and superficial philosophemes who 
have recently but too often formed the whole study of 
philosophy may at lengtyield to a thorough training in 
philosophy and that the true philosophical study may again 
receive its honoured and valued position etc. etc." 
Hegel now became the accepted interpreter of Absolutism 
and was called by his enemies "an official philosopher" because 
of his disavowal of sentiment and revolutionary talk. His 
attacks upon those who gave way to such exuberances were 
in 
valuable to the Government, though /his later days his patrons 
were not so sure of his political teaching. That "the real 
is the rational" may seem a watchword of acquiescence but it 
was capable of being inverted and employed for their own ends 
Wallace Logic of Hegel. Transt:XX.. 
by the followers of the goddess of Reason.] It is suggestive 
as to the uneasiness of the time to find Hegal writing to his 
wife (1827) that he had laoked at the university buildings in 
Ldtain and Liege with the feeling that they might one day 
afford him a resting place'when the parsons In Berlin make the 
4140fergraban completely intolerable for him'. 'The Roman Curie. 
would/ 
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would be a more honourable opponent than the miserable cabals 
of a miserable boiling of parsons in Berlin." Almost tegel's 
last writing was an article on the English Reform bill of 
1831. He acknov lech es the danger of this measure, but perceives 
the inevitability of the change and points to the Enrlish 
experiment of municipal self- government as a security against 
the dangers of revolutionary principles... Even the moderate 
liberalism of this paper was too much for the growing fears 
of the Prussian government, and a second part of it which 
Hegel was preparin_. was stopped by the Censor. (V. Caird's 
Hegel, pp 103, 104). At the same time the rule of Hegel 
counted in the court and University for long and Feuerbach 
never escaped from the result of his crith sm of the Hegelian 
system. 
Two upheavals in the political situation of urope made 
quite clear that stability had not been reached despite all 
the efforts of reaction. The first was the French Revolution 
of July, 1830. It drew to Paris many ardent spirits, including 
Heine, and Feuerbach longed to follow them. Paris they felt 
was to be the _future home of freedom. Lange, in his'isty 
of Materialism,' vol II 142, writes, 'If you wish to fix a 
definite point to describe as the end of the idealistic period 
in Germany, no such distinctive event offers itself as the 
French Revolution of Uuly 1830, Philosophy had lost its charm 
since it had entered into the service of Absolutism... men 





in 1830 and it became the fashion to fittfAV*0 despair of 
Germany's future and to regard the more realistic France 
as the model of the new epoch. " The German rulers were 
again ready with promises of constitutions to their people, 
but they also took more substantial measures to protect 
themselves, on the one hand by the treaty of Berlin, 18330 
a measure for mutual help, and on the other hand by the 
institution of the Zollverein or Custom Union which excluded 
Austria but added much to the prosperity of their country. 
Again, in 1848 came the crash of Revolution to warn them 
that all was not right. Austria which had been the home 
of reaction suffered. greatly. The mob sacked the palace of 
Prince Metternich, and it was only with the help of Russia that 
the Hungarian generals who had led the outbreak were overcome 
and executed. A proclamation in favour of free institutions, 
religious liberty and universal education was made, but in 
1851 it was cancelled. In France Louis Philippe abdicated 
in favour of his grandson. In Germany many of the princes 
hastened to grant constitutions, and sanction was given for 
the convocation of a great National Congress of Representatives 
of the people by a provisional self -constituted Ae mbly. 
But even this Assembly proved for the German patriots a 
vast disappointment. The flow of words was interminable, 
the results vague. Feuerbach defending himself in his V.W.R. 
at Heidelberg in the end of 1848 from the charge of desertion 
RE 





'Liberty', could work miracles. When other methods are 
in operation, he declaresohe will not be an idle spectator 
but he wants no empty talk. As the King of Prussia on the 
ground of scruple refused the crown offered to him, Germany 
had to wait for Bismarck's fuller plans and the campaigns 
against Austria Denmark and France to reach through blood 
and iron the united life of a nation. The time of the worst 
reaction was to come. It lay, says Grun, between 1850 and 
1860 and so bad was it that the cannon roar on the Alma 
sounded as blows of freedom. We are apt to forget with our 
own ordered progress that the Continent was so much the 
scene of confusion, upheaval and oppression, yet Italy did 
not achieve unity till 1870 and when Gladstone visited. Italy 
in 1851 he found there 20,000 political offenders in prison. 
Amid all these changes the two chief leaders of reaction 
were at times conscious that they were fighting a losing 
battle. Many of their sayings have been preserved. You 
can do everything with bayonets except sit on them ", confessed 
Metternich; and again, "Ancient Europe is at the beginning 
of the end, I have come into the world either too early or 
too late. Earlier I should have enjoyed the age; later 
I should have helped to reconstruct it; today I have to give 
my life to propping up the mouldering edifice. "; while 
Francis II declared," My realm is like a worm -waten house, 
if one part is removed one cannot tell how much will fall." 




In 1830 he could .,pen the aphorism, "What is Christianity 
now? Only permission in the land of the philistines 
under police protection to eat one's bread with security'. 
In 1851, March 14, writing to Kapp in America, he 
exclaims, "Europe is a prison. The difference between 
a free man and a prisoner is only a quantitative one, only 
this, that one has a somewhat roomier prison." And 
again at a later period, he writes, "There only is divine 
faith, truth and soundness where there is Nature, where 
atheism, the theoretical of course of which the Bible, 
at least the old Testament knows nothing, is an impossibility, 
divine faith an incommunicable necessity, where it is one 
with the understanding of man himself, where mans understand- 
ing canQitselfhink ..,, no other cause than a God, where 
consequently the proof of God is. still not a necessity on 
the satisfaction of which prizes and stipends are offered, 
the confession of faith is still no merit which is announced 
by servile newspaper writers and police- servants in order 
to gain for themselves through belief in the Highest the 
favour of the All -Highest (Aller Hochsten)" 
For Germany the political tension was relieved in many 
places by the strop` administrative genius of the rul/ers, 
by the advantages which came with the Customs Union, and 
through the development of Science and the aid it 
rendered to ,:lec ,:nical and technical efficiency. It is 
worthy of not,,? in this connection that the first railway 
was opened i:°, ,,. _ t ...__ ;.- in 1835. 
These/ 
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These beneficetnt occurtences affected even the spirit 
of Feuerbach who turned them to his own argument in the 
Preface to W.C. written in February, 1843, "In these works I 
have sketched with a few sharp touches the historical solution 
of Christianity and have shown that Christianity has in fact 
long vanished not only from the reason but from the life 
of mankind, that it is nothing more than a fixed idea, in 
fragrant contradiction with out fire and life assurance 
Companies, our railroads and steam carriages, out picture 
and sculpture galleries, our military and industrial schools, 
our theatres and scientific museums." 
But sufficient has been said about the political situation 
to give us a background to understand the details of 2euerbach's 
career which will have to be considered later. It is time 
to endeavour to supply a similar outline of the philosophical 
and theological situation. 
The Philosophical and Theological Situation. 
Although Feuerbach's career was destroyed and his 
influence diminished by the power of the Reaction, the 
references in his writings are naturally more in defence of 
his own views against the current intellectual doctrines. No 
one can say that these were insignificant. The contrary was 
the case. If the years before and after the fall of 
Napoleon displayed in Germany a remarkable poverty of 
political genius, they offered a remarkable wealth of 
intellectual power. 
the/ 
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the Rationalism of the illumination period gave place 
to the Romantic Movement, the transition being marked by 
the "Sturm and Drang Periode", which finds expression 
in the "Sorrows of Young Werther" by Goethe.L4p 11 is y 
Feuerbach has given us some extracts from his father's 
letters which reveal the influence of this sentimental 
tragic mood, the silence of the beloved and the ensuing 
agony, the threat of suicide if his friends had not been 
so dear to him, the longing for the dagger of the robber 
to pierce him etc. etc. 
Romanticism, with its headquarters for a time at Jena, 
and later at Berlin, was more that a German movement and 
more than a literary mood. It swept across the whole of 
Europe and it attempted a philosophy of life in every sphere., 
Reaching back into the past to escape the arid boundaries 
of the Rationalism of the previous century, it drew new 
vigour as in England from the Ballads and songs of earlier 
days. The danger that threatened it and indeed overtook 
some of its representatives was an idolatry of-Mediaeval 
mysteries and outlook, the sacrifice of reason,timagination, 
the suffusion of Romance with sentiment. It tended to 
become and actually became in some cases exclusive and 
aristocratic, a company of 'beautiful souls.' 414943. 7 
Its chief services for German literature lay in the 
translation of Shakespeare by A. W. Schlegel and fleck, 
the humour of Jean Paul Richter and the patriotic songs 
of/ 
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of the "Vaterlanddichter ", foremost of whom was 
;ovalis. Eut its influence extended to Philosophy 
and Religion and carries us into the midst of the 
great system builders of the XIXth century, Hegel, Fichte, 
Schelling and Schleiermacher. Haym in his work "Die 
Romantische Schule", p 7, points out that ' Dichtung' 
and 'Philosophie' have always since the beginning of our 
great literati, epoch in Germany worked together and 
interpenetrated one another in lively fashion. If 
indeed the essence of Romanticism is to be brought under 
one formula, he says, it is to be found in this extreme 
spirituality, in the flowing together of the life of 
imagination and of thought, and herein again lay the 
possibility that the finest outpourings of the life of 
the soul, the impulses of piety, could thus bind them 
together in peace." (p8) As the several members of 
the group did not as a matter of fact hold together on 
the question of religion, it is well to r member that 
the movement had its Aeaker and harmful side as well as 
its nobler. 
It was impossible for these scholars to pass by the 
three great books of Immanuel Kant, especially "Die 
Kritiaue der feinen Vernunft ". A criticism of 
preceding theories they themselves challenged criticism 
and completion. Awakened from his dogmatic slumbers 




of the understanding, to discover the principles 
necessary for experience, and to find room for the 
"Ideas" of Freedom, Immortality and üod in a wider 
view than that possible to the followers of Descartes 
Locke and Berkley. 
Feuerbach's interest in Kant in indicated by a 
reference in his "Gayle ", p 222, "Philosophy before him 
in Cartesius and Leibnitz had still tie character of 
indifference over against philosophy in itself. They 
express their thoughts only as subjective opinions and 
hypothesis with a certain legerete and indifference. 
Dogma is still )resupposed as the highest interest, or 
this supposition in the minds of men is respected." 
Philosophy as a true and original activity, that is to 
say, first appears in Kant, and Feuerbach is relentless 
in his advocacy of thought free from dogma. 
KLant's doctrine was avowedly a theory of knowledge in 
the first instance though it contained elements which took 
it out into the wider field of re &lity. liNallace in his 
book on Kant (p. 219) says truly, "He left behind him no 
system, but he threw out suggestions of matchless fertility. ' 
Thus we find that schools of the most opposed character 
claimed adherence to his philosophy, according as they 
emphasised or rejected one or other of the Critiques. 
Agnostics laid stress upon the ignorance of the trans- 




theologians proclaimed the primacy of the practical 
reason and the assurances it gave of the moral and 
spiritual Kingdom. 
It is not necessary to go into details here of the 
erettb 
contradictions and difficulties which Kant left/44 his 
successors. One especially formed the object of many 
controversies, the dualism that obviously existed between 
sense and understanding. Both were necessary; according 
to the famous saying, "Concepts without perceptions were 
empty and perceptions without concepts were blind." 
Knowledge was thus only of phenomena, while the 'thing} 
in- itself', the ground of phenomena, lay outside the 
catagory of causality. Jacobi, with his own doctrine 
of realism, wittily commented upon the 'thing -in- itself ", 
declaring that" without this proposition one could not 
enter the Kantian system and with it one could not remain 
in it ". And Heine declared the distinction between 
things that exist for us and things that do not exist 
for us to be an Irish bull in Philosophy. Undoubtedly 
there was a problem here -which required to be investigated. 
The energetic mind of the time could not rest satisfied 
with this mysterious 'thing -in- itself, or with the other 
gaps and chasms which investigation revealed. With 
immense courage and subtlety it grappled with the problem 
of the'Given' or the 'Non -Ego' in knowledge in morality 
and/ 
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and in religion. 
Fichte's moral enthusiasm found in the 'Non -Ego' that 
which was posited by the Ego itself as a limit or barrier 
within or against which it was to work out its destiny 
and win its freedom. Schelling 's doctrine was more 
imbued with the spirit of Romanticism, ever inclined to 
mysticism, preferring symbol and intuition to the 
contradiction of thelmoral life. Nature is not merely 
a limit; she is akin to the Spirit which seeks to 
comprehend and use her. "Matter, says Hoffding (History 
of Modern Philosophy, II, 165)," is slumbering spirit, 
spirit in equilibrium, and spirit is matter in process of 
becoming." Hence there is identity of subject and Object 
in the absolute principle which underlies all things. Hegel 
in epigrammatic fashion after he had broken with Schelling 
declared that this Absolute is "the night in which all cows 
are black." (Prefsce, Phenomenologie des Geistes). 
Feuerbach and his circle had no love, of Schelling; 
witness, for example the Intmgduction, Briefwechsel zw. 
Ludwig Feuerbach and Christian Kapp, p 8 and 9, where 
Schelling accuses Kap4of plagiarism and Kapp returns the 
charge, an..i the description Feuerbach gives of his 
sensations when looking into the volumes of Schelling, 
but less personal criticism is to be found- in chap IX W.C., 
in an Essay "In criticism of the Hegelian Philosophy (Vol 
II,/ 
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II p.207) and in "Vorlaúfige Thesen zur Reform der 
Philosophie (vol II, p.244). 
In the last he says, "Spinoza is the real and proper 
founder of the modern speculative philosophy, Schelling 
reinstated it and Hege4orought it to completion." And 
again, " The Identity- Philosophy is distinguished from the 
Spinozistic only in this, that it quickens the dead 
phlet,matic Thing of Substance with the Spirit of Idealism, 
Hegel especially makes the self -activity, the power of 
self -distinction, self- consciousness an attribute of 
Substance," And again p 260, "Schelling and Hegel are 
opposites. Hegel represents the manly principle of 
self-dependence, self-activity, in short the idealist 
principle; Schelling the feminine principle of titbm*a 
receptivity, of susceptibity: first he is the receiver 
from Fichte, then from Plato and Spinoza, finally from 
Jacob Bóhme, in short the materialistic principle. Hegel 
is deficient in intuition, Schelling in power of thought 
and definition. Schelling is a thinker only in universals, 
but when it comes to a matter of particulars and definitions 
he lapses into the somnambulism of the Imagination.... 
Rationalism is with Schelling only appearance, irrationalism 
truth... Hegel makes up for the lack of realism by stout 
sensible words, Schelling by beautiful words...Hegel as 
the self -negation of negative thinging, as the completion 
of the old philosophy is the negative beginning of the new: 
Schelling/ 
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Schelling, is the old philosophy with the imagination or 
under the illusion that it is the new Realphilosophie." 
But it is in the Criticism of the Hegelian philosophy's 
(f e p 2Ú7) that we find the concisest statement of the ?gray in 
vrhich Feuerbach viewed the relationship between the great 
writers of this epoch. To quote a few sentences," The only 
philosophy which be ins without presuppositions is that 
which has the courage and the freedom to doubt itself, 
which produces itself from their opposition. The new 
Philosophies have ho. ever ,taken as a whole,begun with them- 
selves not with their opposite. They hove directly pre- 
supposed philosophy, i.e. their philosophy, as the truth. 
Mediation has with the_a1 only the significance of clari- 
fication as with Fichte, or of development, as with Hegel. 
Kant was critical over against the old philosophy, but not 
against himself. Fichte presupposed the truth of the 
Kantian philosophy. He has no further wish than to raide 
it to the level of science, to bind together what Kant 
has left separate, to deduce these from one common principle. 
Schelling takes for granted also the philosophy of Fichte 
as proved truth on the one side, while on the other side he 
is the one who reinstates Spinoza in op)osition to Fichte. 
Hegel is Fichte mediated by Schelling. Hegel crrried his 
Polemic against the Absolute of Schelling, he recognised in 
him the lack of elements of reflection, of understanding, 
of negativity , i.e. he enthused, he defined, he fructified 
the/ 
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the absolute identity with the seed of the Begriff (of 
the Ich of Fichte) but at the same time he still takes 
the Absolute for granted...Hegel was to Schelling as Fichte 
to Kant. Both were true philosophies according to their 
content and material, both had only a purely scientific, 
formal interest." 
WhaA Feuerbach has in mind in these reflections is thown 
later onrp. 211, where he says, "The Hegelian philosophy 
consequently comes up against the same objection which the 
whole of modern philosophy encounters from Cartesius to 
Spinoza, the reproach of a direct break with sensible 
perception, the reproach of an immediate presupposition 
of philosophy." i.e. Nature and what is given in Nature 
have no real part in the construction of the system. (see 
p. 230 centre). 
In line with these last words we may quote the rOference 
in W.C. (p. 87 eng. trans) "Interesting material for the 
criticism of cosmogonic and theogonic fancies is furnished 
in the doctrine revived by Schelling and drawn from Jacob 
Bóhme, of eternal Nature in God," (i.e. the ground of exist- 
ence which God has in Himself). 
" 
The simple meaning of 
the doctrine is that Nature or Matter cannot be explained 
as a result of intelligence; on the contrary it is the basis 
of intelligence, the basis of personality without itself 
having any basis; Spirit without Nature is an unreal 
abstraction, consciousness developes itself only out of 
Nature." 
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Nature." "But ", he goes on to say, "this materialistic 
doctrine is veiled in a mystical yet attractive obscurity, 
in as much as it is not expressed in the clear simple 
language of reason, but emphatically enunciated in that 
sacred word of the emotions, God." 
If Feuerbach therefore came into touch with rich veins 
of philosophic thought in the world of his day, he had also 
to assay and test many theological doctrines. To this 
task it can hardly be said that he devoted the same care 
or disinterested appreciation. The scorn which comes to 
controversialists all too easily was a favourite weapon 
*a in his hands. "The unbelieving unbelief of modern 
times ma Les a hiding place for itself behind the Bible 
which is in its nature and origin Indefinite, "(N.C. 
p 251 Eng. trs.),he complains, and again, p 109ß' The 
speculative theologians and philosophers of modern 
times foist in all sorts of pantheistic definitions, although 
they deny the principle of pantheism -- a self -contradictory 
fabrication." and also, p 53, note, "The fabrications 
which modern rationalistic orthodoxy and pietistic 
rationalism have advanced concerning the Incarnation in 
opposition to the rapturous conceptions and expressions 
of ancient faith do not deserve to be mentioned, still 
less controverted. "and again, p 164 " I turn with loathing 
and contempt from modern Christianity in which the Bride 
of Christ readily acquiesces in polygamy, at least in 
successive/ 
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successive polygamy. Iturn back with reverence to the 
misconceived truth of the chaste monastic cell ". 
Yet disappointed as Feuerbach was with his intellectual 
and spiritual associates, the age was not so barren as 
he declares. The labours of the Tubingen school betrayed 
and occasioned a great ferment of thought. Bauer applied 
to the hew Testament the methods of criticism which De 
Wette had used in connection with the Old Testament. 
Strauss, whose career suggests many parallels with that 
of Feuerbach, emphasised the llegelian dialective in sacred 
History with his "Leben Jesus" (1835) and in Christian 
thought with his "Christliche &lanbenslehre" (1841.2) but 
ended in a hopeless materialism with "Der alte and der 
tieue Glanbe" (1872). If the activities of these and 
their associates are not to be reckoned for gain to the 
Christian cause, and they certainly awakened many to the 
reality of historical and critical questions that must 
be faced, yet such works as "The Sinlessness of Christ by 
Ulmann and J. killer's "Doctrine of Sin" prove the 
existence of vigorous and valufble positive thinking. 
Also the names of Lampe, Spen4er, Francke, and Bengel remind 
us that Pietisn exercised a wide and beneficient influence. 
Schleierrn tiler and even Kent before him were the recipients 
of its ppiritual powers. Through Zinzendorf and the Brethern 
it opened up spring s of individual and religious feel in: 
Over against the dulness of orthodoxy and rationalism alike 
it/ 
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it continued the teaching of Philip Jacob Spener and 
sought to bring to men the doctrine and blessings of 
regeneration. Without polemic it endeavoured to make 
clear in the Reformed Theology the distinction of 
essential and non -essential, and thoughit taught the 
importance of the individual it yet emphasised the need 
of instruction especially in bible knowledge. This 
devotional study ran out into practical works of 
benevolence, passed beyond the bounds of nationality and 
entered upon the modern crusade of missions to heathen 
lands. Tholuck, born in 1799, lived till 1877 to see 
these interests so dear to his heart firmly established. 
Ably contending against Rationalism as he did, he persuaded 
men not less by his devotional than by his theological and 
critical writings. 
But here is the judgment of Dr Hastie in his introduction 
to The History of German Theology by Lichtenberger," p. 
XXIV; "The work of German Theology throughout the century 
has been in its own way, however much it has been misre --- 
resented and decried, a work of revival and renovation 
and reconstruction. In the midst of the disturbed faith 
and the distracted consciousness of the times and its 
manifold yearnings and gropings after a new order of life 
and thought, it exhibits the application of the highest 
energies of the human mind, in the free spirit of 




what is most vital in Christianity and most essential 
to religion. And although it has learned to restrain 
the speculative flight of the individual reason, and to 
abandon many a cherished idea and form, it remains not 
the less conspicuously conscientious, hopeful, and 
reverential in dealing with all the cardinal problems 
of religion." 
At the same time it is good to remember that Hastie is 
thinking not simply of the first part of the XIXth century 
but especially of the latter part when Ritschl and his school 
had definitely set theology in the path of Christian 
experience and history. There were indeed many disturbing 
factors in the life of file Church. The relation to the 
State had not been settled at the Reformation and Luther 
had given the Prince a place of authority larger than that 
assigned to him in e.g. the Westminster Confession of raith. 
Also the Consistorial system hampered and delayed the growth 
of liberty within the Church. The Union of the Reformed 
Churches 
and Evangelical4in 1817 was more of force than inclination, 
so that inji 45 there was recognition granted to the Lutherns 
in Prussia who had separated. But inj$53 the decree went 
forth the Union must not be broken. 
Controversies within the Church were many and periodicals 
and magazines appeared to represent the various issues. 
Endeavours were made within the Church to introduce reforms 
both intellectual and practical. Although Bavaria and 
ERLANGEN/ 
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Erlangen were the homes of Lutheran Confessionalism, the 
mediating theology held sway. Ministers were uneasy and 
so too were the people. Desiring, the rites of the Church, 
we w. are told, in Baptism and Confirmation and giarriage, 
they paid their Church tai- and wondered what the sermons 
were all about. And at the back of everything there 
sounded the appeal of the Communist h,anifesto of December 
1847, "Workers unite: You have nothing to lose but your 
chains!" 
In considerin the general influences at work in this 
period we cannot pass over the extraordinary persistence 
of Rationalism. The influence of Christian Wolff was a 
force even after Kant had dealt faithfully with him. He 
died in 1754, yet his teaching continued to direct the 
thoughts of large numbers of people. Among the clergy were 
many who feared the appeal to the feeling of the Nietest 
or the Idea of the philosopher. Loofs has pointed out 
in his "Leitfaden zur Dogmengeschichte" that whereas 
Rationalism reached its height in EnEland about 1750 it 
held sway for many years after that in Germany. Kant, critic 
of ,rolff as he was, still in many ways snowed its influence. 
The very title of his book on religion, "Religion within 
the Limits of pure Reason" makes this plain (1793) and 
from him we have the definition of Rationalism, ''He who holds 
as morally necessary, i.e. as duty, merely natural religion 
can be called rationalist in matters of faith.," and this 
is/ 
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is distinguished from Naturalism and supernaturalism. 
v. u:, t n 
(Loafs' Grundlinien der Kirckengeschichte par 306). 4p °T"e.r 
Hegel was himself a child of the Aufklärung, a larger 
movement than Rationalism but including it, and however 
he might speak about 'objective reason' he himself showed 
in his deductive method, his preoccupation with mind, his 
tendency to substitute principles for persons the spirit of 
that sdhool. 
Feuerbach with his practical interest in religion was 
ever on the alert to detect its baneful presence, e.g. Luther's 
doctrine of the two natures appeared to him just such an 
expression of the old theology of the old Church. But 
he himself did not escape the snare, and Lange reproaches 
him for giving us in W. C. a "Reason hanging in the aid ". 
But Bolin takes him to task for this, and protests that 
he does not take into account the later development of his 
doctrine. While this is partly true and there is a 
development, even in his later works the cold and narrowing 
influence of the old theory of a detached and disinterested 
reason is to be foand. On4hing certainly marks Feuerbach 
from the theologians that while he used reason to criticise, 
they for the most part used it to confirm, It served 
its part in the overthrow of dogma and sharpened independent 
judgment on such matters as the wars of religion which had 
disgraced the XVIIth century. That Feuerbach was affected 




with its reference to just such affairs. 
Two great writers exercised throughout this period 
a commanding influence. Firstly, Hegel with whom the 
interests of theology and ohilosophy were closely linked 
together, so that Feuerbach could say, "The Hegelian 
philosophy is the last refuge, the last rational support 
of theology". ( Vorläufige Thesen, II, 262.) ; (and GrIndsaitze 
§ 5 Ç The Speculative philosophy is the true,the considtent, 
the rational theology' and secondly, Schleiermacher, with 
whom began the rejuvenescence of theology and the 
establishment of religion in her own right. Noble in 
character, learned in many spheres, eloquent in the pulpit 
and in the study alike, Schleiermacher exercised an influence 
on Feuerbach greater than he admitted. He calls him "the 
last theologian of Christianity (I.249) but declares he was 
too cowardly to confess a theology without a God" ( ti 1.C, p.9). 
Generous reference is made elsewhere however to the unforgett- 
able impressiveness of his personality and his preaching. 
Apart from this the relation of Feuerbach to Schleiermacher 
as also to Hegel is worthy of further consideration andi,must 
be content with this brief reference at the present. stage. 
Reviewing the various movements of the period we are 
impressed with the many factors which were working for unrest 
and disintegration. It is only right to say that Feuerbach's 
voice was not alone in its protest and criticism. it is 
wise also to consider that revolts have long memories and 
the/ 
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the fibres of their roots in this case stretched out 
across Europe even to America and to far distant controversies. 
The age was strained and dissatisfied. Absolutism in State 
and University and Church pressed heavily upon its desires 
for ampler life. Religion, beset as ever by many foes, 
had discovered new utterance but struggled uneasily within 
the state -made union of the Churches uncertain even of its 
friends and advocates. 
CHAPTER. III. 
THE PERSONAL HISTORY, 
EXPERIENCE, AND ACTIVITY 
OF FE+J ERBACH 
AS INTERPRETATIVE OF HIS THEORY OF RELIGION. 
" Who will may hear 
Sordello's stcbry told ." 
Browning 
"Those obstinate questionings 
Of sense and outward things , 
Fallings from us, vanishings; 
Blank misgivings of a creature 




The Personal History, Experience and Activity 
of Feuerbach. 
We must now look a little closer at the personal 
history and experience of the man who was so sensitive to 
the movements of the age. These details will cast light 
upon his final verdict as to the validity of religious 
experience, and they will show it to be a development 
through a sharp antagonism to an effort at a positive 
statement. 
The family into which Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach was born 
was one of distinction. Of the five sons the first became 
an archaeologist of note, the second and third professors 
of mathematics and law respectively, while Ludwig the 
fourth was encouraged amid the changes and disappointments 
which befell him by the constant loyalty of Fritz his 
younger brother. The romantic tendencies of the father 
have been mentioned, but these did not prevent him rising 
by talent and energy to a place of high rank in legal affairs. 
The title he bore was indeed both of length and consequence, 
"Konigliche bayrische "+irkliche Statsrat and Appelationsgericl±s 
Praesident." His inclinations were to philosophy but 
the discouragement of his father and the pressure of 
circumstances through an early marriage led him to seek 
a road which would provide the means of existence for himself 
and the eight children who appeared in due course. When his 
son Ludwig sought to disregard these stern necessities and 
to, 
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to pursue philosophy at all costs, it was only after he 
had received grave and repeated warnings from one who had 
personally reviewed the difficulties of such a career. 
"My will and my reason curb the passions',his father had 
written and it was well for his son that he had his father 
to finance him even with the slender assistance which he 
requested. Of his mother we need only say that she played 
her part with the supreme sympathy and affection we find in 
the story of many of Germany's famous sons. 
Born oil the 28th July 1804 at Landshut in Bavaria and 
dying on the 15th September 1872 at Reckenberg our author 
longed for a recognition which came too late. Yet the 
years between were full of many labours, interesting 
literary and philosophical contacts, much hero -worship, 
more rebelliousness against the idols of the University and 
the iitxttixmicg State lively hopes, disillusionment, hardship 
and retirement. 
Starcke speaks of the mystery of his character. He refers 
not to the attractiveness of a man who was often silent in 
company, moody at times and halting in speech till the 
barriers broke down under the pressure of thought and 
feeling, but to the "%esignation ", practical as well as 
philosophical, with which he passed from his dreams of a 
Professor's chair and accepted the isolation of a home in 
the country. Did he ever really reconcile himself to such 





The question arises also whether his theory of 
religion and life were influenced by these circumstances. 
"Feeling is a dream with the eyes open," he writes, (W.C. 
chap XV, p 141 Eng trans), Wishes are for him no guide 
to reality. Bid he gather these lessons among the ashes 
of his youthful hopes? Unfortunately for the theory,the 
key to his philosophy was early fashioned, disappointment 
came later and it came largely because he mocked at those 
who said that Religion was more than a dream. It is possible 
to say that if early success had been his lot he might have 
a 
been /more balanced man. One cannot tell. On the other 
hand success might have made him more materialistic than 
he/'actually is, it might have taken from him the sincerity 
of his appeals for sympathy and love. Or again, it might 
be argued that religion should have come as a welcome 
release to the often depressed student of the Bavarian village. 
Certainly he was what is now called an 'intvovertt, self - 
centred in thought and imagination, like a dreamer who 
sought by pinching his body to waken himself or assure 
himself he was awake. The solidity of the world revealed 
by the senses came to him as a relief and comfort against 
the unsubstantiality of his desires. This effort to 
escape illusion itself formed a complex which determined 
his outlook. Bolin has a pathetic chapter on Feuerbach's 
loneliness, entitled, "Vereinsamt ". The quotations from 
his/ 
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his letters show that his shyness was something which 
accompanied him all his life. Writing to his brother 
Fritz in 1831 he says, "Withdrawal- within ourselves and 
modesty is alas the fault of all of us. Humility is 
with us the peculiar original sin." Even in 1837 he 
confesses that he is a peculiar person not to be classified, 
and later he laments, "My whole life has been made up of 
limitations, renunciations and denials, of being thrown 
back upon myself, "xxii Yet on the other side there was not 
lacking confidence in himself, and even pride; "My time comes 
yet.," he writes near the end, "therefore only patience." 
eternal optimist great child ". 
But we may leave to psychologists the interpretation of such 
a character, and ourselves, wary of imaginative construction, 
keep to the more obvious path of fact and experience. 
Psychological processes do not give a final explanation. 
They may show the symptoms but not the cause of them. 
Feuerbach had a mentality as well as a mood, an intellectual 
position as well as an emotional pose and we do not do 
sufficient justice to him if we say he needed only a 
psycho- analist to put him on the right path. 
As a schoolboy, we are told, he read his Bible carefully 
and the desire of his father coincided with his own that he 
should follow the study of theology. "The first tendency which 
came forward with definiteness in my time of youth, he says, 
16 
roughly in my 15th of /yearx was not for science, nor even 
philosophy,/ 
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philosophy, but religion. This religious tendency arose 
in me not through religious instruction, i.e. about 
confirmation, which had rather left me, though I knew it 
still perfectly good, quite indifferenxt, or through other 
outward religious influences but purely from myself through 
the need of a something which neither my environment nor 
the school instruction gave me. As a result of this 
tendency I set religion before me as the goal and calling 
of my life and determined to be El theologian. But what 
I once was to become, that wished I now to be already. 
Consequently I busied myself as pupil at the gymnaseum 
zealously with the Bible as the foundation of Christian 
theology." (Kohut. t3p 28,29) Hebrew he studied not only 
at school but privately with a Rabbi. Among the books he 
read were Oibbon'sZecline and Fall, Mosheim's Church 
History, Herder's letters on Theological Study, Eichhorn's 
Introduction to the Old and New Testaments and a theological 
Church History of the XVIth century. At this time also 
he made acquaintance with Luther and Hamann, the so- called 
Magician of the North, critical of his fellowtownsman Kant 
and a believer in the simple apprehension of reality as 
given in the facts both of nature and of revelation. 
In his school -album he enters the following quotation 
from Opitz, "Mhoso lays aside the desires of the world and 
thinks on that which is not to perish lays an anchor so sure 
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II. p 380, Curriculum vitae meae). 
ie are reminded of Renan in his youthful days, destined 
to be a more genial critic of Christianity, who, we are 
told, was so devout in spirit that he never neglected to 
introduce the cross into his signature. Neither ever lost 
something of these early impressions and Fauerbach retained 
more of selfdiscipline and unworldly regard for others. 
The emphasis upon the practical side of Christianity, "die 
Menschenliebe," in Herder's Letters had greatly impressed 
him and the influence was permanent. 
In 1823 he went to Heidelberg as a student of Theology 
and, encouraged by his father, applied himself with such 
diligence that he afterwards declared in his dry humorous 
way, "Theology has destroyed my digestion ". Even the 
intellectual fare was to prove before long unpalatable. 
Of Paulus, the head of theological rationalism, he 
declared that his lectures were nothing more than "a 
spider 's web of sophisms which he limed together with the 
mucous refuse of a miscarrying ingenuousness." The 
elegance of the language foreshadows his later achievements 
in real vitu.oeration and express more than the usual dissat- 
isfaction of student life. Others came under his scornful 
comment. "The only philosopher &ere is Erhardt, but this 
is a philosopher in name and not in fact. He has indeed 
frequently good and beautiful thoughts, but they stand there 
8o forsaken beside him like orphanchildren and girn at one 
another/ 
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another like dogs and cats, instead of shining bright 
together in one flame of love and sacrificing themselves 
to one fundamental thought as they ought to do. " (Vol II 
p 382) 
One professor alone pleased him, Karl Daub, and part 
of his excellence was that he pointed beyond himself to the 
genius of Hegel. (Daub, we are told, revised the proofs 
of Hegel's Encyclopaedia.) In a very charming interchange 
of letters with his people at home he expresses his whole- 
hearted desire to enter upon the study of philosophy. 
It is in other hands in Berlin than in Heidelberg, and 
besides would he not have the opportunity of hearing the 
great Schleiermacher and the famous Neander. His parents 
feared the allurements of the great city, but the lad replied 
somewhat sententiously but sincerely, "The devil has his 
quarters not only at Courts but in small towns and villages, 
but the man who carries something else in heart and sense 
than the common life and strife will go through the midst 
of hell unspoilt: what it extorts from him is only mocking 
jest. There as here my narrow solitary room will be 64 
the great wide world in which I move and a kindly Charon to 
carry me out of the land of joyous mortals into the silent 
iin°lom of the dead where are my books: there as here, alone 
by myself, will I eonsume my poor dry bite of supper instead 
of carousing in thirsty company, and cold water will be my 





be the horn of plenty for my many and great merrymakings, 
and the ink will be the Burgundy at least for my pen . 
It was earnest pleading and indicated a sober resolve 
and a change of direction. Kohut remarks truly, "As 
Ludwig undertook this Mecca- journey, he had already passed 
beyond theology. (p 34). It was, as he said later, that 
something had entered into his being (Wesen) which had not 
yet appeared in his consciousness(Bewusstsein). He stood 
ready in his being as a novitiate in the vestibule of the 
temple of Isis while his consciousness lingered yet in Palestine. 
His father knowing that philosophy promised little as a 
Brotstudium" hesitated to yield to the impassioned appeal 
of his son. "I too have dwelt in Arcady" he urged, but 
the boy replied that he had lived dwelt felt and thought in 
theology... he could sing and rejoice like David, lament 
with Jeremiah over the fall of the divinely dedicated city, 
he had been with the disciples throught the Holy Land hanging 
on the lias of the Master, drinking in the honey of his 
teaching. "I have lived in Theology. But now she pleases 
me no more, she gives me not what I demand, what I require, 
not my daily bread, not the necessary victuals of my spirit: 
to the wretch on the cross she proffers a spong of vinegar 
instead of the desired drink of cool water...Palestine is too 
narrow for me, I must, I must into the wide world and this 
is borne only on the shoulders of the philosopher.... To 
turn myself back into theology means to cast again a spirit 
that has become immortal into mortal hell once for all 
laid aside: for philosophy offers me the golden apple of 
rtality/ 1 Í!l't 10! is 
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immortality and assures to me the enjoyment of eternal 
happiness, a presence a likeness with myself... I will 
press Nature to my heart before whose depths the cowardly 
theologian draws back trembling, whose meaning the physicist 
misunderstands, whose deliverance alone the philosopher 
completes... the man, but the complete man, nor the maa as 
the doctor sees him in the hospital or under anatomy, as 
the jurist in the state or penitentiery, as the financier 
sees him in the baker and brewer... Share with me the joy 
over the founding of a new kingdom in me, over my new life 
and the defeat of a world which cared for me in such step - 
motherly fashion that she has left me no other way than to 
consume myself with vexation, and rejoice over the beneficient 
feeling to have escaped the hands of the dirty parsons and 
to have as my friends spirits like Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant 
and Hegel." 
To his brother Edward he wrote more concisely, "extra 
philosophiam mulla salus." What could a father do but 
own 
shake his head, quote his /experience, counsel prudence and 
submit and give introductions to his friends in the great city; 
Berlin fascinated the young Southerner. Never was there 
such a University, Other universities are mere "Kneipe" 
(light student gatherings)compared with this hive of industry. 
Hegel's lectures were much clearer than his writings, we are 
told, because adapted to his hearers, and after attending but 
a few the new student writes that he sees already in bright 
flame what with Daub appeared still dark and unintelligible. 
He/ 
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He required all his enthusiasm, for his food was most 
abstemious and his manndar of life most secluded. He formed 
no club connectious, took no part in political life, and 
yet as a foreigner and as the supposed member of a secret 
society, he was both despised and the object of police 
supervision. These matters he did not mention to his 
father but the latter came to hear of it and broke out 
against the folly of the time, not forgetting to commend the 
thoughtful silence and self- control of the boy. 
Only for a short time did he attend Schleiermacher and 
Neander. "The theological mix -up of freedom and independence, 
reason and faith were vexatious even unto death to my soul 
which loves truth i.e. unity, definiteness, the unconditioned." 
Philosophy had won its victory for the time over theology, 
the ancient queen of the sciences. 
Time was to cast a shadow over his worship of Hegel, but 
Berlin never lost the attractiveness of a first love. Often 
his thoughts turned to the Prussian capital. There surely 
amid his disappointments he hoped that sufficient freedom 
might be found for one of his disposition. "Prussia I 
revere as my second, my spiritual, my true fatherland, "he 
writes, a statement which must be understood in contrast with 
the narrow conditions of the south. A visit in later years 
brought back many vivid experiences. At this corner he met 
Hegel. There in the Dreifaltigkeit Kirche he listened to 
the eloquent and architonic sermons of Schleiermacher. 
Rhantasy/ 
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Phantasy served Feuerbach ill in his hopes and memories. 
Even Berlin would not open the door to the man whose teaching 
had flouted the authorities. 
Already in 1827 -8 the alert mind of the student was 
moving away from his master. "My words with which I took 
farewell of Hegel were somewhat along these lines, he writes, 
'Two years now have I heard you, two years mndividedly 
dedicated to your philosophy. Now I feel the need to 
throw myself into the exact opposite. I am now going to 
study anatomy.'" 
Ne are to consider later and in more detail the relation 
of pupil and master, but it is necessary to say here that 
Hegel's teaching on Theology and .philosophy excited bïhs 
suspicion. Was the task of philosophy merely to recognise 
and justify by a process of rationalisation the particular 
Christian doctrines? Had religion no sufficient ground of 
her own? And on the other hand, was philosophy only a 
disguised, an esoteric theology? 
As for the larger speculative question, what was the 
relation of Denken and Sein, Logic and Nature? Where was 
the necessity of the passage from the one to the other? 
Did the dialectical movement ever take one outside itself? 
Beyond the Logic was not the thinker forced to recognise the 
immediateness of Nature? For he writes (Curr. vitae mae,1827- 
88) 
a Were there no Nature, never would the immaculate virgin 
Logic/ 
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Logic produce one from herself." 
With the whole atmosphere of the University Feuerbach 
felt himself dissatisfied. Like a good German thinker 
he hated mediating theories and later characterised them 
as he had found them among his teachers ttì the following 
sarcastic fashion, "Christian and modern elements were 
stirred together into a mass of sausage in which the 
orthodox Church doctrine supplied the meak1the Schleiermacher 
theology the bacon, and the Hegelian ;Philosophy the spice." 
The wings of the young student were beginning to weary for 
other climes. The sand of Berlin was irritating his eyes, 
Before he was to cleanse them finally in the pure air of 
the country, he presented his Doctor- dissertation in 1828 to 
Erlangen University. The title of it makes plain that the 
spirit of Hegel yet held sway in his thinking, ( "De ratione una 
universali infinita". The paper was sent to the theological 
professor, G.A. Harless of Erlangen, and also to Hegel. 
In both cases Feuerbach sent letters in which with modesty 
and yet with independence he asserted that he was convinced 
of the truth of the chief contents and believed that one 
positive thing he had done was "to destroy a deceptive 
appearance of the sensible consciousness which could appear 
only at a time where the single individual valued himself 
as absolute and infinite and consequently the Universal would 
be ascribed to him as an attribute, thinking as a power, as 
artistic skill, as aptitude. For with the ancients, just 
to/ 
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to touch on this in passing fashion, where in general not 
the immediate not the real personality but only-the 
individuality perceived, thought, mediated through art 
had worth, there was valued, and so to say existed, no 
individual soul; the soul passed for the absolute Universal, 
as God self, Animus Deus est, as with the Indians Brahma 
is called pure thinking, intuition, Wisdom, the Soul ". 
(Kohut, p. 55). The chief thing to notice is the 
enthusiasm for Reason, a sphere where individuality does 
not count, a distinct forecasting of the interpretation 
given in J.C. and later. Reason is of the essence of man, 
it is not an abstraction, with it essence and existence 
all together. (Vol II 386) In his letter to Hegel he says 
further, Christianity cannot be understood as the perfect and 
absolute religion, this can only be the kingdom of the 
actuality of the Idea and of the existing Reason. Christian- 
ity is nothing else than the religion of pure self, of the 
person as exalted spirit, which exists in general and is 
consequently only the antithesis of tie old world,. What 
significance, for example, has Nature in this religion?.. She 
lies there not comprehended not taken up into the unity 
of the divine Being, full of mystery, so that only the 
'person' (not Nature, the world, spirit) celebrates its 
salvation which was just its knowledge,. Reason has there- 
fore in Christianity not yet been set free." 
His father is very pleased with it all, jokes about a 
Professor's/ 
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professors chair at Erlangen where the son is lecturing 
as a privat dozent on Desc,rtes, Spinoza and philosophy 
in general. There was no sign, however that he was to 
carry the place by storm. While his father might write 
with fond pride of the alert mind, the good presence and 
the fluent speech of the young man, his friends confessed 
that his oratorical endowments were not the strongest side 
of his genius. Further, the trend of his thought was 
against the fashion of the day and the pietists disavowed 
him. 
The real crisis came in 1830 with the publication, 
anonymously, of his book, " Gedanken eines Denker úber Tod 
and Unsterblichkeit." So far as man's personal hopes were 
concerned there was more about death than immortality in 
b( 
it, and though, as I have said, published anonymously,was 
generally ascribed to Feuerbach. The Bavarian police laid 
hold upon it. Not only in Bavaria but elsewhere, as 
his father at once perceived, its influence would be more 
than prejudicial, it would be fatal to the hopes of his son. 
This sombre verdict proved all too true. Time and again 
the author applied for some post only to find this spectre 
destroying all the good efforts of his friends. On one 
occasion the Pro -Rektor of a university addressed to him 
a polite letter , referring to the report that he was the 
author of the book, and saying, "I ask you to put me in a 
Position to prove the baselessness of this imputation." 
Feuerbach/ 
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Feuerbach made no reply and afterwards regretted that he 
had not answered this inquisitorial challenge as he thought 
it should be answered. One kindly critic pronounced it 
"clever but comfortless" and shrely hinted that it was easy 
for a young man with an indefinite capital of years before 
him to deal lightly with thefinal extinction of himself 
as an individual and the transition of the material to 
other forms. To do the young man justice, he tells us 
(Bolin p 4) that he wrote it with heartfelt and painful 
thoughts but steeled himself to indifference because of the 
call of present duty. 
It anticipates his later treatment of religion,especially 
imrnortalitylin so far as it emphasises the psychological 
explanation of the belief and traces it back to the vanity 
of the individual who bauilds this 'pons asinorum' to take 
him over the gap between this present life as it really is 
and his view of it. It is all very eloquent, lively, 
satirical, and it must be confessed, unsatisfactory. Its 
merit is its frankness, its criticism of the positive 
theology, and its disclosure of the method which Naturalism 
ever follows. (Vol III pl) The theme and the argument 
constantly reappear in his other works and in other settings. 
(Vp W.R. pp 17 -20) "What is the use of a meal if the 
hunger is past ? ", he asks in one of his Satir. theolog. 
Distichen, under the title "Das mùtzlose Jenseits". 
The/ 
62, 
Chapter III. Pers. 
The discouragement of his hopes of office did not 
diminish his literary activity nor his plans. He proclaims 
that his failure is his freedom, i.e. to become a writer." 
"I had rather be a devil in league with the truth than an 
angel in league with a lie.' This sounds a little like 
whistling to keep his courage up, but he really was pursuing 
his studies diligently. In 1833 his 'History of Modern 
Philosophy appeared, in 1834' Abaelard and Heloise, or The 
griter and the Man.' His thoughts turned to Paris, for 
since the Revolution of 1830 and the residence of Heine there, 
1831 Faris was the El Dorado of youthful Germany, Realism 
was the keyword of the future, industry assumed a new 
importance, yet theological and political thought still 
interested the young author. He felt that Paris would give 
him the inspiration he needed. Could his father give him 
funds to go there? No, came the reply, funds were not 
available. Should he try Zurich? Alas, there were too 
many hungry Privat.- docents there already. He becomes more 
restless. At one moment he laments he has no Mecaenas, 
at another he cries, the world is wide, France, America, lie 
before him. There are some very interesting letters between 
euerbach and his friend Kapp when the latter went to America. 
,1I. Bolin, p. 186 ff. ( 1832; 41; 50g The land of the free 
and the brave was set before him somewhat after the 
discouraging manner that we find in Dickens's account in his 
martin Chuzzlewit ". The correspondence is a pecullir study 
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in contrasted views, Feuerbach scarcely believing that all 
the beautiful things he dreamed about America were not true 
and the other seeking to make him aware of the hardness and 
barrenness of life in the new country. 
Events were moving however within the circle of domestic 
interests that were to shape his career after their own 
pattern. The hand of Necessity which later he emphasised 
as so determinative in the affairs of men was guiding his 
own. In 1833 came the death of his father. Two years 
later he became engaged to Bertha Löwe whom he married in 
1837 settling at Dorf and Schloss Bruckberg between Ansbach 
and Nuremberg and connected with a porcelain factory which 
originally belonged to the State but was now a private 
company in which his wife was deeply interested and his 
brother -in -law manager. (Gran I, 222). 
The reception accorded to his 'History of Modern Philosophy' 
(S.W. vol IV) was very good. There was no doubt as to the 
intellectual capacity and independent force with which he 
dealt with Spinoza, Bacon,etc. Bolin admits however that 
Feuerbach lacked the historical sense and that behind these 
studies there were the exposition and interpretation of his 
own views. In 'Leibnitz' (S.W. vol V) which appeared in 1836 
we have what is meant to be an extension of the former work, 
its second part. The influence of this study is to be found 
in the new interest in individuality along the line of the 
'Mbnad'/ 
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'monad' and a more acute recognition of the religious 
problem. In 1838 there came from his pen "Pierre Bayle", 
'A contribution to the History of Philosophy and Modern 
Culture." It took him back to a study of Rationalism 
among the disorders of the XVIIth Century. A recent outbreak 
of religious strife between Protestants and Roman Catholics 
in Bavaria seemed to show that the old evil spirit of religious 
repression had not passed away. "The aim of my Bayle was 
to instruct and shame an infatuated and exasperated people." 
(Vo r . WR. Le c t . 2.). 
Starcke in his Introduction, p 19, stated in concise 
form the various stages of Feuerbach's development. In 
"Leibnitz" he finds the close of his first, or metaphysical 
period. Here the substantial, the actual is to be found in 
the Universal. The second period opens with Bayle "in 
1838 and closes with the very important Grundsätze" 1843. 
There he saw the actual in the individual in conflict with 
the universal,while Reason was cast hither and thither between 
them. He confesses a certain difficulty in defining the 
limits of this period, but he selects the year 1843 so that 
the Grundsätze become the last significant work from this 
standpoint. Already at this time "Sensibility is proclaimed, 
but it is with still a trace of metaphysical" Resignation ", 
with which later Feuerbach will have nothing whatever to do. 
One/ 
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One must here satisfy oneself with the sensible world, as 
if there were talk of a reality in itself outside the 
sensible world. First with 'Luther', 1844, begins the 
last period of the history of his thought. Reason is close 
bound to the sensible reality, dir, as Feuerbach himself says, 
"First in "Luther" I have fully thrown off the philosopher 
and alloyed the philosopher to pass completely into the Man. 
I have passed from the recognition of the reality of sensibil- 
ity in natural science to the recognition of its absolute 
reality. This insight I gained first in the sphere of 
religion ". (S.W. I. XIII). 
Some of these points will come up later in the course 
of our discussion, but our present interest lies more in the 
definitely religious works, four of which with 'Bayle' we 
shall treat in some detail, gathering about them or the 
criticism of them, the philosophical principles involved. 
d 
In 1841 appeared Das Wesen des Christentums, (vol VII) 3rd 
and enlarged edition in 1848 -9. * Das Wesen der Religion 
followed in 1845 (vol I). `Vorlesungen uber das Wesen der 
Religion (vol VIII,) in 1851 andTheogonie, nach den quellen 
des hebraischen, romischen und griechischen Altertums, (vol 
IX) in 1857. These and other writings occupy ten substantial 
volumes in a collected edition begun in 1846. "Theogoni,11 
was intended to be his swan -song,(though a supplement was 
added later," Zur Theogonie "), his whole system presented 
in/ 
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in compact form. With it he would revive his oriental 
Latin and Greek linguistic studies and with them his youth 
in which they had their roots and then make an end. He 
confesses that the youngest is always the most beloved and 
so Theogonie is the most prized. His only regret was that 
outward circumstances are so unfavourable." Up to the present 
indeed I have had no lack of will nor of mind and material, 
but I lack the agreeable locality, the nest for the hatching 
out of my thoughts, and alas I belong to the birds which 
carry on their task of propagation only in a special place... 
But it is better to end as a swan than as a talkative goose. " 
These last words refer to the unfortunate bankruptcy of 
the porcelain factory at schloss Bruckberg which had been 
his home for nearly 25 years and his removal to Dorf Reckenberg 
in the neighbourhood of Nuremberg and especially to the very 
uncomfortable quarters he had to put up with there. Feuerbach 
wrote in his diary (Grin vol II p4):--- 
" Bruckberl was with my limited means the basis of my 
dconomics, but economics is the basis of Philosophy and 
morals," and later he wrote "My parting from Bruckberg is 
the parting of soul and body. I have signed today my 
contract of rent with H.V.B., and with it haply I have signed 
my death -warrant." Not very brave words perhaps, but F. 
confessed elsewhere that his was not the heroic spirit which 
could rise superior to its chains. In addition to these 
troubles his health began to fail; first in 1866 a slight 
shock/ 
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shock befell him, then another in 1870 and the end came in 
Sgpternber 1872. 
A wider public had become aware of his necessities. In 
1862 a grant of 900 thalers had been made by the Schiller 
Boundation, to be spread over three years. Karl Gr:Un with 
whom he had much correspondence, later published, on 
Christmas 1871 handed over a considerable present of money 
from a group of friends with the kindly words "et is not 
forgotten by us, as it ought not to be forgotten by the 
whole German people that you are that critic who has never 
taken anything from man without giving it back to him again 
two or three times over, whose "Essence of Christianity" was 
the enrichment of man alone and whose "Theogonie" was in 
single -hearted fashion the apotheosis of human development ". 
Some evidence of the respect and appreciation in which he 
was held was revealed in the huge concourse which gathered at 
his fundral, 20,000, it is said, in the famous Johannis 
Kirchhof at Nuremberg. It was arranged (Bolin, p. 340) by 
the Social- Democratic Labour Party, of which since 1870 FuevbAC/t 
had been a member. That death makes strange companions of 
us all is instanced in the fact that this was the resting 
place of Albrecht Durer, Hans Sach and Wilibald Pirkheimer. 
His wife with a sincere excess of devotion is reported to 
have s &&d," He was more than mortal, he w5-s a god." But 
one finds less reason to excuse the orator who at the graveside 
began impressively "Auch die Götter sterben." Reading over 
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these farewell and commemorative speeches, it is hard for 
us today to envisage a situation in which they have reality. 
',`That strange tisinterpretations of Christianity must have 
been in the minds of people, under the influence of Pietist 
and euritanito make this rebound from the heavenly realities 
back to the uncertain joys of this earth! 
But here are some quotations which bring the situation near 
to us. "He it is to whom we are debtors and whom the coming 
generation yet in another fashion will thank, who above all 
has torn down the curtain which separated and divided us from 
our proper selves, who has torn away the veil and the bonds 
which for thousands of years through the hands of priests 
has been laid on the eyes and hearts of men and as a result 
of which our race pictured itself on our earth as on a place 
of cursing, a vale of woe, imagined that everything high, 
beautiful, noble, everything divine is to be found only beyond 
and above us, not in ourselves, which imagined we must first 
die in order to come into possession of all these highest 
goods, for there above behind the stars, behind the arch of 
heaven dwelt the great God and there only is true eternal life, 
there in the beautifulother land. This dream of mankind it 
is which Ludwig Feuerbach, he at least before all, once for 
all has destroyed and shattered to pieces... The world is 
one, eternal and infinite, and there is no above and below, 
Present age and age to come. The highest revelation of the 
world's/ 
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world's being is the self -conscious spirit in us, in our 
conscience, our reason, in collective humanity and history. 
Religion is not supernatural, not from outside or above, 
but it is much rather the characteristic work of Mankind, its 
proper feeling, seeing hoping, thinking, a product of its 
very self... That was the inner force and pressure of his 
being... Love of truth." 
If one may be permitted to criticise such an address after 
the lapse of years has robbed our words of any impropriety, 
we may remark that the closing reference, (not quoted), to 
re(4e.vback S 
the distress of life and his consequent sympathy with the 
masses hardly realises the picture of the blissfulness of 
this present life. And when the appeal is made to close the 
ranks and hold by the common idea of Humanity that the 
Fex...,sneacti- °S 
spirit of may continue with them, it sounds a little vague 
to.puur water into vessels that will soon be broken, and ask 
them to abandon the present comfort of a better life beyond 
the grave. Nor does it seem quite satisfactory to say, 
`Thy body we render home to the Mother who has borne us all: 
thy. spirit we preserve for ourselves as our holiest bequest 
which shall never be taken away from us." A good name is 
certainly a noble legacy, but surely the man is more than 
the name, and what right has man, a creature of time, to say 
that our holiest bequests shall never be taken away. 
Poems many in number and varying in quality poured from 
the pens of enthusiastic admirers. Of great importance was 
the/ 
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the address on behalf of the Social Democratic party, not 
lacking in comprehensiveness certainly, (Kohut p 350) "In 
the name of all Social Republicans of the earth, in the 
name of the International Workers' Association in the name 
of the Social -Democrat Party of Germany, in the name of 
his friends, Vaillant, Karl Marx, Johann Jacoby, Bebel 
and Liebknecht I lay this well- earned laurel wreath on the 
bier of the noble dead." 
These names show how Feuerbach's teaching had been 
appropriated by the school of economic materialism. 
Religion being an illusion and Necessity in the form of 
human economic needs being the paramount impulse, how easy 
to use the great literary skill of this writer for their 
ends. 
How wide has the influence of Feuerbach been? That is 
not easy to determine. In the preface to the second edition 
of W.C. Feuerbach says " quite contrary to aim and 
expectation my writing has found a universal public." 
Certainly it has gone through many editions, reaching the 
fourth in 1881 and the tenth and twe-lxth in 1923, also it 
has found its way into Kröners Taschenausgabe, along with 
'Pierre Bayle', l'Unsterblickkeit," V.W.R. and it is also, 
I believe, in Reclat's inexpensive issue. At the same time 
it is not easy to get copies of these. A Ludwig Feuerbach 
Gesellschaft was founded by William Bolin of Helrsingfors 
to work out the implications of his teaching, theoretically 
and/ 
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and practically, but I know only the writings of Bolin 
and Jodl. 
His name is appearing however with strange persistence 
in many writings of to -day, as I have mentioned earlier, and 
there are reasons for this in the mood as well as in the 
thought of our generation. 
Before we estimate the truth of his theory we must first 
give a statement of the contents of several of the books 




SUMMARY AND SURVEY 
OF THE CHIEF ';xIRITIIdGS 
OF FEUERBACH. 
l. PIEñRE BAYT,E 
" Pierre Bayle" is for his philosophy 
the primitive mist which contains though 
in shapeless form the future world. " 
(Starcke, p89 ) 
Chapter 1V.. .ayle. 72.. 
Summary and Survey of the chief writings of Feuerbach. 
Feuerbach hated to keep diaries and so never set himself 
to compile an autobiography. In his letters to Grin and K #alp 
we have however a sufficient record of the events of his life 
and his reactions toward them. It was a different matter 
with regard to the progress of his own writings. Chapters one 
and two of his V 'N R are of special interest in this connect- 
ion, while the Preface to the Collected Works contains amid 
much self-analysis and biographical reference a somewhat 
pathetic utterance as to the ¡passage of time and the changes 
which it brings. It is with reluctance, he says, that he 
issues this edition. "How can I swim against the stream of 
life and go backwards instead of forwards ?" Yet as so often 
happens reflection won the victory over contrary feelings. 
He perceived that if his earlier and discarded positions were 
still used as we =pons by his adversaries yet the dust of dead 
books might serve as fertiliser for new productions. 
We shall not dwell upon the changes in the course of his 
thought for sufficient has been said of this in a previous 
chapter. It is enough to remark that he considered the 
reversal of his position to be so great that he could say of 
himself, "The true philosophy is no philosophy." Our aim is 
to give a summary and survey of the wettings that give most 
fully and clearly his characteristic positions. 
The important ' Grundsätze' der Philosophie der Zukunft" (S. 
W. II 269 -346) 1843, is more suitably dealt with in the course 
of the critical part of the Thesis, especially Chap. V. sec titan 
,5 
"PIERRE BAYLE" , published in 1838 seems to me to be of the 
greatest importance, giving a disclosure of his mind not just 
at one part icular/ 
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icular time but as subconscious background that coloured even.. 
his after -thoughts. 
It is, he says,(Pref. 5,W.) written from the point of view df 
Rationalism and therefore stands opposed to his opinions express- 
ed in W C. yet he admits that W C. is influenced by it, and there 
is no doubt that this is so, not only iñ the supremacy given to 
reason but also in the bias against religion and the'crimes of 
religion' which are there discussed. Lange, as we have seen, is 
critised by Bolin for saying that Feuerbach leaves us with an un- 
attached Reason hanging in the air. It is contended that he sough 
a realistic monism in which the dualism od sense and understand- 
ing is suspended if not superseded. 'hile that is his aim, no 
doubt, it is true to say that Feuerbach remains in the grip of 
reason and the laws of the cold intellect. Miracle is bugbear 
all through. always a plea is made for an independent Science 
and Art, and religion is depreciated because Christiaa truth, 
being Christian only, cannot really be true. In 'Bayle' also is 
raised the question whether Nature and LHeason can be equated,as 
is so often supposed,or if there be left in the end an irrational 
surd explicable only to the supreme Reason, if any such exist. 
'Pierre Bayle, a Contribution to the History of Philosophy and 
Mankind ',as it was designated, appeared in 1838 when Feuerbach 
had married and taken up his residence at Bruckberg. It is found 
in vol. 6 $, w. 
It continued his study of the history of modern philosophy 
and increased his prestige while it stiffened the opposition a- 
gainst him. Was it not tempting Providence,he admitted, to 
chap IV Bajtle. 74 
to issue a book with such a title, only the name of the 'bad 
Bayle', who broke the peace of the ire- established harmony of 
Leibnitz, the loose sceptic, the dialectical guerilla chieftan 
of all anti- dogmatic polemic. Bayle's character and significancee 
for the history of philosophy lie for the greater part already b II 
hind ús, consisting chiefly as it does in his negative relation tc 
theology(Ghap 9). Feuerbach's concern therefore is to show the 
conflict between Faith and Reason, Religion and __orality, as it 
survives to -day, and he proposes to do this by illuiinating the 
sensitive spots and incidentally manking reference to his own pos- 
ition. That he desired to make use of the opportunity for this 
last purpose is frankly avowed. That chapter 4 should begin with 
the words, "Nunzuruck zu Báyle" is of itself significant. 
We are left to gather from other sources the details of Ba.yle' 
life and letters. They may be briefly stated as follows. Born 
in 1647 he learned both Calvinism and Catholicism, as he changed 
from the first to the second and then again back to the first. 
Acting as professor at Sedan from 1675 -81, he also occupied the 
chair at Rotterdam. The attacks of the theologians, especially 
of Jurieu, led to the cancelling of his licence, and so fretted 
his genial nature as to intensify the malady from which he event- 
ually died in December 1706. His criticism of the traditional 
ideas of God and his rention to the world, exposing the contra- 
diction between his power and his goodness, and so making the 
problem of evil central wounied not only rationalistic theology 
but also the revelation which he professed, and most probably 
With sincerity, to defend . 
In order to find a place for philosophy and Liorality inde- 
pendent of religion Feuerbach feels that he must declare that 
religion is hostile and contradictory to both._ To this he is 
forced, he says, by the actions and claims of religion. In 
Catholicism the spitit is set free 
1 over/ 
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over against the flesh, while in Protestantism faith opposes 
reason. This opposition is characteristic of Christianity;' for 
whereas unity is the essence of classical paganism, dualismis 
the essence of Christianity. Christianity indeed adds to the 
many contradictions which are unavoidable and which paganism must 
accept superfluous ones : to the necessary and immanent struggle 
she adds soulshaking transactions, to bodily pains spiritual, to 
natural contradictions supernatural : God and the world are se- 
parated, heaven and earth, grace and nature, spirit and fleeh, 
faith and reason. Mile the op= )osition of Church and State is ally 
an outward expression of this attitude, the characterAstic inner 
contradiction is that between Nature and grace, or. more briefly 
and in the language of the Church, between spirit and flesh. 
Here we see that Feuerbach's interpretation of Christianity is 
to be governed by the ascetic unworldly or otherworldly view of 
it. Over against this stands the life which gladly accepts the 
world, flesh and man, and establishes Art Science and Morality on 
an independent basis. Science begins in truth only where the scient -¡ 
ific /FIRS spirit begins and this begins just where the sciences pass 
beyond the cloister into the hands of free men. (p 19) The Christ- 
ian artist must represent what is Christian not as Christian but 
as beautiful, 
( p 10) 
Does this otherworldly asceticism apply to Protestantism ? Yes 
theoretically 
if not practically, for Protestantism annulled the 
°PPosition of Catholicism between flesh and spirit, as for example 
in/ 
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in the marriage of Luther. But why should not reason be free 
as well as Nature ? Quite in the spirit of Schelling and Hegel 
he declares, Nature is physical Reason. " Protestantism has no 
outward means to still the pains of the soul,since reason is 
bound up with man's very existence and he must in the last in- 
stance seek to put to rest the doubts which come from :Reason by 
reasons which come from Reason herself. - -- Poor man he has for 
his source of healing only the source of evil. The desires of the 
flesh are like insects, but the desires of the impulse of know- 
ledge are like worms in the intestines. -- If peace comes, it is 
not the peace of truth, of reason, but of thoughtlessness or lazi- 
ness or self -deception." This contradiction of Faith and Reason 
is found already in Luther and Calvin: "The Scripture is more than 
all men's thoughts feelings and experience," says the former : but 
it has become more evident in recent times. 
A closer determination of this contradiction leads to an elo- 
quent and incisive chapter, ch. 3, on the nature of Theology and 
Science and the conflict between them. In place of Science we 
may put Philosophy,p 33, because11Philosophy is the Science wgich 
alone represents the idea of Science absolutely, the spirit of 
Science as spirit separated from definite stuff." 
The spirit of science is the universal spirit,p 31, the spirit 
absolutely, the KNIMXXXXI nameless spirit. Theology is essent- 
ially Christian theology, its principle is not truth as such, but 
the Christian truth, what is true as Christian: Particularism is 
its being. Whoever considers heathendom from the standpoint of 
Christianity/ 
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Christianity considers it falsely, unscientifically. Historical 
truth is given only when we deal with hisory in a purely scientrIr 
ific spirit. Science frees the spirit so that kq love, truth, 
humanity are always found on the side of the scientists,p 32. 
"Render to Reason the things which belong to Reason and to Art 
the things which belong to Art." 
And now we have one of those frank descriptions of the scient- 
ific method which clarify the situation. The mere 'Dass' Ofact 
or statement ) suffices for religious consideration, but the 'Wie' 
and ' Wodurch' is the kernel of the study of Nature,e.g. how the 
organs are built, how used, in what dcbes their nourishment con- 
sist. Questions of the wisdon and the goodness to be found in 
them lie outside Mature. These are subjective, in the mood of 
the beholder, and wonder at them may become wonder before a super- 
natural Being of Might Goodness and Wisdom. 
That Fanerbach was seeking to get rid of was the idea of adapt- 
ation used in a petty and imaginative way, so that actual enquiry 
was set aside for ' Astro.theology',Lithotheology, Hydrotheology, 
Insecttheology, on the basis of which proofs for the existence of 
God multiplied and at one time were reckoned at 6561. 
No direct view of Nature could be obtained for the idea of an 
external God was an intervening barrier. Occasionalism was the 
necessary consequence. Teleology appears to have good in it in 
so far as it makes us perceive the rational in Nature, but it is 
only appearance. Man remains in consequence outside Nature always 




able for an eloquent passage in which Feuerbach admits that the 
scientists of the last century, the XVill, were too limited in 
their observation of individual facts. They lacked the deeper 
sense of Nature in general. ''ghat Nature was to their God that 
she was to themselves -- a mere machine. For the most of them 
there was no Zug, no drawing to the home, no apprehension of kii,- 
ship with her being, but rather a state of surprise, a wonder con- 
cerning this mysterious being, an external amazement, not an ad- 
miration springing from the deep, a mere curiosity and conseq- 
uently in the first instance the attention was chiefly directed to 
' curiosa' or oddities. 
As for theology,she has succumbed completely to the marvellous 
so that Miracle,the will in its caprice and ignorance is the basis 
upon which it rests : its metaphysical principle is 'Creation out 
of nothing' for it tends to derive everythigg from God; ' nothing 
being in this case simply the ontological or metaphysical express- 
ion of the groundless, the pure will. 
While theology denies a natural origin for Christianity,phil- 
osophy affirms it has. Religion is an essential form of the hum - 
L 
an spirit,as Volk9sgeist, and so Christianity has a natural be- 
ginning, first in the very nature of religion,and again as the 
creature of a definite historical period, the downfall of the nat- 
ion. We know the good not only through itself but through the 
unhappiness of evil. Christianity has to thank for its purity, 
its strictness, its consistency the political and moral corrupt- 
ion of the time. 
Miracle which occupies a large place in Feuerbach's thought and 
chap 1. , . (7. 
and is constantly being referred to in his writings is described 
here as a natural necessity. It is a form of representation in 
popular religion not in Christianity only although in the case 
in the case of the latter there are differences in kind and aim. 
"The belief in miracle is the essence of miracle." To take mira &k 
as historical fact is to deceive oneself. 
That then is a Fact ? The answer given is, "That which in the 
moment it happens shuts out the possibility of being otherwise 
and consequently for the beholder shuts out the possibility of 
the doubt which the assertion that it is and that it so is diret- 
and necessarily brings with it." One cannot say that this defin- 
ition of Feuerbach's is very enlightening or comprehensive. It 
deals only with an imaedïate and overwhelming experience, and for 
one so interested as he is in Science there appears no scope or 
need for reflection, investigation, comparison etc. 
That galls him,however, id the superficial view of Nature im- 
plied in the idea of miracle. Nature for such a doctrine is a com- 
mon trivial thing uponwhich spectacular inroads must be made to 
reveal to us the spirit of God. Eqat in fact the miraculous,the 
divine spirit above Nature and ruling over Nature is solely Law 
inNature Law not as a de d. letter but the living deeply sensit- 
ive Spirit. the inner creative all -determining soul of Nature her- 
self. 
Chaptr 4 urges the independence of Morality from Religion 
as previously the are ¡.ument has been for the separation of Science 
from 
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from Theology and it involves a defence of Atheism as cpmpat- 
ible with morality. Morality is Nature and Nature is Reason in- 
carnate,so that Reason and Nature may safely be left to guide our 
actions. At the same time these two are not identical for the 
true principle of human actions is temperament, the natural tend- 
ency to pleasure or praise,certain customs accepted in intercourse 
with our friends or otherwise a cheerful feeling which has its 
basis in our nature. "A society of atthé is would exhibit civic 
and moral virtues just as wellit as any other society if they only 
strictly punished crime and joined the ideas of honour and shame 
to certain things': "If the French court had been atheistic, would 
there have been a bartholemew's night ? " There are laws of Nam 
OA thought not dependent on the will of man which by themselves 
and not as a result of free choiee are right and true: vain and 
ludicrous would be the resistance of the human spirit against the 
being and qualities of these laws - - -- : so there are laws of act- 
ion which flow from natural necessity, the most general rule being 
' according to Reason ' 
If it be said that the crimes of Religion, so frequently to 
the fore in discussions such as this, are not of the essence of 
religion, the reply made here is, First, Holiness is the highest 
category of religion and its subjective form is Faith which makes 
the object of faith a mystery to insolent eyes. But Holiness is 
not an original conception which as such belongs to Philosophy, 
because it depends on the conception of truth rationality morality, 
for only the true is holy though not yet is the holiecgñdly/ 
111111Pftwm.-__ 
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Secondly, religion becomes of necessity positive, a state -relig 
ion or a religion whose substance is the Church, a matter of in- 
heritance and opinion bound to time and place. Even Protestantï 
ism which restored the purity and inwardness of religion became* 
outward,formal dogmatic. God becomes a formal 'Pflicht- oWekt'. 
Faith is duty to God,theoretical doubt becomes a crime of lese 
majeste, for religion is a matter of the honour of the godhead . 
The duties of man to man become a subordinate matter. 
Thirdly, Feuerbach sums up this criticism,p 84 , by the assert- 
ion that Theology tears Ethics up by the roots, seeing that she 
pushes the Good beyond man and takes from him his best, his true 
God, in order to give him instead an external foreign deity. 
Chapter five continues the discussion of the independence of 
Morality and describes the nature and the place of Reason. Even 
the Roman Catholics admit neither Scripture not Church nor LtiraAle 
can do anything against the laws of reason,as,for example in the 
case of the proposition that the whole is ever greater than the 
part. The last ap eal is to reason and without it dogma totters. 
Feuerbach has no doubt that Reason is" a clear and lively 
only 
light which lightens all men so soon as they /turn the eyes of their' 
attention and convinces them without contradiction of its truth 
and warrants them in the conclusion that it is God, that it is 
essential and 
the /substantial truth itself which lightens us directly through 
itself and causes to appear in their being the ideas of the etern- 
al truths which lieV.n the universal principles and comcepts of 
Metaphysic s " p 89. 
Wrongly/ 
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Wrongly do the Lpicureans think the witness of the senses to 
be the rule and test of truth, though they are right in mainttn_-- 
ing that our senses cannot be subject to deception as they are 
the first rule of our knowledge and the origin of truth in the 
soulg . It is absolutely necessary that Reason decide between 
different lawgivers. 'If any set against it a supposed revelat- 
ion of God -- it is more reasonable to reject the testimony of 
Criticism and Grammer than the witness of Reason. If one does not 
grant that, it is all up with our faith ( so ist es aus mit un- 
serm Glauben ). p 94. 
In separating the special sciences as well as Ethics from Relig- 
ion Bayle rendered a great service. Hold to Reason, says Feuerbach 
God is also in you,though not in name yet what is more in being. 
The name matters nothing. 'ghat doncerns us is the determination, 
the concept. 
So long as Schòlasticismheld sway, the separate sciences could 
not develop but first in Kant and Fichte philosophy and so ethics 
became independent. Critical as he is of these two writers else 
where Feuerbach indulges in words of generous praise toward them 
here. In the Categorical Impe Tative Kant was the first to write 
a Grammer of Ethics in contrast to what had previously been only 
doctrines of happiness. Fichte nobler than Kant was the hero who 
alone brought to the world for sacrifice the whole power beauty 
and majesty of the moral idea. - -. His ideas are strict, in part 
almost superhuman. But Ethics is no pedagogue whose business it 
is to teach and apply the empirical means to virtue. Ethic+an- 
cannot / 
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cannot capitulate, fawn upon men, accomodate herself to his weak 
ness, she must rather the more affright, shock, crush to pieces. 
If the theologians say that this morality is too abstract and 
negative, their idea of religion is only a glorified self- seekig 
to which morality is simply a means and goodness only a predicate 
6f personality'and sacrifice only because of the reward. And so 
Feuerbach concludes in praise of Ethics, "Only Ethics is the true 
religion ; it is the spirit of reason, the openly outspoken, the 
self- evidenced, the spirit which does not conceal itself, going 
behind pictures of the phantasy, not hiding itself in dark symbols 
and confused ideas. " " Religion is nothing else than the univers- 
al love, conformable to reason, but love to men is the only true 
love." The theology which sets itself above Ethics is injurious 
to states. Only for that man to whom Ethics is theology, duties 
toward men duties toward God is duty a divine necessity, a judg- 
ment in the last instance, an infallibility, a vis primitiva, an 
indissoluble Bindecraft, an Entelechie des Willens, -- in short 
and what more can man say -- a truth. 
Chapter six continues the discussion of the Conflict of Dogma 
and Reason. 
Bayle's opponents being the rationalistic theologians who main- 
tained that Scripture and the understanding were contradictory, 
Feuerbach goes into several details where we need not follow. Leib - 
nity, we are told, out of gallantry to the queen undertook to con- 
fute Bayle's objections to the agreement of Faith and Reason, but 
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but he pushes his own ideas between the dogmas and Bayle's object- 
ions. For Bayle the dogma of the Fall is "this St Bartholemew 
night of the intelligence." The e:_planations of theology are 
unconvincing. ''shy did God allow sin ? To say that He only per- 
mitted it is 
man freedon, 
as the skill 
He loves His 
to make Him; a mere spectator. If it was to give 
this indeed was a costly gift. If to reveal His glory 
of a steersman is best revealed in stormy times,then 
glory more than all His creatures. 
Thus we have the conclusion, not without interest in view of 
recent developments of Calvinism, Protestant theologians sac- 
rifice their reason and most holy doctrine to the Honour of God. 
Their last defence is the unsearchableness and incomprehensibil- 
ity of God.( p.131.6 
The next chapter, 
scription of Reason 
latter she is simply 
the common things of 
the seventh, continues still further the de- 
as in Bayle and the theologians. To the 
a maid who is justified in speaking only of 
life but not of the higher : or, at the high- 
est a concubine to whom only by night behind the back of his faith 
and in contradiction to her commands and therefore with anxious 
heart he makes furtive fleeting visits. But in Bayle Reason is 
the companion of one's life, the ft*end of his soul, the spouse 
with whom he is bound by the harmony of inclination thought and 
character. 
Amid this eloquence it is important to notice that Feuerbach 
lays great stress upon the necessity of philosophising.,speaking 
in/ 
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in terms of praise of Descartes in this connection. From the man 
who was later to say, 'My Philosophy is no Philosophy', and by ü s 
sensationalism and nominalism to destròy its foundations, it is 
strange to find this saying, 'Philosophy is a necessity as much as 
Art is a necessity' p 143 -4. 'The effects of philosophy are infin- 
ite but they are spiritual and therefore they withdraw themselves 
from the eyes. Only the unknowing can mistake them.' 
He is more at home whenhe challenges the claim of the theolog- 
ians to deal with facts. The present, he says, is the being, the 
soul of fact. The present fact I must believe, the mediate fact 
is a conviction in which the original fails us. It has been trans- 
formed in the blue haze of the power of ideas and imagination which 
involuntarily after lapse of years change the objects of the past. 
But the faith in facts as truths, in so- called dogmatic facts is 
the pure blank superstition of the necromancer; it only exists where 
faith in spirit is dead. A historical truth is just a historic9- 
al truth, nothing more, not a divine truth subsisting for itself 
p. 151 
If it is said that for Bayle mystery remains and that he 
continued in the Church as a Protestant, the reply of Bayle is q 
quoted, "The mysteries contradict only the small miserable reason 
of man which is only one portion of reason not Reason itself." Yet 
Feuerbach feels constrained to add that Bayle's doubt was his fate 
the pressure of the world - spirit upon him. He believed but in con- 
tradiction with himself. He is an intellectual ascetic, a spirit- 
ual flagellant. His faith is a voluntary abstinence and Pónitenz 
of his reason. 
The 
AI 
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86. 
The concluding chapters, 8 and 9, give an excellent 
example of Feuerbach's powers of characterisation. Bayle is 
not one satisfied with empiricism: he has undeniable a philos- 
sophic spirit whereby ' the exact and full explanation of the 
least thing leads of necessity to the highest metaphysic. In 
the possession of this spirit he differs from nearly all mod- 
ern selceptics. He was no dogmatic sceptic, he was indeed scept- 
ical about scepticism. An ' occasional' philosopher, he was also 
an ' ocrasional' sceptic, i.e. about definite objects and difficult - 
ies.p 219. Natural ties and circuTistances bound him to the faith 
of his time, so that his scepticism reveals not Bayle himself but 
rather his relation to an external and respected power. Reason 
is meant to develop gradually within faith and out of faith,un- 
til she rise to such a recognition of herself as is to be found in 
Spinoza, one born out of faith and thus already a man of vocation 
and authority. 
Again,p 222, Feuerbach emphasises the philosophic urge, 'an 
activity with true interest, and therefore an original activity', 
concerned only with what is highest first and original, something 
necessary indispensible which summons and claims the highest pow- 
ers of men. But the condition for this is that man empty himself 
lose 'faith', become conscious of his need. 1ith Kant such a 
philosophy is first revealed. 
Although enjoyment does come with the exercise of this activ- 
ity, there is nothing of utilitarian interest here. p 235. " The 
scientific/ 
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scientific man is the objective man, for Science (equated here 
with philosophy) is itself the objective spirit in man because 
that Science 
of the fact /is the occupation with objects which express no im- 
nediate reference to the personal interests of men;even if these 
objects themselves should also be the most useful; the occupation, 
the activity is yet in the first place purely objective. In 
order to know them, one must put the utilitarian interest aside. 
When man thinks only of his salvation he has no feeling for 
Science. Only he who can raise himself above himself is capable of 
grasping the sublimity of science. The first condition, and this 
is also the effect of Science upon man, is the quality of Object- 
ivity ( die Eigenschaft der Objectivitt) which expresses itself 
morally as the virtue of rirghteousness, of impartiality, of truth- 
fulness, of meekness, in tpf/X short, as the virtue of freedom 
from oneself. 
A curious quotation from Bayle on the necessity of the pass- 
ions, instincts and even prejudices of men and women,unless the 
world is to collapse, leaves one wondering if Feuerbach himself 
is sensible of the power of ' blind instincts' and ' Nature' over 
against Reason. p 230. His comment is that Bayle here involuntar- 
ily wanders into Soinozism,' that which in relation to us is blamm 
able, unreasonable, ludicrous is in relation to the universe and 
the universal Reason, which considers the world- whole,unblamable 
perfectly good,praiseworthy. But the universal Reason remains 
with Bayle only an undetermined populat idea which furnishes no 
inner ground or conception; the true conception is the material 
i_mnui gA 
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impulse, the power of Nature. - -- The contradiction remains un- 
solved." But it was not Bayle's affair to remove contradictions. 
Ha significancesissvthatthe ptvees philosophy problems to solve without 
oes euerbach solve Tt by making Nature the body of Reason 
orlon discovering that Nature and man are full of crookedness, 
does he leave this problem of the power of Reason and her place 
in the universe unsettled, making up,as he says of Eayle and his 
contribution, for the scarcity of his lifts by the virtues of the 
giver? 
In his estimate of Bayle there is much which reflects his own 
character, e.g. p 231 and influence; 'Bayle excites the agoetite 
for philosophy, but he does not satisfy it. He gives us mere salt 
of which indeed a very great part has become tasteless for us, 
without appropriate foodstuff, nothing of the animal fare of the 
Leibnitz monad, nothing of the vegetable fare of the Ñpioz:Á.stic 
substance.' 
And again p 217, "Bayle is not satisfied with Empiricism; he 
knows that it is nothing without ph &losophy or metaphysic; he a- 
scends therefore their heights, but just as he is up upon them, 
the air becomes for him too thin for respiration and he does not 
remain init. He has, so to speak, no metaphysical persistence, 
he can give to the thought no substance, no endurance, it evades 
him as a shadow just when he is going to hold it fast; he betakes 
himself therefore quickly again from the heights of metaphysic 
down to the valleys of Empiricism which arernore congenial to him." 
To sum up this brief sketch in its relation to Feuerbach's 
position/ 
chap 4 
position at this stage, we may say, negatively, that he has not 
yet definitely discovered the source of religious error to be in 
feeling or imagination, nor the process by which it works in pro- 
jection, nor its influence on particular theological doctrines. 
He does however attack such theological ideas as the' Honour of 
God' and the claim that dogma is superior to reason and thus,he 
says, to truth. 
The fatal thing in religion is that it is utilitarian, person- 
al and subjective. He seeks therefore the independence of Philo- 
sophy and Ethics from Theology and his argument is woven of sevdr- 
al strands. Ï';e notice the emphasis he puts on the Dualism of 
Christianity whether Protestant or Roman Catholic, his definition 
of Philosophy as the spirit of Science, the universal spirit, ob- 
jective impartial and impersonal, not content with the 'what' but 
seeking the 'how'. Nature is not a dead machine, but the body 
of reason; while Deason is a clear and lively light larger than 
man's, capable of containing mysteries and so capable of explain- 
ing even the paaitaions and instincts of man. 
ly 
inevitable /appeared in the position of Feuerbach as 
his mind developed, but it is correct to say, I think, that there 
his 
are fundamental statements in/Bayle from which he never departed 
90 
C H A P T E R . IV. 
Summary and Survey of the principal Works 
dealing with Religion. 
SECTION. 2/ 
D A S W E S E N 
D E S C H R I S T E N T U M S. 
" I know not what the world will do with this book, 
or misdo, or entirely forbear to do, as is likest; but 
this I could tell the world - - -- You have not had for 
a hundred years any book that comes more direct and flamtg 
from the heart of a living man." 
Carlyle to his wife 
on finishing 'The French Revolution.' 
" Prayer, regarded as an internal fvtmal worship of the 
Deity, and so as a means of grace, is a superstitious de- 
lusion. It is nothing more than an uttered wish... 
Kant. Religion within the Limits 
of Pure Reason. 
chap 4 continued 
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" The Essence of Christianity 11 
We pass now to the consideration of the four larger theologic- 
al writings of our author, in which are contained the maturing 
development of his thought. As we shall note,they indicate chang- 
ing moods amid the old hostility to Theology and the illusions 
which it offers to men as the truth. 
The first editionof Das Wesen des Christentums appeared in 
1841, and we are told that it is impossible for a later generat- 
ion to appreciate the effect made by its publication. " We are all 
for the moment disciples of Feuerbach'', wrote Frederick Engels. 
Originally it was proposed to issue the book anonymously. Feu- 
erbach wrote to his publisher, Otto ' +Vigand, that there was a power- 
ful attraction in this and that every name had its enemies. This 
latter sentence may indicate not merely that the author had ex- 
perienced many a tussle in the world of controversy but that he 
had not as yet lost hope of a professor's chair. If not anonymous 
the book might have such titles as, " yve ec 6"i' a-u Î oY oder 
das Geheimnis der Religion und die Illusionen der Theologie,( not 
it is to be noted, der Religion ) Ein Beitrag zur Kritik der spec - 
ulativ Religionsphilosophie," or " Analysis der Geheimnisse der 
christlicher, Dogmatik ", or" Religionsphilosophie vom Standpunkte 
eines speculativen Rationalismus oder: im Simme der genetische- 
kritischen Philosophie." ( Kohut p 170 & Schmidt p X ) 
But the publisher wanted the 'pull' of his name which after 
all counted for something. It would of course bring down his en- 
ies/ 
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emies upon him. That could not be helped. r'euerbach had to face 
the truth that in hoping for preferment Ai at a University he 
was longing for the moon. There was even a satisfaction in set- 
ting down his name and challenging the world boldly. The subject 
of the book was as much popular as speculative, and apart from 
high moral motives he must not let slip the opportunity of a real 
hit. Thus it appeared with his name and the simple title. 
In July 1854 the English translation came from the pen of 
George Eliot and it is remarkable that here alone in all her writ- 
ings does she set down her real name, _:_ arfan Evans,( ng1 Men of 
Letters,p 43 ). 
Needless to say the book was received with varied feelings and 
remarks by the different parties of the theological and philosoph- 
ical world. Arnold. Ruge, the founder and publisher of the Hallisch 
e Jahrbucher fur Kunst und Wissenschaft and afterwards similar 
Annals for Berlin, acclaimed Feuerbach as the founder of the only 
I, 
possible religious philosophy, the critic whò dealt with Christian 
ity as with other religions, making the religious needs themselves 
the object of investigation. Others wrote that Feuerbach express - 
for them thoughts and conclusions to which they had long been in- 
clined yet which they had not dared to confess. 
Criticism,on the other hand was not lacking kv.Schmidt's edit. 
P XI ). "Every theologian as theologian will and must criticise, 
says Feuerbach, but one must not be too hard on them, for they be- 
lieve that all moral ties which for them have no ground in the 






overthrown when their theological barracks collapse. " 
q2. 
To these critics our author gave vigorous response in his 
article in Ruse's Jahrbu.cher,18z12, "Zur Beurtheilung, der Schrift, 
Das Wesen des Christentums", in the Preface to the second editionà 
and in a reply in the third person to Max Stirner's book, "Der Ein- 
zige and sein i genthum. " 
In the Preface to the 1st edition he points out that his book 
gives in a form concentrated yet expanded and well attested the 
occasional aphoristic and polemical thoughts of the author concern- 
ing religion and Christianity, theology and speculative philottophy. 
It contains the elements and only the critical elements be it noted 
of a philosophy of positive religion or revelation, but naturally 
as is to be expected, of a religious philosophy neither in the 
childish fantastic sense of our own Christian mythology, which al- 
lows every nurse's tale of history to impose itself as a fact,nor 
in the pedantic sense of our speculative religious philosophy..: 
which sets forth, as did at one time Scholasticism, the articles 
of faith as logical metaphysical truth without more ado 
Religion and philosophy are not to be identified. The 'Bild', 
picture or image constitutes for religion the essential difference. 
Religion is essentially dramatic. God himself is a dramatic,i.e., 
a personal Being. Whoever tames from religion the image takes from 
her the'thing'itself and leaves only a caput mortuum in her hands. 
Das Bild ist als Bild Sache,"a phrase anticipating chapter ;9 of 
'Theogonie' where the symbol is also the thing. These are not con - 
eidered as a mystic pragmatology as in Christian mythology, nor 
as/ 
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as ontology as by the speculative religious philosophy, but as 
'psychische Pathologie'. 
His method throughout, he says, is objective, that of analyticg 
chemistry, and consequently documentary evidence is given at every 
point. For the greater part these testimonies refer to a past age 
but that was the claedicalage of Christianity, whereas the present 
form of religion - -- it takes six adjectives to describe it - -- 
' feigen, characterlosen, Komfortabeln, belletristichen, koketten, 
epicureischen Christentum.' 
The history of theology has long proved a posteriori what Feuer 
bach proves a priori, viz., that the essence of theology is an- 
thropology. Hegel's method is therefore perfectly rightly grounded: 
the history of dogma is a criticism of dogma Although the in- 
finite freedom and personalism of modern times has mastered the 
Christian religion so that the difference between the creative Holy 
Spirit of divine revelation and the apprehending human spirit is 
long abolished, the supernatural and superhuman character of the 
ancient time peeps out, at least appearing as a ghost in our heads . 
7e go back to the question, What was this ghost in the first in- 
stance? 
The preface to the second edition opens with a section which 
Miss Evans omits on the ground that it has too specific a refer- 
ence to transient German politics to interest the English reader. 
But these four pages significant summar the .opponents exellitctlota.) 
whom F euerbach attacked. 'present -day Christianity,even ancient 
Christianity 
has been reduced to general principles, the spectl- 
ative/ 
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ative philosophy had been robbed of its honour in the concord it 
established between religion and philosophy, the so- called posit- 
ive philosophy can no longer claim a'personality ' more than hum- 
an flesh and blood. Finally apart from the offending of good taste 
he has weaened the power of religion as a political weapon for 
the subjugation and oppression of man, and antagonised those who 
regard religion as politically indifferent and consequently are 
friends to it in the sphere of industry and politics but in the 
sphere of religion itself are enemies of light and freedom. 
Amid these conditions he exclaims, " Schein ist das Wesen der 
Zest." The police are the boundaries between truth and science. 
The man who has character and hits the nail on the head is worthy 
of death 
The rest of the Preface is valuable as a statement of his aims 
and method, his relation of criticism toward Hegel especially,but 
also toward Jacobi and Schleiermacher. Though the general public, 
he says, will be able to follow his straightforward style, only 
appreciate 
the scholar will fully /the references of his work to many philo- 
sophical writings, for it has a necessary logical basis in hist- 
ory. "My work contains and applies in the concrete the principle 
of a new philosophy suited not to the schools but to man, yet it 
contains that principle only by evolving it out of the very core 
of religion." "This work is nothing but a faithful rigid histor- 
ico- philosophical analysis of religion, the revelation of religion 
to itself, the awakening of religion to self- consciousness." He 





analyses and dissolves the miracles as does Lutzelberger, nor is 
he a critic of Biblical Theology like Bauer, nor of Dogmatic Theo- 
logy like Strauss. 
" This philosophy has for its principle, not the Substance of 
Spinoza, nor the Ego of Kant and Fichte, nor the Absolute Identity 
of Schelling, nor the Absolute Mind of Hegel, in short, no abstract 
merely conceptual Being, but a real Being, the true`Ens realissim - 
um, -- °an : its principle is therefore in the highest degree pos- 
itive and real." p /X f, 
" I differ toto caelo from those philosophers who pluck out their 
eyes that they may see better. 'Phis philosophy is essentially dis- 
tinguished from the systems hitherto prevalent, in that it corresp, 
ponds to the real the complete nature o/f man." p VIII. Both 
in substance and in speech it places philosophy in the negation of, 
philosophy, i.e. it declares that alone to be the true philosophy 
which is converted ' in succum et sanguinem', which is incarnate 
in man. 
In words which Hegel would not have accepted as a true descript- 
ion of his teaching he asserts his direct opposition to the Hegel- 
ian philosophy, "I do not generate the object from the thought, 
but the thought from the object, and I hold that alone to be an 
object which has an existence beyond one's own brain... My philo- 
sophy generates thought from the opposite of thought, from matter 
from existence, from the senses: it has its relation to its object 
first through the senses,i.e.,passively, before defining it in 
tho ught." Ii Speculation makes philosophy say only what it has it- 
.5elf / 
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self thought and expressed far better than religion: it assignsa 
a meaning to religion without any reference to the actual meaning 
of religion: it does not look beyond itself. I,on the contrary, 
let religion itself speak. I constitute myself only its listener 
and interpreter, not its prompter. .. It is not I but religion that 
worships man, although religion or rather theology denies this! :8 
That his work is negative,destructive, he admits, but only be 
it noted ith regard to the un -human elements of religion. the two 
parts of his book are complementary. 'Lhe first exhibits religion 
in its essence, its truth, the second in its contradictions. In 
the first I show that the true sense of theology is anthropology, 
that there is nodistinction between the predicates of the divine 
and human nature, and consequently no distinction between the di- 
vine and human subject. I say consequently, for wherever, as is 
specially the case im theology, the predicates are not accidents 
but express the essence of the subject, there is no distinction 
between subject and predicate, the one can be put in the place od 
the other: on which point I refer the reader to the Analytics of 
Aristttle or even merely to the Introduction of Porphyry. p XI. 
In the second Part, which as Kant would say is a kind of Crit- 
ique of religion, he shows that where a distinctioris made between 
subject and predicate absuddities result, e.g. with regard to 
Son of God' which expresses as divine a relation that is really 
human, that is so explained in part I, but in Part II it is shown 
that a different, non- human understanding of it involves one in 
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This result is of course a consequence of the fact that the first 
deals with religion, the second with theology. 
To the charge that he is Deducing religion to a nullity, to a 
pure illusion, he replies that he is really exalting anthropology 
to fli.XWAK theology, and points out that he does not tale anthro- 
pology in the sense of the Hegelian or any other philosophy but in 
a sense infitely higher and more general. 3o laterp 55,E.T,) 
states that the anthropomorphism of the Incarnation is a worthy 
idea. "Religion is the dream of the human mind ", he declares, yet 
it has its object upon earth, only that object is transformed. "1 
change the object as it i s in the imagination ( in der Vorstell- 
ung oder Einbildung) into the object as it is in reality." But 
the love of illusion and appearance is great, truth is disregarded 
and di shoAnoured . 
Of this preface we may say that while it reveals the intellect- 
ual acuteness of Feuerbach it discloses also the limiting intellect- 
ual conditions under which he worked and which concealed from him 
the weakness of his position. 
As for the book itself, in addition to the two main section ment- 
ioned, there is to be found. at the beginning an ii troductory chap- 
ter dealing with first, The Essential Nature of Man, and second, 
The Essence of Religion considered generally. This very important 
chapter 
/was written, we are told, ( , W 1,200 ) after the essential part of 
the book was finished. At the close of the book, there is given us, 
according 
to Feuerbach's custom, an Appendix of extraordinary in- 
teresV 
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terest with numerous remarks or explanations, illustrations, cit- 
ations. Of these introductory sections it might be said that 
in themselves they give sufficient material for discussion, with- 
out dealing with the particular application of the principles there 
set forth to the details 66 the Christian doctrine. They will 
afford the basis of our criticism of Feuerbach's position later. 
In the first section, "The Essential Nature of elan ", our author 
has tp prepare the way for his own theory as Science ( i.e. ground- 
ed in fundamental principles ) as well as for the special theory 
that in religion man makes himself the object of worship. 
We notice three propositions, 1st, Religion is identical with 
the distinctive characteristic of man, which is self-consciousness. 
In this characteristic man is apart from the animals, for cone - 
sciousness in the strictest sense is present only in a being to 
whom his species, his essential nature, is an object of thought.' 
2nd, This specific self- consciousness is consciousness of the in- 
finite, i.e. of man's infinite nature, i.e. of man as a species. 
3rd. " Consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the con- 
sciousness of the infinity of consciousness." This last prom --os- 
ition may be said to strike the key -note of Feuerbach's philosophy. 
When man is considered a little closer, he is found to be com- 
posed of Reason, Will, Love. These are the constituent elements 
of his nature which he neither has nor makes but is. In these 
three elements the individual can be dominated by man as Universal 
or can make them infinite affirmations and so experience infinite 
joy. These activities are perfections. " Assuredly every being 
loves/ 
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loves itself, its existence -- and fitly so. To exist is a good. 
" Alles, sagt Bacon, "was despeins würdig, ist auch erdig des 7 iss- 
ens." Everything that exists has value, is a being of distinction - 
at least this is true of the species : hence it asserts, maintains 
itself. But the highest form of self- assertion, the form which is 
itself a superiority, a perfection, a bliss, a good, is conscious- 
ness." Of course as an individual man can and must feel himselfto 
be limited, thus being distinguished from the beast, but his aware- 
ness of limitation is only possible because he perceives the in- 
finitude the perfection of his species. Vanity comes in when a man 
piques himself on his outward form as being his individual form 
and not a specimen of human beauty in general, and error appears 
when a man identifies himself ybff and his inevitable limitations 
with the species directly. 
Man is nothing without an object(p4 E T)' But the object to whici 
to which a subject essentially necessarily relates, is nothing else 
than this subject's own but objective nature, " The power of the 
object over him is therefore the power of his own nature ". " We can 
affirm nothing without affirming ourselves." "The object of the in- 
tellect is is intellect objective to itself; the object of feeling 
le feeling objective to itself." 
These and other sentences make plain the anthropocentric tenets 
of our author and at times they have quite a Hegelian flavour,as 
when he says,'the discrepancy between the understanding and the 
nature, between the power of conception and the-power of production 
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dividual significance and has not a universal application; and 
on the otherhand it is only apparent." 
These words culminate in the sentencelp 8 E T. "The eye of tilt 
brute reaches no farther than its needs and its nature no farther 
than its needs. And so far as thy nature reaches, so far reaches 
thy unlimited self- consciousness, so far art thou God." 
To make feeling alone the object of the infinite, as do Jacobi 
and Schleirermacher, is to abolish the distinction between spec- 
ific religious and non -religious feeling. The latter writer is 
condemned also for being too cowardly to confess a theology with- 
out a God. "He seeks a God outside feeling, and hence arises the 
old question,'Does God exist ?' " 
Along such lines as these dines Feuerbach enunciate one of his 
fundamental principles, "Man cannot get beyond his true nature ", 
a very ambiguous statement.indeed.but the key to Humanism always. 
In the next section, The Essence of Religion considered gen- 
erally", the same abstract reasoning is followed. This essence 
hidden from the religious is evident to the thinker, i.e., to 
Feuerbach who regards it objectively. 
Already he has laid down, ist, that the object of the senses 
is out of man, 2nd, the religious object is within him, 3rd,the 
object of any subject is nothing else than the subject's own nat- 
ure taken objectively. And now he declares it is our task to 
altogether il- 
show that the antithesis of divine and human is 
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general and the human individual, or rather " the human nature 
purified, freed from the limits of the individual man, made ob- 
jective," i.e., human nature in general is our human infinite. 
We must remember of course that there is no such thing as an 
existence in general. Qualities are the fire, the vital breath 
of existence. Man takes a point of view above himself, above hi* 
own nature, the absolute measure of his being : he distinguishes 
between what God is in himself and what he is for me. But this 
distinction and this transcendentalism is an illusion. The meas- 
Race 
ure of the /mmimims is the absolute measure law and criterion of 
man, and as for the nature of God if the predicates are human the 
subject also is human. 
The identity of Subject and Predicate is illustrated in the c 
course of the development of religion, which consists specific- 
ally in this, that man abstracts more and more from God and at- 
tributes more and more to himself,(p 21 & 31). There is also a 
parallel movementbetween the idea of God and of man. "`áhere man 
inhabits houses, he also encloses his gods in temples. The tem- 
ple is only a manifestation of the value which a man attackj.es to 
beautiful buildings." "Physical strength is an attribute of the 
Homeric gods: Zeus is the strongestof the gods." 
"Not the attribute of the divinity but the divineness or deity 
of the attribute is the first true Divine Being," according to this 
Primitive view. The reverse is true. "Thus what the theologians 
and Philosophers have held to be God, the Absolute, the Infinite 
¡snot God: but that which they have hele not to be God is God, 
namely/ 
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namely the attribute, the quality, whatever has reality.... The 
fact is, not that a quality is divine because God has it, but 
that Jod has it because it is divine intself." 
With the unification of several, and those a) ntradictory attrib- 
utes,especially in personal form, the origin of religion is lost 
sight of, above all the fact that the true subject has been "con- 
verted by the activity of the reflective power into a predicate 
distinguishable or separable from the subject. "Man,especially 
reality. 
the religious man, is to himself the measure of all A " 
Whatever strongly impresses a man he personifies as a divine being, 
and this dictum appears in Feuerbach's later works repeatedly. 
Religion has no material exclusively its own: everything exist- 
ing has ben an object of religious reverence, i.e. has been treat- 
ed imaginatively. c -s for the infinite attributes og God, every 
new man is a new predicate, a new phase of humanity, and so human- 
ity has infinite attributes. Only in the realm of the senses , 
only in space and time, does there exist a being of really infin- 
ite qualities or predicates. 
Time and not the Hegelian dialectic is t'he medium of uniting 
opposites, contradictories, in one and the same subject,(i.e. suc- 
cessive acts of the same man doing different things ) . But dis- 
tinguished and detached from the nature of man, and combined with 
I 
the idea of God, the infinite fulness of various predicates is a 
concept without reality, a mere phantasy, a concept derived from 
the sensible world but without the essential conditions, without 
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on with the divine :eing considered as a spiritual, i . e. , an ab- 
stract,simple,single being, for the predicates of Gcfd are pre- 
cisely of this character, that one involves all the others, be- 
cause there it no real difference between them . 
This discussion of Subject and Predicate naturally brings in 
the theory of Spinoza. In his case Substance can have an indefin- 
ite numoer of predicates, because it itself has properly no pre- 
dicate. It is a matter of indifference to know them.`Thought and 
extension are the real positive predicates. In these two infinite- 
ly more is said than in the nameless innumerable predicates, for 
they express something definite -- in them I have something. But 
substance is too ItidNTTKIX indifferent, too apathetic to be some- 
thing: i.e., to have qualities and passions: that it may not be 
something, it is rather nothing. (p 24). 
All this brings Feuerbach back back to his position that in 
religious thought and experience the predicate is the true subject 
revealing what it is ; it is also proved that the divine predic- 
ates are attributes of human nature.1 Religion of course knows 
nothing of these anthropom &rphisms; to it they are not anthropo -- 
morphisms. It is the very essence of religion that to it these 
definitions express the nature of God. They are pronounced to be 
images only by the understanding which reflects on religion and {¡ 
which while defending them yet before its own tribunal denies them. 
And now,p26, Feuerbach strikes at an objection which naturally 





The abasement and self- depreciation which charcterise the relig- 
iou man is really the assertion of his ideal in the safer custody 
of the divine nature. The more human God 1Q54.51§Xn1 becomes, the 
greater is the apparent difference between God and man. The pos- 
itive in the divine is human, so the human in man can only be neg- 
ative. That is the need of positiing the same thing twice ? By 
way of illustration, it may be pointed out that man denies his 
reason for he can only know of Uod what God reveals, he loses his 
in - himself 
personality that Ltod may become personal, and refuses goodness /for 
God only is good. Yet the Holy is in opposition to me only as re- 
gards the modificationsof my personality, but as regards my funda- 
mental nature it is in unity with me. 5o with sin and the power- 
lessness to do good. These affirm the reality in God of that which 
On p 28 and 
is in my own nature. /In a note to p.29 a historical and doctrin- 
al illustration is given when it is declared that the Augustinian 
doctrine of mant.otal corruption is only an inverted pelagionism. 
Both say the same thing, both vindicate the goodness of man, but 
Pelagianism does it directly, in a rationalistic and moral form; 
Augustinianism indirectly, in a mystical, that is, a religious 
form. What to the latter is a subject is to the former an object_ 
But how does this remarkable inversion takes place ? "Man-7 -- 
this is the mystery of religion projects his being into object - 
ivity, and then again makes himself an object to this projected 
image of himself thus converted into a subject: he thinks of him- 
self as an object to himself, but as the object of an object, of 





In this projection man virtually retracts his nothingness 
and makes himself the end of God. "In and thrcbugh God man has in 
view himself alone." And he makes a plausible reinforcement of 
his argument by an appeal to what is a theistic principle, "How 
could the divine activity work on me as its object, if it were 
essentially different from me ? " 
This objectification of himself in religion is involuntary and 
as necessary to man as art or speech, but it is to be distinguish. 
ed from what takes place in reflection and speculation when man 
sets himself up consciously for examination. Yet changes come 
with the times, the religion of self- abasement disappears, so 
that man claims less from God and more for himself. Compared 
with the Israelite who trusted himself to do nothingexcept what 
was commanded by God, the Christian is a free- thinker,leaving 
the external duties which occupied the Israelite to the man him- 
self. The matter is summed up in the dictum," What yesterday was 
religion is no longer such to -day; and what to -day is atheism to- 
morrow will be religion," a dictum which of course admirably suit' 
s Feuerbach's own claim that he is really no atheist but a pro- 
phet of the future faith. 
Leaving the Introduction with its general statement of 
principle with regard to the Esential Nature of i4ïan and of Re- 
ligion, we turn now to survy Parts I and II with the applicat- 
ion of first principles to the various doctrines of the Church. 
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understanding, as a moral being, and as Incarnate, with con - 
saquent details of the Christian theology such as the Passion 
the Trinity and the :,other of God, the Logos and the Divine Im- 
age, the Cosmological Prinviple in God, Mysticism or Nature in 
God, Providence and Creation out of nothing. 
Other sections are entitled, The Omnipotence of Feeling or 
the Mystery of Prayer, Faith and Miracle which afe linked inev- 
itably together, the Resurrection and the miraculous Conception, 
the Christian Christ or the personal God, Christianity as dis- 
tinguished from Heathenism, the significance of voluntary Cel- 
ibacy and Monachism, the Christian Heaven. These comprehensive 
and varied topics are dealt with according to the true or an- 
thropological essence of religion, while later in the second parts 
in almost half the number of chapters, these doctrines are shown 
to be contradictions when regarded according to the false or thee¡ 
logical essence of religion. 
That this really means is that with calm assurance and much 
subtlety he applies his method of inversion and his principle of 
contradiction. 
The opening chapter is an attack, not without justification, 
on the God of the Schoolmen and Rationalism, God as pure essence 
or understanding, and it is also directed against Kant, Sceptic- 
ism, Theism, Materialism. " God freed from anthropology is no- 
think else than the objective nature of the understanding or the 
understanding itself regarded as an object. "(p 35) "God is a 
need of the intelligence, a necessary thought,... the highest d 
degree/ 
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degree of the thinking power." (P36) 
These sentences represent a subtle analysis of God as epistem- 
ological or metaphysical Being, apart from real interest for re- 
ligion, and even then it is only a part of man's understanding as 
it appears to him to be neces=sary for knowledge and action. "The 
ontological predicates are merely predicates of the understanding;' 
(note p 40) which conditions and co- ordinates all things, which 
places all things in reciprocal dependence and connection because 
it is itself immediate and unconditioned. "The understanding 
posits its own nature as the causal first premundane existence, 
i.e., being the first in rank but the last in time, it makes its- 
self the first in time also. " 
Reason is thus set in a commanding position, for it is not de- 
pendent on God, but God is dependent onit. " Even in the age of 
miracles and faith in authority the understanding constitutes it- 
self, at least formally, the criterion of divinity. Even omni- 
potence cannot do what is contrary to reason. (p38) So we can- 
not conceive of an understanding essentially different from that 
which affirms itself in man, for" they all fall within the power 
of my thought and thus express my understanding. " 4:p41) The 
understanding is in consequence the infinite being, the necess- 
ary being, "Reason is existence objective to itself as its own 
end, the ultimate tendency of things. That which is an object t 
itself is the highest, the final being; that which has power over 
itself is almighty." (p 43 ) 
Feuerbach waves aside in the following chapter ( God. as 
chap 4 
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MIS a Moral Being or Law) this ontological deity,'erely 
the mathematical point in religion, the ultimate point of sup -?ark 
(p 44) "The consciousness of human limitation or nothiggness 
which is united with the idea of this Being is by no means a re- 
ligiousness consciousness, on the contrary it characterises scept- 
of religion 
ics materialists and pantheists. The vital eleífents /are those 
man 
only which make a man an oject to kimeif ." It certainly is the 
interest of religion,he concedes, that its object should be dis- 
tinct from man; but it is also, nay yet more its interest that 
this object should have human attributes. Luther is quoted many 
times here as elsewhere to emphasise the human qualities of Christ 
and of God; e.g., "That would be a miserable Christ to me, who 
should be nothing but a purely separate God and divine person... 
without humanity. No, my friend; where thou givest me God, thou 
must givérne humanity too." (p45) The conclusion is, "God as a 
morally perfect being is nothing else than the realised idea, the 
fulfilled law of morality, the moral nature of man posited as the 
absolute being." 
One important thing is to be noted here, Disunion from such ..a 
deity, implying the breach of a law and consequently our moral 
nothingness, is painful as it is not with regard to omniscience 
where there is no command to be omniscient. The conception is 
no merely theoretical,inert concept but a practical one calling 
me to action, to imitation, throwing me into strife, into dis- 
union with myself. Deliverance comes to a man. blunting the fatal 
sting of sin when he is conscious of love as the highest absolute 
power/ 
chap 4 
Section a. 4.C. /O9: 
power and truth. Love is the true unity of God and man, of 
spirit and nature, denying their separation. " The deeper we 
can bring Christ into our flesh the better ",said Luther.(p49 
note) We are forgiven because we are no abstract beings but 
creatures of flesh and blood. 
Here it is obvious we are at the beginning of a monstrous 
travesty of Christian doctrine, for Feuerbach is mastered by his 
theories. The consciousness of the divine love, or what is the 
same thing, the contemplation of God as human, is the mystery of 
the Incarnation." The descent of God to man is necessarily pre- 
ceded by the exaltation of manto God. How otherwise could God 
have become man ? The dogma is criticised by reducing it to itd 
natural elements or qualities, immanent in man. Mystery arises 
only from the mingling or confusion of the idea or definitions o 
the universal,unlimited, metaphysical being with the idea of the 
religious God, i.e., the conditions of the understanding with 
the conditions of the heart, the emotive nature; a confusion 
which is the greatest hindrance to the correct ± Lt king know- 
ledge of God. 
Feuerbach attacks, on the one hand, those who allege that 
the Incarnation is a purely empirical fact which could be made 
known only by a revelation in the theological sense. "This is 
laaN crass materialism." Why ? Here Feuerbach discloses the 
presupposition of his theory. "The Incarnation is a conclusion 
which rests on on a very comprehensible premiss." His explan- 
ation, i.e., is deduced from his first principle. Yet he calmly 
goes/ 
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goes on to say, "It is equally perverse to attempt to deduce 
the Incarnation from purely speculative,i.e., metaphysical, ab- 
stract grounds, for metaphysics apply only'to the first person of 
the Godhead who does not become incarnate, who is not a dramatic 
person." (p 51 -52) 
What is the relation between the two things in the dogma, God 
and Love ? asks our author. Is God something besides love ? Thel 
4^ 
love is only an attribute, not a subject or substance. In the 
background of love therefore there lurks a subject who even with 
out love is something by himself, an unloving monster, a diabolic, 
al being, whose personality separable and actually separated from , 
loveldelights in the blood of heretics and unbelievers... the 
phantom of religious ihnaticism. 
Yet love is the essence of the Incarnation. It ruled the Ma- 
jesty of God, not love of God to himelf but to man, and this is 
human love. Every religion worthy of the name presupposes that 
God is not indifferent, Every prayer discloses the secret of the 
Incarnation and involves God in human distress. Love does not 
exist without sympathy and sympathy presupposes a like nature. 
But it may be said that the Christian Incarnation is altogeth- 
er peculiar, that at least it is different from the incarnations 
of the heathen dieties, whether Greek or Indian. There are dif- 
ferences, certainly, and in vol, LS. W. we find an artigle,1844, 
entitled, "Der Unterschied der heidnischen and christlichen Men - 
sehen vergotterung "; the differences specified are well worth 
quoting. I. Paganism deifies only the qualities and passions of 'I 
man/ 
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man, but Christianity the whole man. Hence II. Christianity is 
universal over against the national deities of polytheism, and it 
cares for each individual over against the privileged classes. 
III. Christianity is humble, because the honour of the godhead 
(i.e. from his own nature) 
is inherited from its Father' whereas the heathen acquiring this 
honour through merit are proud. On p 332 .W.this summary is to 
be found; the heathen deifications were only illusory shallow 
superficial, the Christian were deep fundamental radical; in 
heathendom divinity was only a privilege, an assumption of aristo 
in Christianity it is a well- founded orderly common good. 
Because Christ is the end of all human sacrifice, he is the end 
of all deification, God for all. 
These sincere if somewhat complimentary references to Christ- 
ianity do not obscure the fact that, as shown already, the Incar- 
nation is an-alytic fact, no mysterious composition of contraries, 
but a human word with a human meaning. The elevating influence 
of the Incarnation is this that the highest lowers himself for t 
the sake of man. How can the worth of man be more strongly ex- 
pressed ? And how more powerfully could we learn to love all 
flesh and blood upon the earth, as Luther says. (p57 W C ) But 
answers Feuerbach, "that which in the truth of religion is the 
essence of the fable is to the religious consciousness only the 
moral of the fable, a collateral thing." "God loves man" is an 
orientalism, but religion is essentially oriental. 
It is easy to see how along these lines in Chter 5 "The Myst- 
ery of the Suffering God" is analysed and explained. (p 59) "Love 
attests/ 
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attests itse /f by suffering, and the Christians consecrate pass- 
ivity. To suffer for others is divine. Religion speaks by ex- 
ample. Example is the law of religion. Christ suffered for oth- 
ers; we should do li.ewise. 
Hence Christianity is the religion of suffering, and we see 
how Feuerbach has an opening for the expression of the ascetic v 
view of it. The mystery of the suffering God is therefore the 
mystery of feeling, of sensibility. That would man be without 
feeling ? 
suite in the Hegelian manner, though with more sympathy and ini 
sight, the Trinity is represented after the pattern of the three - 
fond qualities of man, feeling intelligence will knit together 
into one. Only man is the original Trinity. God regarded as an 
extramundane Feing signifies that religion is inward and solitary 
Yet solitude is the want of the thinker, society the desire of t 
the heart. Hence the third person in the Trinity which" we need 
not make a separate object of our ananlyis" (p67). The Holy 
Spirit owes its personal existence only to a name , a word. It 
is nothing further than the love of the two divine Persons to- 
ward each other. 
As for the Virgin Mary, this doctrine fits in perfectly with 
the relations of the Trinity. 
The Son is a falling away from the metaphysical idea of the 
Godhead. He affirms imagination as a necessity. He is the nat- 
ure of the imagination made objective. So Christ is the mord, 




and helpful things to say as to words and their relation to the 
meaning of Christ. But of course the 'Word of God is simply the 
divinity of the 'Nord. 
In chapter 8 the Mystery of the cosmological Principle in God 
is discussed. This is the second Person in the Trinity, the 
world -creating principle, but the meaning is that Christ is the 
divine principle of the finite, the intermediate between the 
noumenal nature of God and the phenomenal nature of the world,not 
representing to us the pure idea of the Godhead, nor the pure idea 
of humanity. Seeing that every being, intermediate between God 
and the world, is a being: of the imagination, the psychological 
truth and necessity which lies at the foundation of all these 
theogonies and cosmogonies is the truth and necessity of the im- 
agination as a middle term between the abstract and the concrete. 
The cosmological process is nothing else than the mystic paraphr- 
-aee 
of a psychological process, the unity of consciousness and self - 
consciousness made objective. (p 81) Or,(p 86) The cosmological 
thought in - -od, reduced to its last elements, is nothing else 
than the act of thought in its simplest forms made objective, 
positing itself and then another different from itself. Like a 
true disciple of Hegel, Feuerbach says real difference can be de- 
rived only from a being which has a principle of difference in 
itself. "But I posit difference in the original being, he adds, 
because I have originally found difference as /positive reality. 
Mysticism is swept aside with some contempt. It is deutero- 
scopy, a fabrication of phrases with a double meaning. Our task 
is to show that theology is nothing else than an unconscious 
esoteric/ 
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esoteric pathology, anthropology, psychology,44- a very frank 
if naive confession. 
In connection with the doctrine of eternal mature in God,as 
in Schelling and Jacob Bóhme, the source of Schelling's ideas, 
it is obvious that we are near to many cosmogonic and theogonic 
fancies, as our author says, but he has some things to say here 
on personality which are revealing and determinative. The doct- 
rine of Nature in God aims, by naturalism, to establish theism, 
especially the theism which regards the Supreme Being as a person- 
al Being. (pp 93 -100 ) But personal theism conceives God as per- 
sonal Being separate from all material things. The personality 
of God is not to be establithed through Mature but through ian. 
The need of a personal God has its foundation in this that only 
in the attribute of personality does the personal man meet with 
hilelf, find himself. Stressing his favourite opposition between 
personality and Nature, Feuerbach says, Where personity is a truth 
or rather the absolute truth, Nature has no positive significance 
and consequently no positive 'basis. Nature is not to be smuggled 
in again. The flower of sublimation arises only through the evap- 
oration of matter. 
The doctrine of Creation out of nothing exhibits again the op- 
Position between man and Nature and man's attempt at domination. 
Subjectively we annihilate the world. We would rather be freed 
from weight, resistance, space, time, limitation, necessity. Let 
the existence of the world therefore be arbitrary and momentary. 
L._ 
° d-potence is nothing else than subjectivity free from limits. 
We/ 
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We affirm in this doctrine the divinity of the will, as in the 
doctrine of the Word of God we affirm the divinity of the human 
word. It is however not the will of reason but the will of the 
imagination, the absolutely subjective unlimited will. The cul- 
minating point of the principle of subjectivity or religious ego 
ism is thus reached. 
Creation is identical with Miracle and with Providence, for a` 
the proof of Providence is miracle. This of course is for man 
only , not for the brutes, a privilege expressive of and guarant 
seing his infinite value. Nature becomes the servant of man's 
needs, is degraded to a mere machine. In Judaism (chap Il) 
where this doctrine obtains, 'Utilism' is the theory of Nature 
and is in conspicuous contrast to the attitude of the Greeks who 
looked at Nature with the theoretic sense and heard heavenly 
music in the harmonious course of the stars. The Israelite did 
not rise above the ali:ientary view of theology. He opened to 
Nature only the gastric sense. Eating is the most solemn act or 
the 
/initiation of the Jewish religion. In eating man declares Nature 
to be an insignificant object. Creation out of nothing, i.e. the 
as a, purely imperious act, had its origin only ih the 
unfathomable depth of Hebrew egebism. It pains the egoist that 
the satisfaction of his wishes and need is only to be attained 
mediately, that for him there is a chasm between the wish and the 
realisation, between the object in the imagination and the object 
libmim..-___ 
in reality. Hence in order to relieve this pain, to make himself 
free from the limits of reality, he supposes as the true, the higl 
est/ 
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estlbeing, One who brin_s forth an object by the mere I :TILL. 
JehovaR is Israel's consciousness of the sacredness and necessy 
of his own existence, the Ego of Israel which regards itself as 
the end and aim, the Lord of iature.(p 119) Christianity is Jud- 
aism purified from natiönal egoism and so introduces something 
new an 'essential for not the Israelite but MAN, subjective human 
nature occupies the centre. 
Prayer, the simplest act of religion,''reveals the ultimate es- 
sence of religion; an act which implies at least as much as the 
dogma of the Incarnation, although religious speculation stands 
amazed at this, as the greatest of mysteries." One can understat$ 
how it fits in well with Feuerbach's theory of the subjectivity 
of religion, for to him it represents the omnipotence of feeling 
It is the expression of wishes in the confidence, in the certain- 
ty that they will be fulfilled. (13 122 -4) Wisely does Feuerbach 
say it is sore than the expression of dependence. That alone 
robs a man of words. Prayer has its roots rather in the uncondit' 
ional trust of the heart, untroubled by all thought of compulsive: 
need. 
Thus we come to consider Faith, for faith alone prays and 
the prayer of faith is alone effective, and euerbach quotes with 
approval Luther's definition, "Faith is that courage of the heart 
which trusts for all good to God." But of course he brings upon 
it the usual analysis. "Faith ", he declares," is the infinite 
self- certainty of man, the undoubting certainty that his own sub - 
jective being is the objective absolute being, the being of beifigs, 
and again, "The essence of faith is the idea that that which man 
wishes/ 
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wishes actually is: he wishes to be irmilortal,therefore he is 
immortal; he wishes for the existence of a being who can do 
everything which is impossible to Nature and reason, therefore 
such a being exists; he wishes for a world which corresponds to 
the desires of the heart, a world of unlimited subjectivity,i.e. 
of unperturbed feeling, of uninterrupted bliss, while neTerthe - 
less there exists a world the opposite of that subjective one,and 
hence this world must pass away, - -- as necessarily pass as God, 
or absolute subjectivity, must rem&tn. 
Miracle is the specific object of faith, for miracle satisfies 
the wishes of men in a way corresponding to the nature of wishes 
- -- in the most desirable way. Of course to Science this is all 
absurd. "A circle in a straight line is the mathematical symbol 
of miracle." But less acurately he concludes, " With Christianity 
man lost the capability of conceiving himself as a part of Nature, 
of the Universe. " 
lith his desire to set religion and culture over against one 
another he remarks that the element of Culture, the Northern prin- 
ciple of self- renunciation is wanting to the emotional nature. The 
apostles and Evangelists were no scientifically cultivated men.Yet 
the sorcery of the imagination was /and still is, great where our 
wishes are concerned. 
Of course the mystery of the Resiurection and the Miraculous 
Conception fall under the same explanation as the other,less pro- 
perly dogmatic miracles; the wish realised in the one case over 
against the power of death, and in the other over against the ima 
inative/ 
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inative horror of Nature in certain of her processes. We have 
in this latter case the key to the contradiction in Catholicism, 
that at the same time marriage is holy and celibacy is holy. Pro- 
testant morality,however, is rationalistic in its very beginning 
and this mystery had only a dogmatic and not a practical signific 
ance; they did not allow it to interfere with their desire for 
marriage. 
The chapter dealing with "The Mystery of the Christian Christ 
or the Personal God" is more concerned with a description of feel- 
ing and dreaming as the key to the mysteries of religion than with 
Christ or God as they appear in the New Testament. "It is pleas- 
anter to be passive than to act, to be redeemed and made free by 
another thon to free oneself, pleasanter to make one's salvation 
dependent on a person tha4on the force of one's own spontaneity 
- -- to set before oneself an object of love than an object of ef- 
fort, to see oneself image in the love -beaming eyes of another 
personal being than to look into the concave mirror of self or in- 
to the cold depths of the ocean of Nature 
A powerful instinct, immediately connected with the activity 
of the senses, viz. voluntary imitation, causes example to work 
miracles which the law could not do, and in this way Christ, a 
visible personal living law, a law made flesh, caused joy to the 
early Christians and bestowed the power to resist sin. More thar 
the power of example is the power of miracle ascribed to Christ, 
BO that the miraculous Redeemer is nothing else than the realised 
wish of feeling to be free from the laws of morality, i. e. ,adds 
Feuerbach/ 
chap 4 Section 2.. J.C. 
Jig 
Feuerbach ( as if aware that Christianity also binds us to a 
noble code of ethics ), from the slow and hard conditions to 
which virtue is united in the natural course of things. Morality 
the theologians tell us, is dependent upon faith, and the virtues 
of the heathen are only splendid sins: thus the Christian becomes 
morally free and good only by miracle. 
A characteristic passage is found on p 144, where the relation 
of 0hrist to God is described in the subjective manner with which. 
we are now acquainted. " God as God is feeling as yet shut up, 
hidden; only Christ is the unclosed open feeling or heart. In 
Christ feeling is first perfectly certain oiitself, and assured 
beyond doubt of the truth and divinity of its own nature; for 
Christ denies nothing to feeling; he fulfils all its prayers.... 
he is the joyful certainty of feeling that its wishes hidden in 
God have truth and reality, the actual victory over death, over 
all the powers of the world and Nature, the resurrection no long- 
er merely hoped for, but already accomplished; he is the heart 
released from all oppressive limits, from all sufferings, -- the 
Miir4INX1§11 soul in perfect blessedness, the Godhead made 
visible." 
"Co far the Christian religion may justly be called the absol- 
ute religion, and is distinguished from other religions in that 
the heart in its practical character is not divided from the im- 
agination but restrains and delivers it from the confusion of a 
multiplicity of incarnations. _ 
Belief in the personality of Christ satisfies the longing for 
chap 4. Section 2. W.C. , /2a. 
unity and further with Christ the truth of vision is confirmed 
by 
WIXII touch. He lays great stress upon this. "As subjectively 
touch, so objectively the capability of being touched, palpabil- 
ity, passibility, is the last criterion of reality." 
In the chapter on the distinction between Christianity and. 
heathenism,(chap XVI ) he returns to a matter which he has alrea& 
mentioned in connection with the Incarnation. Four things are 
to be noted. I/ The Christian unlinksinimself from Nature, from 
the chain of sequences in the system of the universe, made hims.4t: 
a self-sufficing whole, an absolute extra- and supra-mundane 
being. This stands in contrast to the animalism of heathenism. 
IV Christianity is individualistic; it cared nothing for the 
soecies,( a remarkable assertion when we consider that Christian- 
ity founded a new brotherhood) But out author can be frank and 
discerning also,for he says, ( a strange confession in view of 
on theory) "Because of this i=ediate unity of the species with 
the individual, this concentration of all that is universal and 
real in one personal Being, God is a deeply moving object,enrapt- 
to 
urtna/the imagination; the idea of humanity has little 
Po 'Ter over the feel -a,.2a.:.se, humanity is only an abstraction; 
ani the reality which orease itself to us in distinction from 
this abstraction is, the muTtitufe of separate limited individuals 
(p 153) 
Ill/ Christians make intellie only part of a man, not the 
essemee, as did -tThi hethen. 
117/ Christ. stanjia Y.1::,t74:lual, yet at the same time 
the ideal, the speolas,huaanity fulness of its perfection 
and/ 
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and infinity. 
The two closing chapters of the First. Part emphasise the 
ne-ative aspect of the Christian life for Celibacy and Monachism 
were necessary consequences of the belief in heaven -premised to 
mankind by Christianity. The individual concentrates all upon Go 
Even activity for others has only a religious significance. 
Without being morbid or nasty Feuerbach points out that sex is 
an essentill part of our huelan system. Sex is the cord which con- 
nects the individual with the species. But he who belongs to no 
sex belongs to no species, hence the belief in personal immortal- 
ity has at its foundation the belief that difference of sex is 
only an external adjunct of individuality, that in himself the 
individual is a sexless independent complete absolute being. (2l10c 
Personal immortality, he says truly, is a characteristic doctrine 
of Christianity, associated, as it is not among the heathen philo- 
sophers, with their fundamental view of life. Above all, the doct 
rine of im<uortality is the final doctrine of religion: its testa - 
ment in ,which it declares its last wishes. The reality of Cod is 
made dependent on man's own reality. If we do not rise again, 
then is Christ not risen. God is the guarantee of my future ex- 
tgayebecause he is already the certainty and and reality of my 
present existence, my salvation, my trust, my shield from the 
forces of the external world. 
Yet no one is agreed as to the qualities of this life as of the 1 
life of God. And existence without quality is a chimera, a spectr 
Existence is first made known to me by quality -- not existence 
first/ 
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first, and after that quality. The primary certainty, he remarks, 
returnin?; to the principles stated in the Introduction, is every- 
where quality, existence fol'.ows of course, when once quality is 
certain. îßo heaven, like God, must have definite earthly qualit- 
ies expressive of praise and of blame. .'this belief selects a 
wreath from the flora, of this orld, and this critical florilegiva 
is heaven. 
As for the Method to be followed ( in later works) p 179, 
"It is necessary to consider religion in its rudimentary stages... 
It is requisite to reg?rd the various earlier religions as present 
in the absolute religion and not as left behind in the past, in 
order correctly to appreciate and comprehend the absolute relig- 
ion as well as the others. process of criticism by the higher 
to be added 
religion does not seem to our author to require /MUM:5th. 
Returning to faith in the future life, he declares it is only 
faith in the true life of the present; the essential elements of 
this life are also the essential elements of the other. "The fut- 
ure life is this life once lost, but found a.. ain, and radiant with 
all the more brightness because of the joy of recovery." (p 182) 
"The natural or rational _!an remains at home because he finds it 
agreeable, because he is perfectly satisfied; religion which com- 
menees with a discontent, a disunion, forsakes its home and trav- 
els far, but only to feel the more vividly in the distance the 
happiness of home." If it be said there is a supernatural body, 
this is only imagination working by miracle, adequate to the 
Limm....._ 
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So the first Part concludes, " Our most essential talk is 
now fulfilled. We have reduced the supermundane, supernatural, 
and superhuman nature of God to the elements of human nature as 
its fundamental elements. Our process of ana: .ysis has brought 
us a1:ain to the position from which we set out. The beginning, 
middle and end of kiigion is Man." 
One would have thought that Feuerbach had sufficiently 
brought to an end the illusion of religion, but with the thorou.- 
mood 
ness of a philosopher he sets aside the pleasant /NëK of explan- 
ation to crown himself with the thundercloud and to weld the 
flashing bolt of devastating criticism by the principle of inner 
contradiction. 
It can hardly be said that anything new emerges, though 
we meet as usual with apt phrases and subtle argumentation in re- 
lation to philosophers and theologians, and also at times a frank- 
ness which lays its finger on some vital characteristic of Christ- 
ianity, only of course to _point out its fallacy. 
The essential standpoint of religion is the practical,or, 
we note, the subjective. No other religion has given equal prom.- 
minenee to the salvation of man. 
and only as 
the heart's 
idea of the 
between od 
Contradicti 
God as the object of Religion, 
such is he god, belongs to Religion not Philosophy,to 
necessity and not to the mind's freedom. Where the 
w.,.rld, of so- called secondary causes, intrudes itself 
and the world, Religion is abolished. Thus we have the 
o Jda 
on between Religion hand Nature which runs through the 
whole/ 
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whole history of Christianity. 'Religion creates the :.Torld only 
to maintain it in the perpetual consciousness of its nothingness 
its dependence on God ". This contradiction is manifest in Vrayer 
the essential act of iLeligion, which appeals to God and miracle 
to realise practical NMI needs. The world is nothing to relig- 
ion, asserts Feuerbach, the world which is in truth the sum of 
all reality is revealed in its glory only by theory . 
Chapter XX deals with the Contradiction in the Existence of 
God, i.e. religion separates Gad from man and yet unites him to 
man. At first the proces is an "involuntary childlike simple act 
of the mind ", but later in theology it becomes an' intentional 
excogitated separation which has no other object than to banish 
again from the consciousness the identity which has already en- 
tered there." Later religions seek to explain away the anthropo- 
morphism of earlier. 
But the crux of the matter is JIM this that spiritual ex- 
istence being only an existence in thought feeling and belief, 
God's existence is a medium between sensational and conceptual 
existence, a medium full of contradictions. God is a matter of 
experience and yet in reality no object of experience, for em- 
pirical experience is proved to me by the senses only." ( p 201) 
Proofs of the existence of God aim at making the internal ex 
ternal, i.e. setting God apart, but 'external' means in space, 
having sensational existence. But is not what religion wants 
for God would not then be dependent upon inward disposition. The 
Ontological proof is the most interesting, because it proceeds 
from/ 
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from within. 
In chapter XXI there 1s quite a good discussion of Revel- 
ation, ever a central topic in theology, and its changing. charact 
er, determined by man's powers of comprehension. `ut belief in 
Revelation is the characteristic illusion of the religious conee 
sciousness, for t religious mind does not distinguish between 
subject and object. "Religion is a dream in which our own concept 
ions and emotions appear to us as separate existences, beings out 
of ourselves. "That which comes from God to man comes to man 
only from man in God, from the ideal man to the phenomenal, from 
the species to the individual." It is correst to say that relig- 
ion is the education of the human race, only religion must not be 
regarded as outside the nature of man. There is sophistry as well 
as superstition in a definite historical revelation. fut under- 
standing is the watchdog of revelation, and as man grows up he 
breaks the chain to show that superstition and folly are the rul- 
ing power. 
As for the Bible, it contradicts morality, for there is 
moral progress beyond it; it contradicts reason because it truths 
are not universally valid; and it contradicts itself. 
There is a contradiction in the Natrxre of God in general, for 
he is conceived under the form of the senses yet as freed from the 
senses. Also, a God who does not trouble himself about us is no 
God, while a God who does not exist in and by himself, out of men 
and above men as another being,is a phantom. 
The idea of God is linked up with that of Revelation and 
through 
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through it with that of personality; so here as elsewhere Feuer - 
bach attacks the doctrine of the personality of God. Kinship and 
resemblance are deceptive and evasive expressions. Imagination 
introduces the idea of personality or individuality to keep apart 
what reason sees to be identical, father and child, archetype 
and image, God and Man. One qualification is added, and it is 
obviously necessary - -- if sensible evidence can be produced it is 
of course to be acceoted against reason's identification. 
Hegel's speculative doctrine of God as well as that of Jacob 
Bohnre is criticised because it makes separate God and Man and so 
lands in contradictions. God is a self only in the human self. 
The opposite of God gives qualities to God. Why not state the 
truth ? Man's knowledge of God is man's knowledge of himself, of 
his own true nature. Unity of being and consciousness is truth. 
Where the consciousness of God is, there is the being of God -- ir 
man therefore. .ghat presents itself before thy consciousness is 
simply what lies behind it. If the divine qualities are human, 
the human qualities are divine. 
We may pause to say that we may frankly admit the difficult- 
ies inherent in all these speculativas as to the divine nature, 
and its relation to ourselves and the world. They are speculative 
but it has to be reinehbered that Feuerbach's own theory leaves u s , 
still With its own contradictions and problems of man and Nature 
and the Universe. 
Theologians have always admitted the mystery of the Trinity, 
though they would object to the statement that originally it is 
nothing/ 
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nothing else th -n the sum of the essential fundamental distinct 
ions which man perceives in huian nature. Feuerbach hardly ex- 
plains why we should project these specially along the historical 
line of the Christian Revelation or what eoperienceSelicit this 
description of God. 
Of course he has no patience with Symbolism which admits of 
the supernatur ̂.1. The Sacraments of Baptism end the Lord's Supper 
have a beautiful and profound natural significance, but he argues 
this is lost when they are lifted into the sphere of miracle. So 
here as fregvtently he works round the discussion to LAracle over 
against Nature and. Reason. 
Faith is defined as "the power of the imagination which 
makes the real unreal and the unreal real." It does not matter 
whether we take the Protestant or the Roman doctrine. It is in 
direct contradiction with the truth of the senses, with the truth 
of reason. And Feuerbach closes with words which seem to echo 
some utterances of Bayle, "7herever religion places itself in con- 
tradiction with reason, it places itself also in contradiction 
with the moral sense. Only with the sense of truth coexists the 
sense of the right and good." But the question is whether Feuer - 
bach has not sacrificied Christian experience to the interests of 
a narrow reason limited to sensible relations. 
The verbal cleverness of the special pleader is seen in the 
discussion on Faith and Love. There is an inevitable separation 
between them it is maintained, on many points, generally the sep- 
aration of man from mod by Faith and the union by Love, ( as if 
Faith/ 
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Faith did not also unite in trust and confidence and Love on 
its side imply duality.) But the treatment of faith is largey 
as intellectual belief, a knowledge of God, given not by nature 
but by special grace. Faith renders a man partial and narro -r, 
making the ground of decision not argument,reason, or the nature 
of things, but conscience, interest, the instinctive desire for 
happiness. (p249) Faith is arrogant, but it is distinguished from 
natural arrogance in this, that it clothes its feeling of super4 
iority, its pride, in the idea of another person, for whom the be 
never is an object of peculair favour. 
We have here thecharacteristic principle of religion, that it 
changes what is naturally active into the passive. The heathen 
elevates himself, tie Christian feels himself elevated. The hum -' 
ility of the believer is an inverted arrogance, unconsciously of 
course. 
Feuerbach's peculiar view of personality enables him to turn 
the argument that after all faith in God is faith in love, in 
goodness itself, and that thus faith is itself an expression of 
a morally good disposition. In the idea of personality, he says, 
ethical definitions vanish, they are only collateral, things,mere 
accidents. The chief thing is the divine Ego. (p260} The acme of 
personality is honour, hence an injury toward the highest person- 
ality is necessarily the highest crime, ( note p321,322), Faith 
necessarily passes into hatred, hatred into persecution, where the¡ 
power of faith meets with no contradiction, where it does not find 
itself in collision with a power foreign to faith, the power of 
lore/ 
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love, of humanity, of the sense of justice." (260p ). Faith 
does not make men moral, only hapoy, because any goodness result- 
ing is done out of rvr^titud.e to God and not for its own sake, as 
Kant would say. (p262) kind when we say God is Love, love i s re- 
duced to ,mere predicate of a darkShbject. 
If you say, "Love is 'od,Love is the absolute leing. ", the con 
tradiction is done away. As for the place of Christ, he is the 
apostle of love, though not the cause of love, for the idea of 
love is an independent idea not deduced from the life of L'hrist 
or any special historical phenomenon. Man is to be loved for 
man's sake. He is an end in himself because he is a rational and ! 
loving being. (p268) 
Showing that he is not free from the aloofness to history 
which is characteristic of Rationalism, Feuerbach declares, "In 
love and reason the need of an intermediate person disappears. 
Christ is nothing but an image, under which the unity of the spec- 
ies has impressed itself on the popular consciousness. }} - Christ 
is the love of mankind to itself embodied in an image, in accord- 
ance with the nature of religion as we have developed it." (p268) 
Certainly in the theory of our author the need of any historical 
Christ disappears, except as a convenience, a symbol. This is not 
a seious treatment of an important subject. 
The Concluding Application in chapter XXVII makes an appeal 
to rise above the standpn -int of Christianity and of religion. To 
what ? Well, religion is sacred as the primitive form of self - 
consciousness, 
but life es a whole is, in its essential substant- 
ial / 
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substantial relations, of a divine nature throughout. This sound 
a little indiscriminating, for there are varieties of life as 
there are varieties of religion and if the latter argue against 
the existence of deity why should not the former; or is this the 
transformed Hegelianism with the old doctrine that the 'real is 
the rational.' 
But we are forgetting Man; sotto continue our exposition, Man 
as the object of this new religious theory includes external Nat- 
ure, for he belongs to the essence of Nature and Nature belongs 
to the essence of ]an. "Only by uniting Man with Nature can we 
conquer the supranaturalistic egoism of Christianity." (note p 27C 
This theory, it should be noted is contrary to common materialism 
and to subjective idealism alike. Yet Man is separate from Nat- 
ure, he continues, and in thy gratitude to _=ian, do not forget 
gratitude to Holy Nature, In the Sacraments of life Man may pro- 
duce the bread and wine, showing his difference from Nature, but 
pure 
water is Nature's own XJ.g3§ gift, a universal element in life re- 
minding us of our origin from Nature. The Sacraments show there- 
fore this double relation of Man to Nature. 
In such words as the above Feuerbach is consciously or uncon- 
sciously preparing the way for'Das Wiesen der Religion', in which 
Nature comes to the front and Man recedes, but where the thrill of 
ecstacy over 'Holy Nature' and the'religious' importance of bread 
wine and water in themselves has died away. It may surprise one 
even here that there should be a desire to retain the words'relig- 
i0us' and 'sacred' and to make apostrophe to 'Holy' Nature. Is 
this/ 
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this the survival of the Romantic spirit and the triumph of Imag- 
ination over cool Reason, the kernal of idealism breaking through 
the hard shell of materialism ? Is it not the restlessness of 
Reason itself, the stirrings of the deeper nature of man ? 
Feuerbach states the matter quite simply; "The work of the seit 
:conscious reason in relation to religion is simply to destroy an 
illusion... And we need ònly, as we have shown invert the relig4 
sous relation, exalt that into the primary which in religion is 
subordinate. "(p 274) "The necessary turning point of history is 
therefore the open confession that the eonsçiousness of God is 
the 
nothing else than the consciousness of /species; that man can and 
should raise himself ( I have underlined these words) only above 
the limits of his individuality and not above the laws, the pos- 
itive essential conditions of his species; that there is no other 
essence (7esen) which man can think, dream of, imagine,feel,be- 
lieve in,wish for, love and adore as the Osolute, than the essen 
ce of human nature itself ." (p 270) 
But what if this inversion itself destroy reason, and,substit -! 
uting theories for facts, ultimately dissolve history man and Nate 
ure into a chaotic dream more desolating and more injurious than 
any of the dreams of religion ? In due course this question 
must be more definitely stated. It is time to turn to the seque 
to Wesen des Christentums Das lesen der religion. 
C H A P T E R . IV. 
Sum:ary and Survey of the principal Works 
dealing with Religion. 
SECTION 3. 
Id 
Das Wesen der Religion. 
I find nothing great: 
Nothing is left which I can venerates 
So that almost a doubt within me springs 
Of Providence, such emptiness at length 
Seems at the heart of all things." 
Wordsworth. 
"Earth .. Mother of simple truth, 
Relentless quencher of lies . 
Meredith. 
/ 
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11 
This book, shorter than the others and set forth in paragratas 
not chapters, has for its purpose the presentation of Religion 
so far as her object is Nature, ( 10.W Vol I . p400) . In 'Luther' 
and Das W.O. he had set this consideration aside, abstracting as 
he must, for the kernel of Christianity there dealt with, he says 
is not God in Nature but in men. 
Wobbermin thinks that Feuerbarh should have dealt thus with 
religion generally before dealing with Christianity in particular 
and then he would not have given us in W. C. a mere a priori con- 
struction,i.e. God as Wnitschwesen. On the other hand he might 
have given us only another a priori doctrine and we know how 
Schleiermacher's Der christliche Glaube' suffers because of the 
first part endeavouring to deal with religion apart from the 
special content of Christianity,( Glre.I part Para 34,3,last sent 
ence). It is true,however, that the two works scarcely hang to- 
gether and there is no reconciliation between .Nature as Deity 
and Humanity except by throwing over Nature and transforming the 
feeling of absolute dependence into the principle of Egoism. 
The style is crisp,cold, and objective, though sarcastic and 
even poetic phrases are not infrequent. 
One should add that it is preceded in 1,361 by Supple- 
ments and Explanations which underline the power of Necessity, 
( 1.374 -5,361 ), the influence of phantasy and emotion in creat4 
ing the supernatural out of the sensible, and the inevitable Ego- 
ism/ 
"b 
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ism of man; 'only death is without egoism.' These two latter 
points, phantasy and egoism, illustrate where "I. ñ. is in touchi 
with 7.C. Only incidentally are the special doctrines of Christ- 
ianity refer: : -ed to, e.g.,the Sacraments. 
Succintly he states his fundamental principle,p 411, "The feel- 
ing of absolute dependence in men is the ground of religion,and 
the object of religion is originally nothing else than Nature,as 
the history of all religions and peoples sufficiently proves." 
Religion is innate in man as the feeling of absolute dependence, 
though not innate as the ideas of Theism. It is" as near to man 
as light to the eye, breeth to the lungs,food to the stomach." 
Here Feuerbach touches on a favourite thought over against Rat- 
ionalism and Materialism alike. 
Varieties of religion are found /partly as a result of man's 
dependence on particular parts of nature,e.g.,trees, hills,and 
partly 
because dependence on nature gives place in due course to 
dependence on political and moral Power,( the Roman Emperor is 
called your Divinity, and the Criminal Code is represented as the 
Code of Natural Law. Elsewhere he gives yet a third reason,the 
differences in human nature and in races. 
'ghat then is this Nature ? In note 2,p 410, he explains that 
he uses it only as general word, just as with spirit, for the de- 
scription of the aesen, Dinge, Gegenstände which man distinguish- 
from himself and his productions and sets together in the common 
name of Nature, but not a 'universal' withdrawn from and separat- 
ed from actual things, a personified and mysterious -:";elan. ( Not 
therefore we presume, 'Holy Nature' .) The/ 
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The faith that another being exists through and beyond Nature 
is due to the pl.antasy of man who injects himself involuntarily 
into Nature,makes:ature a symbol and mirror of his own being. 
( para 9) 
Nature is not.the efect,result of a spiritual,i.e. a willing 
and knowing orthinking being, as little as are the groth of thel 
child in mother -love, the movement of the heart, the digestion 
and other organic functions the effect of reason and will. ( 13) 
Nature is, he seems to say, the great unconscious being, "the un 
conscious God is the presupposition of the conscious,(I. 361 ), 
"from lack of understanding comes understanding and not vice ver- 
sa is the movement of the world. The inference would seem to bet 
though of course not drawn by our author, that man is not meant 
to go back to unconsciousness, or perhaps that Nature has some 
higher form than man yet to come. 
Nature, however, is not purposeful in man's way, as setting 
her energies to a definite goal, hence the frequent misbirths. 
( para 47) 
She is just what'she is. Feuerbach would seem to say that her 
movements are instinctive as the bird's flight or the spider's 
web. (para 47 ). What for us is an insoluble theoretical problem 
that the spider does without understanding and consequently with- 
out difficulties which exist only for our understanding." "The 
appearance of Nature is for us indeed Reason, but the cause of 
this appearance is as little reason as the cause of light is liglf 
Yet Nature is not blind,nor dead,nor casual. She works in con, 
nectedness, which for man is reason, for wherever he finds reason 
he finds system, but from and with Necessity, not however, a log- 
ical / 
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teal, metaphysical, mathematical, i.e.,human necessity, but as 
sensuous, therefore eccentric exceptional irregular, a necessity 
appearing as Freedom. Nature is only to be comprehended through 
herself and is dependent in concept upon no other being. She is 
the 'thing -in- itself' over against 'what is for us. (48) 
There is an evolutionary process going on i,ra :ature; it is be- 
ing proved that organic and inorganic are identical. Yet, or 
because of this, Nature has not unlimited powers. (17,18) 
It mould appear that there is something greater than Nature, 
Necessity, or it may be that this is just part of Nature's secret. 
( 0.W.1,361). But this like so many other things lies unrelated 
to the various parts of his theory and is not worked out as it 
might be, revealing a Power in and beyond Nature and Man alike. 
He has much to say about Necessity and Need in "Er6n5ungen .." 
human 
e.g. "The superXX power in the first instance, the power be- 
fore which at first man bows the knee, is the power of Necessity, 
'die Machte der Noth', the power over death and life." (I.361) 
And the paper ends with a very eloquent passage,p 374 -5, on the 
power of Necessity. It is the founder and destroyer of States. 
Before it every power bends. To it is ascribed the highest attri 
utes of divine majesty. 
It is true that he is referring to human necessity or wants, 
or necessity in relation to mankind, the "resent which lies behind 
man's conscious purposes and strivings, the Being behind the Nat- 
ure of Man which brin; -s to the ground the proud nations which 
think of their own people rather than of the Thole race of man- 
kind/ 
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kind. But the Deference seems also to have a wider implicatian. 
At any rate we learn that Selfishness, not only in a personal 
sense but in a national also, is contrary to the Being of Man. Un- 
selfishness is an inevitable law in history. But whence did Hist- 
ory obtain this law ? From the Being behind Man. Is this Being 
independent of Nature, or is Unselfishness the decree of the Uni- 
versal Being and God Love ? 
The idea of Nature is described,of course,in opposition to 
the Hegelian theory and also to Theism. 
The world, we are reminded, is not given us through think- 
ing but through life, intuition, sense. _an is more than logician; 
or metaphysician, But just this 'plus' ap -)ears to the metaphysic- 
al thinker as a 'minus', this neCation of thinking as DAM ab- 
solute nejation. (25) Nature is for him nothing more than the op- 
posite, the Other of Spirit, which exists only through an express- 
ion of himself apparently voluntary but in truth of necessity. But 
if Nature vanishes into Nothing from the standpoint of abstract 
thinking, so on the contrary does the World- creating Spirit vanish 
into nothing from the standpoint of the real world -view. From 
this standpoint all deductions of the world from God, Nature from 
Spirit, Physics from Metaphysics, the real from the abstract prove 
themselves the Play of logic 
As for the Creation of Nature, creation is of course the great 
miracle; but as in the world of politics so in that of theology, 
r 
the small thieves are hung and the great allowed to run off,which V 
means that men censure the miracle in Baptism but accept it in 
Creation/ 
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Creation. Briefly, says Feuerbach, Nature is superfluous if 
God is our and its Preserver and Cre ;tor. As in W. C. we must 
choose between God or :nature. 
Nor will he have anything to do with the the idea. of God as 
First Cause (15). For in that case there comes the boundless 
arm 0/ of subordinate gods, the regiment of middle causes, which 
after all are the real things, leaving God as a mere 'titular 
cause', an innocuaous, most modest ' Ged.ankendinr.' , a mere hypo- 
thesis to solve a theoretical difficulty, to explain the first 
beginnings of Nature or rather of organic life.... In fact, we 
must not make the limits of our knowledge also the li.n.its of Tat-'. 
ure. 
Certainly there is a weakness in the representation of God 
as just the first of a series of causes, and Theism has generall 
tried to avoid it, using the term 'ground' rather than cause,as 
of a power present throughout the series. In any case a hypo- 
thesis may be quite a usefuland even necessary thing. Feuerbach 
however in his interest in Realism shows a lack of the philosoph 
is sense for unity. "The tedious uniformity of causal series is 
really broken by the individuality of things which give us some- 
thing new. Why go back to the First Cause which gives us the 
wolf as well as the dog ? It 'thus shows itself morally indif fern 
Ont. (7). Also he whimsically says, ' «y individuality depends 
on my nearest cause, my parents, and is lost if I go back to the 
First Cause." 
Man as represented in 7 R. is at once honoured and depreciat- 
ed/ 
ed. 
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We have seen Nature's independence of him, so that he has 
no sure place in her adventures. Yet they have also an inclusive 
relation to one .pother, as we see in Notes in I R and W C. And 
pan is produced as the last and highest of Nature's creatures. If 
Nature is the ground of Religion , he is its aim. Why not, we may 
ask, sat the aim of reality as ; rell \as religion ? But that would 
be to throw away the whole theory of the illusion of religion . 
So much we can say is, that man conscious of his high position ex- 
presses it in religion, for only in man does the feeling of absol- 
ute dependence which is the source of religion come to conscious - 
ness. It expresses itself in Sacrifice, the essentt.l act of nat 
urs.l religion.(28). As the slave of Nature I stride to sacrifice, 
depart 
but as the master of Kature from sacrifice. 
Rather pathetically Feuerbach explains how in natural relig- 
ion man turns to an object which contradicts out and out the prop- 
er will and sense of religion, for here he sacrifices here his fee 
sings to a Being in itself without feeling, his understanding to a 
Being without understanding, he sets above himself what he would 
like to have beneath him; he serves that which he wills to master 
reverences whet he essentially abhors, implores help from just 
that against which he seeks help. He unmans himself to make Nat- 
ure human All in vain. Nature ans'-ers not. Ohe hurls him 
inexorably back upon himself. 
There is much about sacrifice elsewhere, but here it is the 
bridge from dependence to Mastery, to the favourite doctrine of 
our author, to'Egoismus'. Rebuffed by Nature he must have a God, 
and/ 
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and by -.phantasy and emotion creates one after his own image. 
The wish i.s the origin, the `.':esen itself of religion. Re- 
ligion makes Nature homely, so does Culture, but Culture falls 
behind the wishes of religion, for she cannot remove the barrier 
grounded in the being of man; she can give iLacriobiotik but not 
Immortality. Peuerbach is thus quite frank as to the limits of 
Culture and the Religion of Humanity. (32) . 
' Tishes of course vary,as in the case of Greek and Christian, 
and so do religions.( 55). This is, one will remember, a difaim 
ferent explanation from that which traced it back to natural 
surroundings. The gods are realised wishes (51). As belong - 
ing to the world of ideas they belong to the Past or the Future; 
the Present is godless because idea and reality fall together. 
Progress is away from Nature. Only the towns make history. 
The East has no history of progress because it has not forgotten 
Nature over against man. (38). So we have this remarkable con- 
elusion,'Human vanity is the principle of history: 
Feuerbach seen to fluctuate between various representations 
of God, as Nature, as Necessity, as the living ideals of men, 
and as fanciful ideas. Yet he has a grip on truth when he says 
kq 
) 
uuoting Luther "God is a religious word Deus et cultus sand re -III 
lafiva." God presupposes man who shall worship him, as husband 
presupposes wife. "As sound is only in the ear and for the ear, 
so God exists only in religion and for religion, only in faith 
and for faith." (54). But his conclusion is the usual one, that 
religion is thus proved to be only subjective. 
Along/ 
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Along the same line he remarks that Seligkeit and Gottheit 
are one, and points out that man can be moral without G -od, but 
not blessed in the supernatural Christian sense of the word, for 
blessedness lies beyond the limits the power of Nature and man, 
what 
presupposes a supernatural being who can do /for Nature and man 
is impossible. 
Two smaller points may be mentioned to complete this account 
of the book. First, Feuerbach recognises that man's reverence fo] 
animals is not just because of their utility. ¡heir colour, move- 
ment etc. af"ect him and are knit together by 4is imagination. 
This seems to qualify his doctrine of Egoismus and even of depend- 
ence. What is this special quality of the religious or sacred in 
such cases ? Is it a certain primitive awe ? 
Secondly, it is pointed out that 'utility' its an irreligious 
expression. The word ought to be ' beneficent ', for that is 
objective, referring beyond itself to another. 
To su.i up, we may say tha4n seeking to secure a place for 
Religion, apart from Philosophy Feuerbach follows the teaching of 
Schleiermacher in asserting the natural, implanted and inevitable 
feeling of absolute d.,pendence, but he does not, in scientific 
fashion and with thoroughness give it the place it ought to have 
in any larger consideration of religion and its significance for 
the universe as well as man. 
C H A P T E R . IV. 
Suimnary and survey of the principal Works dealing 
with Keligion. 
SECTION 4. 
Vorlesungen über Das Wesen der Religion. 
" Thus is Man that great and true Amphibium 
whose nature is disposed to live, not only like 
other creatures in divers elements, but in divided 
and distinguished worlds. " 
sir Thomas Browne. 
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Those lectures, thirty in number, are of interest in many 
ways. I/ They show us Feuerbach in contact with, yet aloof 
from, the fruitless movements of 1848. 
2/ They give us a survey by himself of his personal 
achievements in authorship. 
3/ They expand and illustrate, alas at great length, 
the compact sentences of the earlier W R. and yet he can say, "I 
love brevity. I say with few words what others say with folios. 
p 67. 
Reference has been made earlier to the part which the stud- 
ent' world took in the political movements of ̀ the time, and it 
was from them that the invitation came to Feuerbach to lecture 
in Heidelberg. They were delivered, however, not in the Universit 
but in the town before a mixed audience of the public from Decem- ¡ 
ber 1848 to March 1849. One student at least, we are told, was 
converted from Hegelianism by hearing them. (Kohut, p 321) 
Appearing in print in 1851, with the omission of one lecture 
only on the foundations of philosophy, and with new references 
etc., they represented, he tells us, "his only expression of act- 
ivity in the so- called revolutionary time, when he took part only 
as a critical spectator and listener and on the simple ground of 
their resultless and heedless undertakings. He had declined to 
stand as a member of the Frankfurt National Assembly. 
Too much faith had been put in words. The constitutionalists 
thought they had only to cry 'Freedom' and the Republicans a' 
Republic', and the miracle would happen. Space and time are funda- 
mental conditions of all Sein and ,`esen, thought and action, pro- 
sperity and success. When he did take part in such a movement, it 
would/ 
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would be with substantial grounds of success. "We want to be 
not political idealists but political materialists." ,e live in 
time when even we unpolitical Germans must forget everything 
except politics, for individuals require to stand together to 
achieve anything" . 
One might think that Religion and Lectures on it had little 
bearing on such a situation, but Feuerbach believes a new 
religion is required for the new age, (Lect 23. p 280 etc.) to 
solve its political and social problems. Religion is the oldest 
Culture and Cup -lture ought to be perfected religion ( p275). Yet 
superstition and religion go together also, and Goethe is 
quoted as saying, " He that has science does not need religion." 
Apparently it is only religion of a particular kind that is 
0 required, only that which is founded on Nature and Man. Wherein 
it differs from perfected Culture entitling it to the name of 
religion, Feuerbach does not explain. It seems to have some 
potent influence, for "Culture is not omnipotent, though it can 
relieve and lessen distress." (269 p). 
His aim, as stated on p 29. and at the close of the lectures 
as his peroration, is emphatically a positive one, "To change men 
from friends of God to friends of men, from believers to thinkers 
from men of prayer to men of work, from candidates of the future 
life to students of this, from Christians who in consequence of 
their own creed and confession are half animal, half angel, into 
complete men." 
These lectures also present us with one of the various surveys/ 
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veys and the most detailed, which he gives of his literary his- 
tory. It is a sad story in its personal aspect but illuminating 
for the study of his writings and the changes in his standpoint. 
In the mood of Spinoza or abstract philosophy he had criticised 
Leibnitz and others (p 10). Pierre ayle ends his historical re- ,-..-_--.---. 
view. But through the study of religion and nature he had come 
to discover the principle of Sinnlichkeit in Religion and the 
full meaning of the senses (p 16). Later this came to be Man' or 
'Egoismus', or again 'Nature' as organisai. Whether you call 
his doctrine Religion or Philosophy he does not care. Name it as 
you please. The essence is, theology is anthropology ( p 21). 
The two classes of his writings, philosophy and religious phil- 
osophy had only one theme, religion and theology and what depends 
on these. 
The reason that 'Das Wesen der Religion' is taken as basis 
for these lectures is that its paragraphs are small and well -pack- 
ed and permit of developing and illustrating the theme that God 
is not only as in Christianity the Good, the cause of Moral Beings 
of men, but the deified and personified Being of Nature. Theology 
is not only anthropology but also physiology ( p 26). My doctrine 
or view is comprehended in two words consequently, "Nature and 
Plan" together. Rather naively he tells us also that he chose this 
method to help to keep him from wandering. 
There seem to be two transition sections, Lecture 10 showing 
the passage to Egoismus from the Feeling of absolute dependence 
through the need which confers power on the object to satisfy it 
through imagination, and again, Lecture 20, where there is a 
ehahg e/ 
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change from the discussion of Natural Religion to one on Theism, 
going over from the strict limits of W. R. to '4.C. 
It is to be confessed that the lectures are prolix. Some 
useful expansions of passages and ideas in previous books are 
given. But as lectures they were not considered a great success. 
We feel, as Feuerbach himself says, that during twelve years in 
the country he has lost the gift of lecturing. The time when he 
said adieu to academic life was so terribly sorrowful and miserabl 
that the thought of resuming lectures never could come to him. 
In the last lecture he apologises for their length on the ground 
that he is no academic 'docent'. Bolin says of him that he was 
a 'Forcher and Denker' but not a 'Lehrer' (p 20 -1). Yet there 
are discussions which bring us nearer to his mind and outlook, 
and definitions which help to focus his, teaching. 
In chap. 4. in discussing the Origin and Object of Religion, 
he tells us more of what he means by 'Nature' and the feeling of 
absolute dependence, Sinnlichkeit, Egoism. Sacrifice and God. 
Luther is quoted where he can help to show the subjectivity of 
religion.. "God is as man thinks ".. 
The main positions have already been sufficiently indicated 
in the presentation of W.R., so we shall keep to what may throw 
further light upon the problems involved and their solution. 
Religion has its origin in the Feeling of Absolute Dependence, 
and its object is Nature. Hegel's jest against Schleiermacher, 
that a dog must be the most religious of creatures because as 
conscious of dependence on his master, is swept aside with a jibe 
at the speculative philosophers who make things according to idea 
and/ 
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and not ideas according to things. As a matter of fact fear 
and in a higher form reverence is a manifestation of primitive 
man's response to the awe -inspiring activities of Nature which 
he makes his gods. 
But fear is not the complete sufficient ground for the ex- 
planation of religion as atheists and even theists say. Fear is 
transitory; if it cowers before the future, it gives place 
to an opposite feeling of deliverance joy gratitude love rapture. 
(We might also add that fear is paralysing weakening.) Even the 
thunder -storm brings b'essings as well as blows, especially to 
such people as do not simply live for the moment but are able to 
grasp in a unity different impressions. The most comprehensive 
name which includes both this positive and negative ground of 
explanation is 'feeling of absolute dependence'... thanks for 
dependence on that object through which I am something as well as 
fear because dependent upon that through which I am nothing (p.36) 
In presenting this positive ground Feuerbach says, ut separate 
myself from the earlier atheists and pantheists (who in this 
connection hold similar views with the atheists). The feeling 
of need is practical, teleological; the feeling of gratitude 
poetic, aesthetic. Yet he agrees with a French writer who says 
that thunder and death etc. have brought to man more of the idea 
of God than the constant harmony of Nature and all the demonstrati 
-ions of Clark and Leibnitz. ( Durkheim on the contrary holds that 
the gode are the powers that maintain the normal order of things. 
So,( 
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So here we have the direct proof that the feeling of absolute 
dependence is the origin of religion, that religion is the 
dependent 
mark of a finite /being. (Lect.V) If there were no death, there 
would be no religion The grave of man is the birthplace of the 
gods.t1 The only religious wish, the only prayer of rude peoples 
is, "Strike me not dead." 
The feeling of absolute dependence is not of course the whole 
of religion, only its origin and basis. Man seeks means against 
that upon which he is dependent. Feuerbach is here working to- 
ward his further development of religion as ' Egoismus', and is 
seeking for a bridge to carry him over to an explanation of self - 
denial and sacrifice which seem to contradict this principle of 
Egoismus. 
Meantime let us note that he says religion has no special or- 
gan, for, if so, there would need to be two, one for evil deities 
and the other for good; and later he declares that religion has 
no special material but can be attached to anything. (p 283). 
Yet the feeling of absolute dependence is so deep- rooted in man's 
nature that we may say that religion is innate. It is not, 
however, a cloudy undetermined abstract feeling, as it is with 
Schleiermacher. It has eyes and ears. Its object is Nature, the 
object of the senses, and consequently its impressions vary. 
How then do we pass from the feeling of absolute dependence 
to Egoismus? ( p 102) The feeling of absolute dependence is only 
an indirect or inverted or negative feeling of self mediated by 
the object upon which I am dependent. The power of the object 
itself/ 
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itself.is derived from, is a consequence of the power of my 
need. The need is just as much the servant as the lord of his 
object, just as mwek as it is proud; it requires an object, it 
is unhappy without it, there lies its subjection, its surrender, 
its selfishness; but it requires it to satisfy itself upon it, 
to enjoy it, to turn it to advantage; therein lies its desire to 
be lord, its egoism. 'Where there is no need, there is no feeling 
of absolute dependence. "Noth lehrt beten.M The need is the 
need of pleasure. ( p 103). 
We shall have to consider this later in connection with the 
Doctrine of the theogonic Wish, but we note here the reality 
of the object and the desire to give expression to a real 
element in religion, though the explanation, failing any active 
operation of the object, seems to be forced and verbal. 
Feuerbach admits that the problem now raised of the reality 
of self- denial and the meaning of sacrifice in religion, (and 
both are undeniable) presents us with the paradox of religion. 
p 85, 80 & 321) Both are, however, subject to the one chief and 
fundamental Wish for Blessedness (Seligkeit), which is the wish 
or idea of an eternal heavenly life from which the idea of the 
Christian Godhead is not separated. The renunciation is of earth 
lY goods for heavenly when the words are uttered, "Not my will 
but Thine be done." 
The problem of altruism is of course a difficult one, and 
perhaps Feuerbach gets out of it as well as any of the moral 
Philosophers by making the sacrifice of self to mean the acknow- 
ledgement and advance of the larger self, the Moral Ideal, in whic7 
man/ 
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man comes to his full stature, or as some would say the individ 
ual becomes a person. But, to do this, he has to point out that 
the religious wish is not a selfish one, merely individual, but 
is determined by duty. Man's fundamental impulses, wishes, dis- 
positions which belong to religion or culture are his duties. 
This of course is a matter where Feuerbach scarcely ever wavers, 
that man has the roots of morality in him. There is a Categorica] 
Imperative, a moral 'Uber' as well as a natural one, and the in- 
ference is that he must obey the first rather than the second, al- 
though the second, it is admitted, will have the last word in the 
event of conflict. 
In lecture 7 it is pointed out that this Egoismus is not 
selfishness, contrary to theology, where strictly speaking every 
love which has not God for its aim and object, even love to other 
men, is itself egoism. (p 62) We have to remember that in a 
sense it is not so much moral as metaphysical egoism which is 
being advocated here. It is the impulse of self -preservation and 
the instinct of reason, grounded in the nature of man, without 
which man cannot live; it is exhibited even in the organism 
which appropriates what it can assimilate and sets aside what 
it cannot; it is evidenced in the self -assertion of men over 
against all unnatural and inhuman demands which theological 
hypocrisy, religious and speculative phantasies. political 
brutalities and despotisms seek to impose upon men." (p 63). 
The mystery deepens as we set this creature of such vigorous 
impulse in the midst of Nature, for we have gone above and 
behind/ 
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behind the feeling of absolute dependence itself and discovered 
the last subjective ground of religion in human Egoism." ( p 69) 
What is this Nature of which we hear so much, the original 
object of religion, the ground and source of man? Unlike the 
work 'God' which is a mystical undetermined word with many mean- 
ings; Nature', we are assured, is a clear sensible unambiguous 
word and being." And he proceeds to define it, "Das bewusstlose 
Wesen der Religion is to me the eternal underived Being, the first 
Being in time though not in rank, the physical but no the first 
moral Being." Man is its child, part and yet apart, for the chiic 
as it grows up naturally critices its parent (:). p 46. There 
is no deification of Nature. But Feuerbach never really decides 
whether man is to be included in Nature or not, or rather he de- 
cides for Näture yet leaves man a pathetic figure wrestling with 
fate. 
He speaks of his love of Nature, (Lect. 11, p 116) and the re- 
plies to the challenge, "What is your definition of Nature? You 
do not give one. Spinoza spoke of God or Nature as symonyms. 
Do you ?" "No," he replies. Nature is the 'Inbegriff' of all 
sensible powers, things, and beings, which man distinguishes 
from himself as not human; as with Spinoza, a being not super - 
naturaliworking not by will and understanding but by the necess- 
ity of its nature, but, as is not the case with Spinoza, not again 
aBeing at the same time supernatural, supersensible, aloof, 
secret, simple but a Being manifold, popular, real, perceptible, 
by all the senses. 
Nature/ 
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Nature is everything which proves itself to man as ground 
and object of his life, apart from the supernatural infilterat- 
ions of theistic faith. Nature is light, electricity, magnetism 
air, water, fire, earth, animal, plant, is Man, so far as he is 
an involuntary and unconscious being, nothing more, nothing 
nebulous mystical, theological. 
Nature is the " Wesen oder der Inbegriff der Wesen", and things 
whose appearances, expressions or effects wherein she reveals and 
maintains their "Dasein and Wesen", have their foundation, not in 
thoughts or purposes and resolutions of the will, but in astronom- 
ical or cosmic, mechanical, chemical, physical, physiological or 
organic powers or causes. 
Over against the Cosmological argument for God, i.e., from 
the world to its cause, Feuerbach asserts Nature is self- subsist- 
ent, eternal. (Lett. 12, p 130). It is the reason of man, 
rising from particulars to universals, which has made God "the 
Cause in general." That is all, and it is an explanation that 
does not help, for we are interested in particular causes, and, 
if I must go on, why not go past God himself to his cause; while 
further to make @god a cause of the world makes him dependent on the 
world. 
These arguments suggest to Feuerbach an analogy between Nature 
and the State; as a republic is the historical task and practical 
goal of man, so the rule of Nature by and within herself is the 
theoretical aim. Nature has neither beginning nor end. ( p 129) 
All is "Wec4sel- wirkung ", reciprocity, all is relative. Nature does 
not run out into monarchical points; she id a republic. Those 
accustomed/ 
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accustomed to the princely regime cannot think of any common 
life of men without princes, nor can he who is accustomed to 
the idea from infancy think of Nature without God. "But Nature 
is xxim aä no less thinkable without God, an external and super 
natural being than the state without a lordly idol." 
Over against such a conception of Nature, however, is the con- 
ception of Miracle. (Lect 26). It is, says Feuerbach, one of 
the most important if we are to know the essence of religion, 
especially Christianity. We must set aside the miracles or 
marvels of Nature, though they are put forward to protect the 
claims of religion; they are for us marvels but not such in and 
for Nature. For one thing, (p 311), Nature gives no laws and 
received none, as if sun moon and stars were human beings; these 
ideas are inpplicable here because human. She is a law to her- 
self in so far as she works according to her own constitution; 
and so we set aside the view of Rationalism which supposes a God 
who gives laws to his world as a king to his subjects and who may 
abrogate what he gives. Again in religious marvels man is 
interested in himself, whereas natural marvels are indifferent to 
his wishes and needs. 
Luther is quoted ( p 307-0 8) as extolling the books of Script- 
ure which give us the teaching and words of Jesus rather than his 
miracles. In this he was considering the latter only as histor- 
Í 
teal happenings of the past, dead and gone, relative to the cir- 
cumstances and individuals in connection with which they occurred 
bound to space and time. His interest is religious. It is no use 
believing Christ wrought miracles in the past, e.g., bropght 
Lazarus/ 
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Lazarus to life, if one does not believe he can still do that 
for oneself, for one's brother etc. ( p 309) "We have still the 
power to work such signs," declared Luther, "when it be necessary '.' 
(p 310, and of. W. Glaug. in sinne Luthers). There is then 
comments Feuerbach, no difference, no real separation between 
faith in miracles and faith in God, and no other proof of his 
existence is given by God than these marvels. 
As for the Resurrection of Christ, (Lect 27), this of course 
is a proof of God's power over death; but we are here in the 
realm of 'religious' not historical facts, and it is pedantic to 
refer the one to the other; religious facts exist only for faith. 
Jesus as presented in the Bible is not a historical but a 
'religious' person. The Resurrection is a sage, and since the 
belief in resurrection existed long before Christianity, the ele- 
ment of interest in our own resurrection through Christ is very 
marked. In fact, "religious miracles are not possible without 
man" ( p 321) . 
We are thrust back to the realm of wishes. What are they? 
How are they defined? The question meets us again in 'Theogonie' 
Here, p 322, we are told that wishing is bound up with man's very 
existence and also with God's. " Keine Religion, kein Gott, ohne 
Wunsch, aber kein Mensch ohne Wunsch." But there is a difference 
for religion has wishes which are fulfilled only in the power of 
the imagination or faith, whereas man as such, who sets in the 
place of religion, education, reason, natural perception, and in 
earth, 
Place of heaven /has wishes which do not overleap the limits of a 
%re and reason, which lie in the sphere of natural possibility 
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and realisation. 
Varieties in religion, (elsewhere due to difference of objects 
in Nature and differences in man, see para 37 W R., are to be 
traced back to variety of wishes; the Greek is content with 
this world, the Christian longs for another. ( p 69) The 
Christians changed their gods because their religious tastes 
changed, the heathen gods did not give them what they wanted. " 
Religion is nothing more than the art of life. Every satisfaction, 
of an impulse is a divine pleasure and so we reverence the objects 
or beings upon which this satisfaction depends." ( p 68). 
Thus, Lect. 29, God and Immortality are joined together, for 
without God the doctrine of Immortality has no beginning, no prin 
-1 
ciple. Nature thinks only of continuance of the species, replac- 
ing the old by a new individual. Over against the rationalists 
Feuerbach adds significantly, ( P353), and it applies to his own 
doctrine, " who does not wish to end with Nature must not beging 
with Nature." 
A God is not a natural power, a world- cause, ( p 349). A 
God is essentially an object of reverence, love, adoration, a 
Being of the heart not to be found by telescope or hammer, only 
in faith. He becomes therefore the realiser, or the reality of 
human wishes for happiness, perfection, immortality; deity is 
no longer self -dependent Being but an attribute of man. How can 
separate my being from my wishes, for what I wish is my heart, 
n31being. The warmest, most inner, most holy thought and wish of 
Zan is, or at least was, the wish, the thought of eternal life." 
Yet/ 
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there are not necessary wishes, according to Feuerbach, 
for the barriers against which they cry out are barriers only to 
the imagination of man. That a man is tied down to space and 
time simply means that he is bound up with earth. "Apart from 
earth I am a phantom. I am essentially a being of earth." 
The psychological proof of the being of God is thus only an 
indirect proof of the infinitude of the human spirit. ( p 344). 
Let us concentrate on the real wishes of man which can be ful- 
filled in social progress and culture. "The one devil of mankind 
is the man coarse, superstitious, self -seeking, evil, but also 
the only God of man is Man himself." 
Thus closes with a repetition of his aim, given earlier in 
this summary, a book of exhaustive completeness, requiring only 
in his "swan- song ", his 'Theogonie' some further remarks. 
C...H A P T E K IV. 
Summary and Survey of the principal Works dealing 
with Religion 
Theogonie. 
.._e: edi n . 
Section 
"Full lasting is the song, though he, 
The Singer, passes. 
"It is too philological for Messieurs the philosophers 
and too philosophical for Messieurs 
the philologicns." 
Feuerbach to Bolin. 
Chapter 1V. Section 5. Theogonie. 
"TH.EOGONIE 
nach den :,uellen des ciassischen, hebraischen 
und christlichen Altertums." 
As we have seen this work was intended to be Feuerbach's 
swam- song', a recapitulation of his whole spiritual life, 'eine 
Wiedergeburt ab ovo' in the highest degree consolatory and 
elevating, a shelter in late life from the reaction of ' 50. (v 
Bolin, p 31 and Nachlass, vol 11. 121). He remarks upon its 
freedom from scholastic expressions, from unholy subjectivity, 
and also from all reference to German school- philosophy, although 
it was directed against the transcendental, philosoph#pal,religious , 
political and even juridical Absolutism of the Germans. 
"It is, "says Bolin, p 32, " the simplest, completest, most 
mature of all his writings, where in the form of a certainty 
happy in itself he sets forth what his earlier works had represen- 
ted in the form of wearisome philosophical arguments." To his op- 
ponents it was a 'mere snake in water', and the indifference was 
such that the ban upon it still continues, despite the new inter- 
est in the science of religion. 
To consider it now in a little more detail, we may say that 
the style is more subdued than in the earlier works, the tone 
less scathing and bitter, despite occasional outbursts of invect- 
ive, and the mood is more objective. References to the literary 
sources indicated in the title are many, especially in the earl- 
ier chapters dealing with the Iliad and the Odyssey. But the 
intention is philosophical or theological, and the literary 
material/ 
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ial, in itself difficult enough of interpretations for I under- 
stand that the theology of Homer is not definitely settled, is 
all pourv:xi into the familiar moulds. (p38). "The A.sh is the otbg 
inal apearance of the gods, there wishes arise, so also do the 
gods sprih up." where is not treatment of the theories of schol 
ar 
ars on questions of litery criticiom only those of Christian 
P 
CI 
theologians. Of the meaning of vpopist the i''uries, the conflict 
of the old and the new gods in Aeschylus we find 'Very little dis-; 
cussion, thou of course,(P 347) the principle is laid down that 
the theoloelcal ideas chance with chanc,ing moral ones. 
Homer is said to have used theology as a key to the Mad, 
says our author, but he begins with the wrath of -chilles over th 
insult from Agamemnon, and this is equated with the will of Zeus, 
( chap 2) 
Here also it s established that the gods are the representatives 
of human self-love, that they appear necessary only in the moment 
when man forgets and loses himself, that they do only what the 
man himself does or at least wishes to have done, as he wakes out 
of the tumult of passion and comes to himself, aso.g. when the 
sods presenve the body of Hector for Priam which Achilles in his 
senselese hate had refused, it was for the interest and deeper in 
tention of Achilles. 
"Natnre " plays a conspicuous Dart in his theorisings here 
as elsewhere, and in chapter 26 is equated with deity, "Gott und 
Natur stn il nur ein .lendtadys," two words with the same meaning, 
but so also are'Gott und. Mensch 1 Zeus is ert Nature, part man 
(p 226)(235) 
But Nature's laws cannot be broken, she rules as necessity, and . 
even/ 
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even the gods must bow before her. 
The true and last ground why gods do not fulfil the widihes 
of men is just that the gode are the servents of nature and Nat+ 
ure only in 4er inconsiderate laws. ean. himself, as part of a 
swish-d*inv bells& toward man, is over ansinst man, not only a 
daimon in good but aloe in evil. ( P232). 
More space is given to the fact noticed here, that our wish- 
os are denied and thwarted., which would seem impossible if Ash 
Is to be dleectly equated with God. In chapter na,e.g., the 
gods are Janus-like, both denying and affirmlea our wishes, hut H 
'that is due to the original natural element in their composition I 
which later becomes separate. re'e example, the Parsee or Indian 
prays to firer water, he presuppoeest though he has no human 
form before his eyes, that this theoloaieal belng of fire and 
water is a crypto-anthropomorphic being. 
Homer did nothing more than give to this human sense of 
Nature-religion, as is apropr1ate, a huean body also. He seized. L 
the Proteus, the man in fire and water, beast and plant, in short: 
In all natural bodies, transforming and hiding himself behind. 
Ahem, by tee throat and compelled him to the confession that 
Theology, as also natural tneoloey, in only a deceptive incognito 
far Anthro nology. So Homer is unfolded in aceordance with the 
theory of eeuerbackei 
es for tee inhuman fateschapter 24, which comes to men, he 
admits tee eeds ara not only wish-denying AEI risaeaffirming, but 
are on every side absolutely wish-denying. Ohapter 21 says that 
in / 
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in the wavering nature of human wishes is the explanation of 
the ambiGuous and wavering relation of the gods to destiny, or 
necessity, e.g., if well, I want to live for ever, if sick, I 
want to die, and so of all our inevitable expeeiences,they are 
both feared and loved. Cut there Is another explanation, as in- 
(i.e, wishes) 
dicated above ;'the gods are not only gods/ but at the same time 
Nature-beingo, "The eieh is indeed the origin of religionof ( 
tho Eods, and tho wish itself as such rises from men, but the 
abject of the wish springs from external nature, from the senses 
for man has originally no empty supernatural phantastic wishes, 
the object of his senses were also the objects of his wishes. 
From theea remai :s we see how difficult it 1.3 for eeueresach 
to detech man and his wishes from the object to which they are 
referred. The nature-beings force themselves into our life a- 
gainst our wish, Th4ObjOet is prior to the wish and compels ree 
cognition oflitzelf. ;hy should. this not be the case also with 
the object of the supernatural wish which forces itself so inev- 
itably into our life according to Feuerbach'e own admission? 
eut to continue, religion is not derived from natural ob- 
!Oets, but from man's impressions of them, and so the gods are 
only 
not objects of revelation in the ordinary eense, but/a revelat- 
taa of objects to the sense. 
Nature in man does not say the same as Nature outsideoven 
though manes nature is grounded in Nature,(a statement which hard 
ly makes for clearness). it Is ail wrong to derive natural and 
hum laws from the same source without distinction. 
Monotheism/ 
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Monotheism has its source, we all) told, in sun-Torship, yet 
on R 390 it is stated that vo believe in one ,:od because all our 
wishes ran out to one great desire for happiness , and yet again 
. 
in earlier writinc;s0.g. 7: C. it is said that man has a sense of 
unity in himself, and bee ause of this he choosos one personality 
(Jesus in the ease of the Christian religion) to be his god. In 
any case we notice that Yeuerbach finds it impossible to get rid 
of this spell of unity, either in ::s..ture or L an or in the re- 
lation between the two. 
Faith la defined, in Chapter 8 
) 
as, in i/e strict signifie- 
_ 
I 
snots, nothing but the conviction or Certainty of the wish of its 
fulfilment, e.g.,in Immortality, over against a holding for true 
or a conviction from subjectively sufficient grouiad s, really auf- 
ficient wishes. In Rovins KV,13, God is a -,od of hope. In Heb- 
rswa XI,1. faith is a sure expectation; its object is the pro- 
1 
mises, not an object of sense-knowledge 
The o...called proofs of the existence of 6'-od,l) 49. express 
a great misstatement about the being of gods,"since viewed apart 
from wishes in this way they are presented as if it were a matterA 
,1 I 
dry and indifferent, just as if it were some mathematical truth.1 
Over a&ainst the evils of Rationalism and speculative philosophy 
mas_querading as religion he is anxious to show that religion is 
a warm personal relationship, though of course he narrows it to 
a fatal% that is subjective. As he say elsewhere, q1od is a 
MAgloua idea", and,p113,"Pectus facit theologtot." 
Contrasting the old theology with his version, he tells 
11 ,4/ 
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us, 04, theology creates with God a world out of nothi4s. 
which is nothing ulore than just nothing, while anthropology 
creates with Fiature the gods out of the sensitive nothing 
( empfindlichen Vichts ) in the human breast, 
.de of G-o3 is really derived from the senses, .seeig 
that the wishes are from the senses. Hence the idea of God is 
not from a so-called relifjous sense, or Gefhl, which is only 
negativo impotence". just the empty space, tbe place 'where', 
but not the stuff or seed from which the ods ariee. The mat- 
erial is just the fiery, infinite and untamed Glickseligkeitgl- 
trieb. 
In chppter 9 the very important subject of "Der theogon- 
ische Wunsch" i6 dlscused. The Wish Is Ofined as the ex- 
pression of a Went or Noed(Maneel) , of a barrier, a nothing, 
whether Nichtsein, Nichthaben, Nichtk8nnen,.. a revolutionary 
a 
expression against it. "The Wish is *ire slave of necessity, 
but a slave with the will of freedom, a son of poverty, of 
want, but of the poverty which is the mother of desire, of love 
In esoence this is the impulse to happiness or to succeed in 
what one does or desires. 
From this point of view intellectualism in religion and 
are 
rigorism lin moral0Amcto be attacked. _od is no a priori be- 1 
ingswithout presupposition (p66), nor to be proved (49), nor 
the invention of priest and rulers (p105), or is he 'moral 
Powers' in the meaning of the modern. bra. 1n morality-phrase 
contradlotine the happiness-impulse In man. "For morality 
without/ 
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without hapelleas is a word without sense." 
- 
Niong two lines it would appear that the 1.ilpu1se from which 
reliion springs is innate and original, vlz., as Feeling of 
absolute dependence and as Egoism or deire for happiness. 60me-', 
times Feuerbach seems to Defer to the one and sometimes to the 
other. (p47). He colf:pares it to cravitation , to homesickness, 
undouhtable,im;ilediate, 
to the hunr.3er for food. It Wapproved and valid by itself, 
needs no proof, is sufficient and happy in itself. It is calla( 
deity. 
Considerable space is devoted to the discuesion of hapeines4' 
and the two worjs which seam necessary to explain it, '3eligkei4 
( blessedness,bllso ) , or as that may seem too otherworldly,' 
1Glackselicicelt". The ground of this 'aloe or happiness is to 
be found in God's freedom as Creator, for God is the fulfiller 
of our wishes, orosays Feuerbach correcting himself and showing 
how difficult it is for him, even to escape anthropomorphism or, 
may we say,objectivity, the fulfilment, of the wishes,(389) 
God and happinesn aro one,(383) "God is the prefaee,happi* 
sees the context of Christianity," (381), and the qualities 
aecribed to the one may be transferred to the other,e.g. in* 
corruptible, immortal, dependent.- on itself, and vice versa, 
or universi 
Feuerbach sees that there' is in religion this wid_er/refer- 
°ace. That is both its claim and its implication, he says 
frankly. Happiness is cosmic in its demand for validity. "Un- 
less grounded on omnipotence, blessedness is: *Are hypothesis." 
But of course he rominds us, seeing that Uod only makes what 
Chapter 1V. Section 
the earth 
NX1Ata brings forth, he is nothing else than Nature, 
12. 
The desire ,for happiness la, however, conditioned by The 
rights of others to the same satisfaction. Conscience benomes 
the sense and authority of social usefulness. There is nem sis 
not only in outward evil but inwardly in Ihe consciousness of 
the evil dead. Conscience is thelaiter e6o 11 das andere Ich 
in ich, 6o. the father is the conscience of the son, friend of 
friend, the Jew of the jaws, the t!4-.rk of the t+reolcs. (0211 
We seem to be working here on a pure-1y empirical basis. 
hot only faith but 'conscience comes by hearing' and also from 
the eyes. C;onscience is no .special edowment (Anlage),above 
all it is not inborn, but something langebildeteepinculcated,. 
often with much trouble driven into oneself by onets own effort 
iselbst LAngeblaUtes) Conscience is the fear to do something 
which involves ounishment, even if this consist only in the 
unfavourable judgment of anotner, or,ln the case of the major4-.. 
ity, just the thought, 'Wrist will people say ?°, (p170) 
To derivellUnt' from a particular power, from a sense of 
. right distihguished from the fundamental im-,)ulse of man, or 
froma special 'Rechtvernunftl, to separate 'Right' from 4goism 
aid Utilitismus, to make it a thing in itself, signifies to 
derive .L4 hedge which I set as a protection for the pleasure- 
garden of my right from a particular 'Hedge-sense', to make the 
hedge froMa thing for the 6arden to a thing for itself, an end 
in itself. :.(or, the judge and lawyers as such it to true tirt 
hedge is the chief matter, for it is the boundary of my rights, 
the/ 
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163, 
the diviline partitLon biteeea mine and thine; out for weself, 
the oecueler or oener, the thorn hedge is only the inetrument of 
valt rient to keep far away all profane hand e and looks from the 
sanctuary of zey oelfelove. 
eertainly ?dent ana erofit (self-love) may contradict one 
another, out only in special C06S. It is not fair to make 
these, exceetione the rule. Ihe conflict of ;:Zit and erofit 
is only on between the profit and interest or another and mine. 
Unioez a man accepts a law for others as Tell as for himself, 
he destroys the very foundation of human Life aed thought, for 
he wille teat the same thing oe and not oe ct one and the same 
time. ()A(4-5) 
iii lo a curi)us argument, W3 mey remark, which reduces 
selflanneee to an intol1ectu1 contradiction. The reai argu- 
ment le, I hould imagine, elore realistic than this. Qn p,172 
he mentions 4Uleiches elut, cialones rut as words which 
expreoa tne bond of tribal morality, or aealn, 7'reuerbach cults ; 
himself not only Egoist but Communist,'Uomein 'einseh 
Does Ooescience need God ? he asks, and answere,"not 
Yet man postulate e divine justice onlY because human justice 
does not always reach its goal.(p176), Zven if It be said that 
man judges only the act, but Liod the conscience, thoughts and 
intents, doee not the Church claim to do that with sword and 
fire ? ehit room is loft for eod ? (the argument, it will be 
Looted, is ona'ad hominem' ad so fv,r an evaelon.) 
The / 
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" The gods ara not lawgivers, nor givers of conscience, but man 
out of the innermost ground of his nature, from 2,e1f-love, 
that there be a Moral Order,( shades of iichte ) that with 
crime there be bound penalty and evil, with virtue reward and 
happiness. The gods only fulfil these hopes and fears.' 
Thee are some of the leading thoughts in i''euerbach's soc- 
There Is however no such thin a docial Contract tal theory. 
in the sense of the'Contrat the'Tractatue piliticus' 
or he Leviathan. (eh 38). The Naturalism of our author re- 
volts against the rationalistic presuppositions of these works. 
"These are groundless, not because godless, but because aoart 
from ieature.(p354) 't least they have made only one,and indeed 
a later, fact of the natural histo9 to be the only and. the 
first fact. The inner and fundamental condition, the moed, 
the reverence which the common life presupposes for its origin 
and continuance is that reverence for parents which is ground- 
ed. in nature, aboorbed with the Mother's milk, and arising from 
physical involuntary dependence and connectedness. There Is 
no difference between reverence for 4od and reverence for par- 
ents, a belief held also by Qurkheiir. It is to be'rememtered 
of course that parents are themselves dependent upon. Nature, 
and therefore only secondary gods, although from the point of 
view feeling, the human rather than the rational or natural, 
parents may be more honoured and precious than the gods, since 
they are the first and nearest cause of our greatest good which, 
is life itself. Unles2 a man has had experience of an earthly 
father/ 
r Thgn 
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father,therefore, (P 356), ha cannot know what God is it; who 
has never had the feel-Inc of hi self over a4Tainst man as a child 
cannot think or feel himself a iiid over aainst Nature or 
Deity. go religion and social history go back to Nature and 
to our mother's milk, 
ie forp.evelation, it is claimed by the pagans for their re- 
ligion with asimose4 right as by the Christians for theirs, and 
the difference in the representation of the deity is due to dif- 
ferences in the type and character of the worshipper. In the 
Scripture we havo'Dichtung' for "Zahitheitage fur Geschichte 
Gtter fAr gegenstandliche, materielle Ves.en.' (P333). Only a 
mad- 
UMIAK man. would think the pages of cripture lithographic doelv., 
ments of soloy , the box of Noah a. zoological gardenotc. 
ith many quotations from the Fathers and a new emphasis 
on'elig'cLaiti and also with a wavering between life as continu- 
ous and life as heavenly existence, the essence of Christianity 
is defined. as 'Idas Leben,aber das himelische selige ewige Lebe 
this Llone is true life. But with his anhap:;ly perverseness in 
exegesis,(296) he explains that the versa,'God is a spirit' doe 
not siEnify that God is a God, of spirits but that he is a God of 
the living and not of the dead. 
Ina chapter on'the symbol' (ch )9) he seeks to discredit 
anthropomnrpqismsaying, "Man representa the thix throwt the 
thing itself, washing with water to represent purity. The 
SYmbol was also the thing, 6,Ac.ziritqfos, .107t 44..,ftt,ts,1 Apt simil- 
. 
sr but identical, though later religion forms and adopts the imp. 
age/ 
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ago, mimicking reality. The-symbol also represents the uni 
vere. it i a "Gattungsbegriff°, but an individual which, 
oart of the species itself, oricinally comprehends the whole 
species. (364,-5) For example, the ?halluz 18 a symbol of div- 
ine creative power, but the Phallus, not Ideed the wooden or 
stone one, Is n organ. with which man maes not pictures of the 
sens but actual boins consequently it is an organ of Nature 
own productive power. 
The symbol is pantheistic, not theistic. Liht is a pict- 
ure of the spirit, not because man has discovered a rosemblance 
between te iiht in him/and sensible light, but because with 
the openinF, of the eyes ther comes the opening. of consciousnesE 
The difference between, God. and man is only a difference beu . 
twom clocles and, clases.(371) DettY is not sonething ov6r 
and above human powers, but only above that which man wishes 
and thinks away froat within a power, it is the human power it- 
Self, only treed from the burJ;.ensome limitations, additions and 
aPPendagos with which in man it is bound up. (372) It was Aquin- 
as, les human than the Bofermers Who sought to make scholastic 
distinctions between the attributes of 6.od a:A God,e.g, God has 
Icy,delight, but not as passions, emotions ! 
Religion is distinguished from Morality (p285) by the dif- 
fer3nce of prayer from action and of wish from work0e.g. in the 
Iltad/7.154, wo read, "1 battle ae:ainst him and Athena gives me 
the victory', so the Scholiast to Apollonion. Rhodios praises th( 
poet because of his true delineation o iaturo, seeing that the 
Chapter 1V. Section 5.Tlign 167. 
men consider how the work is to be completed but the women, 
as being the wewzer beings, only are allowe to pray and uttas 
entreaties. Thus 'prayer is the Only purely religious organ cf- 
religion, the only practical as well as theoretical 1ivin de- 
finition of the nature of the gods, the only true unfaisified . 
confession of faith, for how other than through prayer can I 
without mixture of atheistic Nature and self-trust prove and amn 
-firm faith in the omnipotence, providence and goodness of the 
gods." and sharpening of definition. 
To sum up, we may i,ayOnat amid ,,-10U varioty,4and much re 
petition there is not much real progre'Ls. no in C. he reduc- 
es all Christian dogmas to his anthrobological measure, being 
simply the real ised. wishes of the humanheart, so in Theogonie 
with the old religions of Greect, Rome, and Israel. there 
a great accumulation of material just to prove the old positionE! 
Vie may pay tribute to this industry and recognise the justice 
of hie complaint of the heavy cost of the books he had to pur- 
chase to equip himself for this task. The and V. W,R. on 
the contrary develop a doctrine of Nature which avowedly takes 
U s beyond the book on Christianity. 
note,howaver, that the feeling of absolute dependence 
has almost disappeared, and its place has been taen by tne 
LTluckseligkeitstreib' :ature is still inexorable, but man 
is more intense than ever in seeking the completion of nis nat- 
ure as he conceives it. 6o too a fuller, if not more satis- 
tYlag acteolAnt is given of conscience and of social right. when 
the/ 
. 
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the spring of 1868 -9 brought new health to him, he projected a 
new book on The Will and Happiness -Impulse, and a Treatise on 
Ethics. (Bolin p 174 -6). But later he says, "Nothing new can be 
begun. The present is for me only a still continuing past." 
A fragment on Ethics was found in his Remains. 
Even when forty years of age he confesses to C. Kapp that 
his works are fragmentary (Bolin, p 170-1), setting forth the 
'Whole' only from a particular standpoint; they end therefore in 
a note of interrogation. Such partial representation, he adds, 
must appear a monster over which a man must be furious, or, if 
the mood be gracious, greatly marvel. 
The simplicity of this appeal may almost disarm the critic, 
for truly there has been matter sufficient for fury and for mar- 
velling. But, if these works end with a note of interrogation, 
they demand an answer, and before an answer can be given a crit- 
ical examination of them must be made. In doing so we may wise- 
ly bear in mind, what Feuerbach did not alwa rat remember, that it 
is only a particular standpoint. Though widely accepted to -day 
it is not a standpoint which enables us to interpret the "Whole" 
or even its most important sections, those parts of which we are 
most keenly aware and which we value most highly. 
Its very particularity may , however, prove effective some 
outstanding truths, that prayer belongs to the essence of relig- 
ion, that the feeling of absolute dependence rises into trust and 
loy, that Nature is not independent of God and that Man depend- 
ent upon both is the goal of Nature and member of a Kingdom of 
Ends, 
/68, 







of his Personality 
and contemporary Politics. 
for Reality 
and Anti -Hegelianism. 
I find I have been only in an enchanted castle, 
I have been imposed upon by spectres and appar- 
itions. I see myself and the whole frame of 
Nature shrink into fleeting ideas, which like 
Epicurus' atoms dance about in emptiness." 




Section 1. IntroductcDry. Desire for Reality and 
Anti- He &:elianism. 
A critical Examination of Feuerbach's Argument. 
We have now passed in review the most important of F. 
s writings on Religion. Other writings may be said for 
the most part only to expand particular points raised but 
the principles remain the same. The emphasis undoubtedly 
changes, as will have been perceived, more indeed than 
Feuerbach was himself aware. Yet we saw how in the 
preface to S.W. he looked forward rather than backward 
and would use the past only as material for the future. 
We note also his confession to Bolin that he offers a 
view only from one particular standpoint. 
From the beginning however religion is treated a some- 
thing false, religious experience as ordinarily conceived 
does not give us reality: God comes to be described as 
a creation of the theogonic wish: man cannot escape his 
own nature; Theology is anthropology. 
It is obvious that many elements are involved in the 
arguments employed, psychological, philosophical, political 
even, certainly social, not to mention personal experiences. 
It shall now be our task to disentangle these various strands 
and to test their cogency and worth. 
1. `ire shall touch out briefly upon the personal and 
political elements for these have been dealt with sufficiently 
stressing at some length the philosophical presuppositions 
as they are developed out of opposition to Hegel. 
 7 0. 
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2. The method employed is analytical and the approach 
psychological. 
3. Hence (a) we are given a Schema of the human powers 
involving his theory of man, Nature and God, and (b) 
the stages by which transition is made from Nature to 
Man as the object of religion. 
4. These elements are linked up with a peculiar Epistemology 
or religious Phenomenalism. 
5. Thereafter we shall consider the Mechanism of the 
Theogonic.. Vish, , 6. ,and the relation of Religion as 
practical to morality. 
7. Passing to the substitute for Religion which F. offers 
us in Humanity as divine, we shall then set the Criticism 
Feuerbach's 
of Barth alongside Theology and consider what Luther has 
to say of Revelation. 
Concluding with a statement of Religion as immediate 
experience and a summary of the Thesis, or Conclusions. 
All Feuerbach's personal desire for reality and his political 
condemnation of "Schein" or appearance entered into his crit- 
icism of theology. Strange as it may appear, he denounced Re- 
ligion because it was not real enough. In his early days he de- 
sired something which went beyond books and instruction and ec- 
clesiastical systems. Despite all the wildness of his language 
there still remain traces of what we might call the religious 
instinct, so that now and again we are surprised by assertions 
of real insight. His interpretation of Christian doctrine is 
in/ 
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in its own way more sympathetic and penetrating than Hegel's. 
One can only call extraodinary the number of his references to 
Luther and the Fathers. Leese, ,p 4, gives us this formidable 
list, "Tertullian, Salvian, Ambrosius, Hieronymous, Athanasius, 
Augustin, Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius, Clemens Alexandrinus, 
Origenes, Gregor von Nyasa, Chrysostomus, Theodoret, :lTinucius 
Felix, Albertus Magnus, Thomas von Ilqu&no, Bernhard von Clair - 
vaux, die Mystiker, Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, die Bekenntnis- 
schriften, Konzilsbeschlusse, Bibelstellen and das Gesangbuch 
der Brudergemeinde -- die Genannte sind es, die Feuerbach pluna 
dert, um ein Gebilde zu konstruieren, das er als 'Wesen des 
Christentums' reprasentiert." 
Finally I need only mention the somewhat pathetic insistence 
with which he declares that he is no atheist, at least in thexax 
ordinary sense. We recall that in the Prefact,S.W.p xv he com- 
plains,"He who says and knows of me no more than that I am an 
atheist saya and knows of me just as much as nothing," while in 
W.C. he writes, "It is false to say, I say Religion is nothing, 
God is nothing. I only show that they are not what the illus- 
ions of theology make them." It is with the illusion of theology 
that he has to do not with that of religion, as he indicated in 
the title for W.C. which was rejected. The trouble is that he 
is employing his own interpretation of words and deluding him- 
self as well as others. 
In his relations with Max Stirner he reveals this effort to 
save something from the wreckers. This writer, in his book, 
"Der Einzige und sein Eigentum ", attacked him as a 'pious athett 
who/ 
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who gives us only a theological deliverance from theology 
and religion. He takes away the Subject, God, but leaves 
the attributes, and this he has to do, for God is a Being 
compacted of all realities having the predicates of nature 
and of man. Stirner on the other hand went all the way 
of individualism and was prepared to renounce every obligation 
save that of self. 
To this Feuerbach hotly replied disputing the presentation 
of his case as partial and misleading, and as for the title, 
well if he is to be dubbed atheist one gets the impression 
he does not object to the adjective. 
His aim is after all not uncommon among those who have left 
a communion or partyhe endeavours to retain all he can of 
what is best, i.e. the ethical elements of religion, while 
adapting both the doctrine and the practice to his own 
purposes. He tells us he denies only to affirm. In y1,C,, he 
claims that the first or positive part is the important 
section and the sedond only imposed upon him by sheer honesty. 
In VWR P 28, 29, 329,he declares his aim is "to lighten the 
darkness of Religion so that it may not be the plaything 
of powers hostile to man who still today serve themselves 
with the darkness of religion for the oppression of men, 
to turn this unconscious twisted phantastic reverence and 
love of man.. bito conscious straightforward rational 
reverence and love. (also p 29 quoted) . In- searching for 
reality he found himself thrown back on Nature and sensibility. 
(VWR p 16)./ 
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(VWR p 16) . Through the study of Religion and Nature he 
had come to discover the full meaning of Sinnlichkeit in 
Religion and the full meaning of the senses. And man is 
real not as a phantom or half angel half man but as a 
creature of earth. 
"God was my first thought, Nature my second, and Man 
my third." So he discovered that Man is the beginning, 
the middle, and the end of Religion, and considered that 
he had found the essence of religion when he made it an 
affair of man and man alone. 
But he was the victim of an illusion when he supposed 
that this was still religion. He had left out the reference 
to a trandscendental object, although he was (WC 44), 
"It certainly is the interest of religion that its object 
should be distinct from man, but it is also, may, yet more 
its interest that his object should have human attributes." 
Hence in his efforts to explain the feeling of absolute 
dependence he finds he cannot leave man supreme as he desires 
except by a suspicious process of inversion. Nature has 
her say in the end, and so Von Hugel contrasts the warm 
humanity of it C. with the cold chill atmosphere of W.R. 
and the Stoic submission it inculcates. Along this course 
Feuerbach was carried in his search for something real. He 
thought it was the desire to uncover the essence of religion 
but in part at least it was the result of his opposition to 
Hegel. 
Feuerbac h's/ 
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Feuerbach's relation to Hegel deserves a special note 
which will be added later. At present we remark only the 
reaction which, he tells us, is the clue to his theory ( vol. 
I. 248). The transcendental deduction of Sein from Denken, 
the existence of the object from the thought of it drove him 
to emphasise in aggressive and, as will appear, excessive 
fashion the mere 'given' the data of sense -experience. He 
objected also to Hegel's statement of the relation of 
Philosophy to Theology, in which religion presents us with 
the concepts of philosophy merely under the form of imaginatial 
He wants to be rid of "this unbelieving faith which professes 
to be satisfied with ideas which it knows to be incomplete.11 
(Pref. S.'::1. ). 
11 I battle against the abstract unhumanity of philosophy 
as much as against the imaginary illusion of religion." 
(V.W.R. 16, 17). "What to Hegel is secondary, formal 
subjective is to me first, objective, essential (I. 249). 
According to Hegel e.g. Empfindung das Gefiihl, das Herz, 
is the form into which the content of religion must sink 
in order to become the property of man : according to myself, 
the object, the content of the religious feeling itself, is 
nothing else than the 'Wesen des Herzens'..11 
Jodl, p 69, says that after laying the foundations of his 
philosophy Feuerbach makes the religious problem central and 
henceforth philosophy almost disappears. But may it not be 
said also that at the beginning in the laying of his philosoph- 
ical/ 
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ical foundation and in his attack on Hegel Feuerbach is 
prompted by an understanding of religion as an experience 
quite different from correct or even noble thinking. he 
begins his S.W. with Explanations and Expansions of '?l.C., 
which contain the essential consequences as also the premisses 
of this writing (p xvI4 His doctrine is Religion or Philosophy, 
name it as you please, (3rd Lect. V.W.R.). Pure thought must 
be humanised. As pure thought it is not for men. (Intro. S.w.B). 
11The world is not given us through thinking but through life, 
intuition and sense" (W.R. 25) Sinnlichleit stood for reality 
(WR 16) over against thought, and although Feuerbach (S.W. XIII) , 
says it is not to be taken abstractly by itself or else we 
shall have a dualism over against Spirit not to be surmounted, 
it continues to be a supreme and final test of reality. We 
must have a God that can be perceived felt and handled, in 
space and time like any sensible object. Sinnlichkeit passes 
over into the larger conception of Man, as Jodl points out 
and as Feuerbach himself indicates, (SW xIII), But it is 
man as a sensible individual over against the despotic Universal. 
Even when he cornes to define Man as a being separate from the 
animals by reason of his self-consciousness, this unique quality 
serves not to lift man above the limitation of sense into the 
free world of thought. This privilege rather makes him more 
subject to illusion in so far as he makes a distinct object to 
himself of the self of which he is conscious. It is indeed a 
strange sequel to the vaunted superiority of man that in so 
important/ 
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important and precious a matter as religion he should really 
be at a disadvantage with the animals. They at least do not 
deceive themselves. 
But of the place of self- consciousness in his system we 
shall see more later. The point here is that in his effort 
to ma .e Religion real he has to make it wholly human or rather 
human in a narrow and untrue fashion. "Apart from earth I am 
a phantom. I am essentially a being of earth "(VdR ]Lett. 29) 
Realism becomes Naturalism with the emphasis on sense - 
experience. 
Feuerbach however is sufficiently the heir of the great 
idealist tradion to make a spirited declaration against this 
conclusion. He is not a materialist nor is he a spiritualist. 
Both theories in isolation are false. Only together do they 
present the truth and neither must yield to the other. Here 
is psycho- physical parallelism anticipated but without exact 
details. Or, we have really a dualism covered by a name, 
"Organismus ", an interesting anticipation of those religious 
psychologists who have en- listed the concepts of biology to 
explain "Behaviour" and who fiznd in all the arts and activities 
of man a function of a particular environment. (Uren, p. 101 
"Ames "). 
He presents the rather pathetic figure of a man who puzzles 
his frienxds as much as his enemies. He seeks to keep the 
even path between the flesh and the spirit. He is on friendly 
terms with the Materialist writers, see his review of Moleschott 
1s 
book and correspondence, (Bolin p 26). (See Note, Feuerbach 
and/ 
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and the Jra.terialists). But he is also pledged to self - 
consciousness and. morality. Do his Socialist friends up- 
braid him, saying, 'Your writings are useless rubbish', 
because they do not have any bearing on such a case as that 
of the woman who had become a criminal and in defence explained, 
feel as if the evil thoughts rose out of my stomach,' a 
picture indeed of present -day Society? Then he replies, 
'True, yet there are many evils, even stomach troubles which 
have their reason only in the head. I have set myself the 
task of the exploration and healing of the head and heart 
sickness of man'. 
The theological question is dissolved into the social and 
political. In the preface to his S.W. XIV he says the 
question whether God exist or not, the opposition of Theism 
and !.theism belongs to the Eighteenth and seventeenth century, 
but no more to the nineteenth. I deny God, that is for me, 
I deny the negation of man. I put in the place of the 
illusory phantastic heavenly 'Position' of man which in 
actual life becomes necessarily the negation of man, the 
sensible actual, consequently of necessity also political 
and social'Position'of man. The question of the existence or 
nonexistence of God is just, so far as I am concerned, only the 
question of the existence or non -existence of man." 
He really leaves unsolved the problem of the reality of 
the--° spiritual over against the material and their relative 
importance. Or rather the die is cast against the claims of 
the spiritual by the sheer fact of sensible conditions. 
Religion to be real must be human only. 
7gá 
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SECTION 2. 
Feuerbach's METHOD, 
analytical and psychological 
etc. 
"Method is procedure according to principle.' 
"Dogmatism is procedure without previous criticism of 
the conceptions involved." 
(Kant ) 
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HIS METHOD. 
V1ith this fever of realism in his blood he defines his 
METHOD. He calls himself '-n inductive theologian, a 
natural philosopher in the domain of spirit ". His enquiry 
is an empirical or historico- philosophical analysis, a 
faithful and correct translation of the Christian religion 
out of the oriental language of imagery into plain speech.' 
He repudiates all self -sufficierl speculation. The general 
propositions in the Intro. to «.C. are, he tells us, ' no 
apriori excogitated propositions but are generalisations 
from known manifestations of human nature and in particular 
of the religious consciousness.' As a matter of fact this 
philosophical introduction was written after the rest of 
the book and only set first because that is the fashion. 
"I differ toto caelo from those philosophers who pluck out 
their eyes that they may see better. I therein call upon 
the senses!themselves to witness to the truth of my analysis 
and my ideas.' 
With such a Method Feuerbach is rather apologetic about 
the philosophical or theological atmosphere of his argument. 
He is 'forced to appear even to speculate or which is the 
same thing, to turn theologian while I nevertheless only 
analyse speculation, reduce theology to anthropology.' 
Perhaps it were well for him to be apologetic since 
Speculation and theology no one can escape who endeavours to 
understand life. It is easy for him to say '(Vol II, 414) 
"Keine/ 
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"Keine philosophie ist meine Philosophie'". But what he 
means is not the abandonment of connected thinking on great 
themes, but freedom from abstract and empty concepts and 
concentration upon what the facts have to say for themselves. 
He wishes to give which is not merely historical but 
philosophical and in the main analitic. Bauer deals with 
Biblical theology, Strauss with Christian doctrine and the 
Life of Jesus. But Feuerbach claims a larger view. He 
deals with Christianity in general, with religion and the 
causes of religion as it has actually developed in Christian- 
ity and in Christian men, so that his quotations are from men 
such as Luther and Augustine,'in whom Christianity was not a 
dogma nor doctrine but religion." 
Now it is possible and proper to criticise such a method 
and to ask whether analysis and history can ever by themselves 
give us the essence of Christianity. Leese,p.5,takes up 
this point and quotes effectively both Troeltsch and Hegel. 
Christianity is not merely a magnitude of historical 
importance situated in the past but it is an eternally 
present magnitude, an eternally present question which must 
be answered through a synthesis of historical and empirical 
induction and a point of view which on the basis of personal 
experience has come to some decision as to the truth or 
untruth of the Christian religion. Or as Hegel Us put it 
with his gift of illustration. 'If the knowledge were only 
historical, then we must regard such theologians as cashiers 
Íi 
in a business house whose books and calculations deal only 
with/ 
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with the wealth of another man.. they receive indeed a 
salary but their merit is only to serve and register the 
property of others'. 
This is quite right, but to the open mind history has 
its own witness to bring, and there are those who have been 
convinced of the truth and value of Christianity as the story 
unfolded itself before their enquiring soul. This result 
of course cannot come to one who regards it as a cold science 
as Feuerbach says he intends to do, (W.C. VI). These words 
are certainly ominous, but the names of the witnesses he 
claims to produce show that he was not quite so mechanically 
minded. 
4uite as important as thisobjection to the method is the 
other that Feuerbach, claiming to be historical, is not true 
to his promise. Romanticism had its real interest in 
history, though mixed with speculation and imagination in 
many cases. But our author was influenced by the latter 
more than by the former. This indeed is his crime that 
professing to study and present historical facts he viewed 
them not dispassionately, but through the ideas which he had 
come to form in his revolt from Hegel. 
In fact his enquiry is more psychological than historical, 
i.e. it is ruled as we shall see immediately, by an analysis 
of the activities of human nature. He presents us with a 
Schema or classification of these activities in a very neat 
and compact form, and this after it has been made is employed 
to/ 
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to decide the '.hole question of the value truth and reality 
of religion. Based as it may appear on an actual survey 
of our powers, it is really an a]priori construction, a 
formula as intellectual and potent as that of Hegel. 
Starcke p 95, 96 points out that Feuerbach's terminology 
varies e.,_. in Bayle the theoretical reason looks to the 
welfare of the individual (e.g. it might keep a woman from 
marriage because of the possible pains of motherhood) while 
the practical reason is the universal etc. But for the more 
important writings there is little change or difficulty 
except on the smaller matter of the difference between Herz 
and Gemüth and the larger concern of the definitions of man 
and Nature and the relation of the one to the other. 
The point is that Psychology is to command the field. 
Our task, he says ('" . C . 86) , is to show that theology is 
nothing more than an unconscious esoteric pathological 
anthropological psychology.' or more briefly, " My task is 
to solve a psychological riddle, unnecessary because history 
has already solved it . ' (1.223.). 
This is warning enough, and Jodl scarcely veils the 
presuppositions with which Feuerbach comes to investigate 
Christianity when he says, "the new thing in Feuerbach is 
his understanding of the practical passive, not to say . 
pathological character of Religion. Its roots are not in 
thinking but in the heart and will." So much is certainly 
true that Feuerbach exposed the practical side of religion 
but/ 
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but that merit was overshadowed by what he considered to 
be its unconscious and pathological elements. 
As we go on to consider what further was presupposed in 
the exposition of religion by a psychological analysis of 
the human faculties, it will be useful to have before us 
for our guidance the three principles which Leuba has set 
down for the conduct of just such an enquiry, p.212. P.S.R. 
1. Religious faith in God or gods rests on the conclusion 
of inductions from inner experience. 
2. Religious experience as inner experience comes under the 
competence of empirical psychology without any restriction. 
3. As empirical magnitudes the gods of religion come within 
the competence of science especially of empirical psychology. 
I quote this concis@ statement from Vobbermin (p 14 ff)+for 
he make the illuminating comment, thus for Leuba empirical 
psychology as the appropriate scientific discipline proves 
the religious belief in God to be an indefensible illusion, 
for religious experience under this view is only a particular 
derivative of the life of the human soul. Since religious 
experience usually is concentrated in belief in God, so 
belief in God has also to take its place under this condemn- 
ation also. And in consequence belief in God is emptied of 
its object and set before us as an illusion. Leuba thus 
takes over the role of a modern Feuerbach. Indeed the theory 
of Illusionism is carried through by Leuba in a fashion even 
more disproportionately rigid and persistent than by Feuerbach. 
How/ 
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How far this parallel between Feuerbach and Leuba exists 
we have sought to show in a Note at the end. 
It is time now to turn to the details of our author's 
Psychology. 
C H A P T E R . V. 
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a) Psychological Scbmma of the Human Powers 
involving his theory 
of Man Nature and God. 
b) the Stages by which the Traction is made from 
Nature to Man as the 
Object of Religion. 
" Blood and brain and spirit three 
(say the deepest gnomes of Earth) 
Join for true felicity ." 
ríÄ;ïeredit ,. a 
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FEUERBACH'S PSYCHOLOGICAL SCHEMA of the human 
powers in. -Vo l Ving his Theory of Man, Nature and God. 
Remembering that in general man consists of mind, affection, 
and Aill, (according: to Femrbach, these are not qualities 
or possessions of man, they áreman) we may set down his 
schema thus, chiefly from the invaluable and important notes 
in 1.C. 
Over against Reason with Science and Inf &hence as its 
instruments, Nature as its object, Law as its life, Morality 
as its expression showing itself in the Species or Race of 
Man developing along historical lineswe are to set Feeling 
with Imagination restrained and guided only by the deeper 
instincts of the Heart, finding God as its object, Miracle 
as its instrument and reaching out in faith and freedom to 
the blessedness of the supernatural life, concerned more with 
the individual than with the species, scorning the world 
through its doctrine of Creation out of nothing and a 
particular Providence, and declaring its independence of the 
world by habits of celibacy and Monachism which already carry 
it to the gates of heaven. 
It is all very neat and compact and quite in the fashion of 
the speculative philosophers and theologians like Schleiermach 
er who loved a Lehrgebaude. 
We notice that the decisive contrast is between Reason 
and Feeling (with Imagination) and between Nature and God. 
Unlike/ 
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Unlike Kant and Hegel he refuses to distinguish Reason fron 
Understanding. There is only one Vernunft or Verstand. 
The ' Idease of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which were 
'problematical conceptions' (p 236) such that we can have 
no knowledge of an object corresponding perfectly to an idea, 
and yet were the means by which a passage might be made from 
our conceptions of Nature and the Non -dgo to the practical 
conceptions p 230), these were set aside by Feuerbach. So 
too with the Hegelian claim for the Reason which can solve 
the antinomies into which the Understanding falls: that 
also is set aside. 
The Understanding or Reason is the scientific part of our 
nature, "that part which is neutral, impassible, not to be 
bribed, not subject to illusions, sees fact as fact." Other 
definitions make clear its interest in the Universal, in 
Law and in general concepts such as the Species or Race. 
Linked with Understanding is Nature, its counterpart, which 
plays so large a part in Feuerbach's Schema. It cannot be 
said to be so easily defined as Understanding. Its meaning 
is elusive and changing in several respects. It is always 
making its appearance in 'ß'1.C., W.R, VWR & Theogonie as we have 
seen. It is a ghost that is never laid, haunting him to 
the end. There is no need to be surprised at this for the 
Problem is a critical one in every philosophy. Nor can we 
be/ 
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be surprised that he should be challenged, Vúáß, Lect. XI p 
116, ',1h8.t is your definition of Nature? You do not give 
one. Spinoza spoke of God and Nature as synonymous. 
Do you ?" 
"No, he replies, Nature is self- subsistent and eternal. 
She is a Republic. Nature is no less thinkable without 
God, an external and supernatural Being than is the state 
without a lordly idol." (Lect I). Nature is the 
Inbegriff of all sensible powers, things and beings which 
man distinguishes from himself as not human: like Spinoza 
he means by Nature a being not supernatural, working not 
by will and understanding but by necessity of its nature, 
unlike it is at the 
supersensible aloof secret simple, but a being manifold 
popular real perceptible by all the senses. Nature is 
everything which proves itself to man sensibly as ground and 
object of his life apart from the supernatural infilterations 
of theistic faith. Nature is light, electricity magnetism 
air water fire earth animal plant, is man so far as he is 
an involuntery and unconscious being, nothing more, nothing 
nebulous mystical, theological..." 
That is to say that Feuerbach will have nothing to db 
with Spinoza's distinction between Nature naturans and 
Natura naturata (The Ethics Part I. Proposition 29 note), 
maintaining that the latter is the only reality. 
Practically the same definition is given in W.R. p 4101 
note/ 
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note 2 where he safeguards himself as a nominalist at war 
with general concepts by saying that he uses it only as a 
general word, but not a Universal withdrawn from and 
separated from actual things, a personified and mysterious 
Wesen. 
At the same time he makes statements which link up Nature 
more closely with Reason, presumably man's since we know of 
occur 
no other, and yet other passages /there Nature is removed from 
this scene of appearances and becomes a thing in itself. 
In Bayle "Nature is embodied Reason" and that seems to be 
at the back of his mind all along, for Nature is the sphere 
in which Miracles do not happen. Also in 7C. p 133 Nature 
is the material to which mind gives the form, quite a Kantian 
idea and again involved in his conception of science. 
Yet Feuerbach cannot get away from the " Matura naturans ". 
(V'WR p 27) "The unconscious being of Nature is to me the 
Eternal the underived being the first Being in time, though not 
m ram$, tae 104ysd.cal but not the first moral being." And 
again WR. Para 47," the appearance of Nature is for us indeed 
reason, but the cause of this appearance is as little reason 
as the cause of light is light. 
1. 
To sum up, we may say that Nature may mean /either sense 
material or sense objects; 2. sense objects as the material of 
physical law or necessity, the realm of science, presumably 
a closed system, since miracle is shut out, although there 
is some spiritual interaction not further defined and Jodl 
points out that Feuerbach in his definition of sensation and 
thot/ 
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thought wants to leave the system of Nature open because 
there are so many objects in Nature uncomprehended (this 
of course is in line with a consistent nominalism and in 
dividúaaisn .) see later on his theory of knowledge; 
3. The eternal uncomprehended Power in the background, 
our great parent, and like all parents made to be criticised 
by their children, but unlike some parents at least we 
notice it has the power of the last word. In fact it looms 
large over humanity as a Fate or Necessity ore, dare we say 
it,as a God. It is the source of man's life, it rules his 
temporal existence through his needs and it eventually brings 
him to the dust. In Theogonie,chap 26,he points out that 
in Homer, according to his interpretation, God and Nature are 
merely a hendiadys, two words with the same meaning, but so 
also are God and man. And in Para 28 he says simply 
"the divinity of Mature is the basis of all religion, including 
Christianity, the divity of man the aim of all religion." 
The relation between the basis and the aim of religion and 
between Nature and Man is never satisfactorily dealt with, 
though Nature lends herself to the play of man's phantasy 
and reason so that he thinks his " impressions" of Nature 
are true both in a scientific and in a theological sense. 
As for man's relation to Nature and how he is both inside 
and outside her we shall have an opportunity to consider 
later when we deal with the transition from the Feeling of 
absolute Zependence to ' goismus. The present explication 
of/ 
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But it is to be recognised that Schleiermacher is too 
rich a thinker and personality to maintain consistency. 
His speculative and romantic monism is wont to neglect the 
teleological trend of life, although he defined Christianity, 
(para 11. Care), as " a monotheistic faith of the teleological 
type which is essentially distinguished from other such faiths 
by the fact that everything in it is related to the redemption 
accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth." The historical element 
in the life of Jesus is limited to the events as they are 
comprehended by the narrow capacities of the first disciples, 
and the Resurrection, the Ascension, and the Session at the 
right hand of the rather are lightly dealt with because they 
are not considered redemptively important. His desire to 
construct a 'Lehrgebäude' leads him to make a division of 
his great work into two parts, para 29, the first dealing with 
the religious consciousness in general, as it is always 
presupposed but also always contained in every Christian 
religious affection, (or state of mind) thus postponing the 
definite historical reference and the contradiction involved 
by sin. 
These general influences apart, para 50 is the most damaging 
sentence and closest to the subjectivity of which Feuerbach 
and others accuse him. "All attributes which we ascribe 
to God are not to be taken as indicating something specific 
to God, but only something specific in our manner of referring 
to/ 
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to Him the feeling of absolute dependence." Under the 
influence of the Kantian phenomenalism he is reluctant 
to say too much about God in His own nature. 
But with all his aberrations Schleiermacher traces this 
feeling to religious experience, desires to say that it is 
separate from other feelings, not in degree merely but in 
quality. It refers to the unity above all differences, not 
just to the world in the sense of the collectiveness of the 
temporal being and still less an individual part of the same. 
Religion is 'sui generis' and it gives us a feeling of the 
Universe as no other does. As one takes a comprehensive 
view of the 'Glaubenslehre' as well as the 'Reden', we must 
admit that Schleiermacher intends us to see in religious 
experience an objective reference and a genuine validity. 
(Wobbermin and Leese have both interesting and valuable 
discussions on this point), It might be said that his 
treatment of man too suffers from the mingling of various 
motives in his mind. Being equally dependent with Nature 
upon a God who is described as a 'W'oher', a Source or a 
Causality, man is not given the place over against Nature 
to which he is entitled. Yet a defective presentation of 
God does not mean Schleiermacher offers a theology without 
a God. IIe was so far from being cowardly that he was courage- 
ously inconsistent. 
Our chief concern, however, it to show that Feuerbach, 
appropriating/ 
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appropriating the phrase 'feelinv° of absolute dependence' 
as characteristic of religion, also gives tit an object, viz, 
Nature. At the same time we are compelled to notice his 
other statements which seem inconsistent with this. Nature 
as the object of the religious emotion is displaced by human 
phantasies, the God of heart, the God created of the human 
wish, while in another place Feuerbach seems to substitute 
the Race of Man either as an ideal or in its totality. These 
varying descriptions appear to reflect the mood in which he 
happens to be and are not related to one another in a final or 
satisfactory fashion. 
At times Nature is treated with high disdain, and yet again 
Nature rebuffs her offspring driving him to take refuge in 
a God of phantasy. The boot is on the leg of now one now the 
other. human progress we are told is away from Nature, and 
as man developes, especially as he becomes more a political 
and less (comparatively speaking only of course) a physical 
being, his conception of God changes. Zeus is the father 
of kings. Physical existence is subordinated to civil and 
moral. The criminal code is equated with the code of Nature, 
The Roman Emperor is called by the Christians 'youi.divinity'. 
Nature is forgotten. The East has no story of progress such 
as enriches the West because it has not set itself above 
Nature East and West are related in outlook and character 
as the countryman and the man of the town. - Only the towns 
make/ 
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make history: only human vanity is the principle of history, 
(`NR para 37, 38, p 451) . 
Man, i.e. has to set himself above Nature to attain the 
richer life. What becomes of his dependence then? Or is 
Civilization after all a mistake? At any rate Nature has 
the last word. Death ends all argument. But does it, even 
for Feuerbach? "The grave of man is the birthplace of the 
gods." And this may possibly mean that man meets Nature's 
last challenge with a defiance which may have only imagination 
behind it, but appears with a force which suggests it has 
an authority above nature and even above Man. 
But Feuerbach saves himself with words, "The feeling of 
absolute dependence is the ground of religion and its object 
was originally nothing more than Nature (W R p 411) Yet 
he reminds us that the lower stages of religion are carried 
up into the higher. If that be so, why should not the 
original objective reference be found in the higher stages 
as well as in the lower? Because God, originally nothing 
else than Nature, has been changed into a phantasy? or is 
it just because Feuerbach allows himself to be ruled by the 
early conception of religion and does not allow any real 
development in the religious consciousness? He is in fact 
a victim &f the purely genetic method. 
It would appear therefore that to Feuerbach the feeling of 
absolute dependence is not the merely subjective emotion which 
he declares it to be in Schleiermacher's theory of religion. 
It/ 
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he has no desire to reduce religion to soliethinp onesided4 
abstract. My F A D is no theoloical Schleiermacherish 
cloudy, unde ̀ ttmined abstract feeling. It has eyes and 
ears. l' Its object is Nature, the object of the senses, and 
thus our irnpressionsvary and idiosyncrasies in our conception 
of Nature develop with varying sympathies (free translation) 
But, p 42, Man seeks a " Mittel" or instrument against that 
upon which he is dependent, e.g. a belief in immortality, or 
the religious wish and only prayer of primitive people, 
'Strike me not dead. ". 
Fear therefore/he says wisely, more wisely than Leuba. 
at times/is not the complete and sufficient ground for the 
explanation of religion. Fear for one thing is transitory, 
for it does not look at the future, but also because after 
the fear is past, a feeling opposed to fear follows, viz, 
deliverance, joy love gratitude. 
And again he says, "I separate myself from the earlier 
atheists and pantheists, who in this connection hold 
similar views with the atheists, that I give for religion 
not only negative groi4ds of explanation, but also positive, 
not only ignorance and fear, but also the emotions opposed 
to fear, the positive emotions of joy, gratitude, love 
reverence " (V`.m 3738). ts which are defied." pp  
It is obvious that he has enlarged this primitive feeling 
of dependence, using this sense of awe and mystery, "Mara" 
as/ 
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as the scholars call it today, which is at the root of religion, 
so that man's nature and desires are brought actively and not 
merely passively into relation with nature. Thus man with 
his higher aims or deeper needs becomes the centre of the 
play in the effort to use Nature to his own advantage. She 
stands over against him as a. great storehouse of wealth, a 
factory for tools whereby he will subdue all things unto 
himself until Nature ( bewusstlose Nature) rings down the curtain 
and dismisses her workmen. 
He accuses (VV1R42) Theism of isolating Man from Nature. 
He does so himself without recognising that Nature herself 
receives a new meaning as the mother and source of such an 
independent offspring. She becomes the Universe, the 
Fountain of Life, ' Natura naturans'. 
This egoism also, this desire for the preservation of such 
a self as man is admitted to be, which Nature herself fosters, 
so that she becomes to it both nurse and guide, is not just 
worldly nor selfish nor merely human, but noble unwelfish and 
related to the cosmic powers. For this .Egoism is not 
absolutely self -dependent. It is dependent on other men and 
it is, as a need of his nature as well as an aim of his spirit, 
dependent upon that power which is above all and through all 
and in us all. But Feuerbach is limited in his power to give 
expression to this because of his conception of Nature as the 
realm of scientific law and exhaustively revealed in sense- 
perception./ 
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perception. 
But a new explanation of the origin of Religion in the 
nature of man has yet to be considered. To a certain extent 
it stands apart from the two we have discussed and consequently 
it seems to hang in the air. It is also prior to the others. 
We have been warned that man has his own aims above Nature 
and apart from her. the feeling of absolute dependence is 
changed into Egoismus, while poor old Nature is just like 
a grandfather of the Victorian age whose existence we cannot 
deny but whose standards of life no sensible youth would 
follow. e.g. VTR p 27. "The unconscious Being of Nature is 
to me the eternal underived being, the first being in time, 
though not in rank, the physical but not the first moral being." 
Here is the fateful sentence in chap 1, para 1 C setting 
forth this new view of religion. "Religion has its basis 
in the essential difference between man and the brute. " 
The brutes have no religion, the religion of elephants belongs 
to the realm of fable. Feuerbach has thereforeno sympathy 
with such critics of religion as Celsus who said that if horses 
had religion they would picture the gods in the likeness of 
horses, although he cannot keep his own hands off this feeble 
weapon against anthropomorphism in religion. 
Further religion consists not only in the separation of 
the brutes but in man's power of separation from 
man from / dxiigilaxximxi xii imitioggxaxmaxxbxmmxl1x11/himself. 
Chap 2. Religion is the disuniting a man from himself so that 
he/ 
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he possesses self -consciousness. 
And then a third stage is reached in this new definition 
of religion with the assertion that "consciousness is present 
in the strictest sense only in a being to whom his species, 
his essential nature, is an object of thought. he brute 
is indeed conscious of himself as an individual, and he has 
accordingly the feeling of self as the oemmon centre of 
successive sensations but not as species: hence he is without 
that consciousness which in its nature as in its name is 
akin to Science, Science is the cognisance of species." 
"Hence the brute has only a simple, man a two -fold life; 
in the brute the inner life is one with the outer; man has 
both an inner and an outer life. The brute can exercise no 
function which has relation to its species without another 
individual external to it but man can perform the functions 
of thought and of speech, which strixctly imply such a 
relation apart from another individual. Man is himself at 
once I and Thou: he can put himself in the place of another, 
for this reason that to him his species, his essential 
nature, and not merely his individuality, is an object of 
thought. Religion being thus identical with the distinctive 
characteristic of man, is then identical with self-consciousness 
But Religion, expressed generally is consciousness of the 
infinite, thus it is and can be nothing else than the 
consciousness which man has of his own not limited and finite 
but infinite nature. 
We/ 
GL 
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SECTION 4. 
Feuerbach 's Doctrine of Self- consciousness 
and of the Knowledge of the Infinite 
or God. 
His religious Phenomenalism 
" When you go one step beyond the mundane system, 
you only excite an inquisitive humour which it is 
impossible ever to satisfy." 
" Our ideas reach no farther than our experience; we 
have no experience of any divine attributes or 
operations: I need not conclude my syllogism: 
You can dra w the inference yourself. " 
(Hume, Dialogues 
p 409,& p 391 ) 
w 
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Feuerbach's Doctrine of Self- consciousness 
and of the knowledge of the Infinite or God. 
The question of man's self- consciousness and knowledge has 
come at the end of an examination of the psychological study 
which Feuerbach makes of human nature. 
'Feeling' we saw to be marked down as the decisive element 
in Religion and most fitly described as a feeling of absolute 
dependence. This led to a discussion of the object upon 
which a man feels himself dependent. Originally 'Nature', 
this object becomes 'Man; seeking a perfection and completeness 
over against the barriers of l;ature, an ideal only to be 
realised in the Race or Species, upon which therefore he 
feels himself dependent. In this argument there is, it will 
be observed, a curious mixture of qualitative with quantitative 
perfection, as if the mass of humanity must be better because 
bigger than the individual. Yet man is not a mere individual 
or unit; he has a sense of the infinite within him, but this 
infinite is real only as it .refers to humanity as a species. 
lo keep this 'infinite' of which man is undoubtedly conscious 
Within the limits of humanity is the goal sought. Feuerbach 
achieves it by the limitation of man's knowledge to what is 
human and to what is sensible or perceived by the sense, by 
a statement of the relation of predicate to subject which 
denies the existence of the subject when reference is made to 
God, and also by a reference to the varieties-of religion. 
The result is a religious phenomenalism which denies the 
transcendental/ 
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Knowledge of Inf. 
transcendental object of theology and which makes other knew- 
ledge eventually also phenomenal, or simply our'impressions'cf 
the world about us with no assurance as bt their independent 
reality or truth. 
This however is to anticipate,, and we must look at details. 
His fundamental proposition runs,'Intro. ',v.C. p2', "The conscia 
:ness of the infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of 
the infinity of consciousness, or in the consciousness of the 
infinite the conscious subject has for his object the infinity 
of his own nature." 
What is meant here is stated more simoly perhaps in the wordd 
"The predicate is the truth of the subject, what the subject is 
lies only in the predicate. Subject and predicate are distin- 
guished only as existence and essence. The negation of the pre- 
dicates is therefore the negation of the subject. " ( W.C. p19,} 
This effort to get rid of the subject and make the predicates 
alone real, for that is what it amounts to, is of course to de- 
monstrate the illusory character of the divine being whose at- 
tributes are real only so far as they are abstractions of man's 
moral and intellectualN qualities. ,Ian is the Ens realiss 
imum. It is his predicates which are real. His consciousness 
does not go beyond hhs own qualities and infinity is a predicat( 
of himself and not otherwise an object of his knowledge. 
Feuerbach has here in mind not only the scholastic problems o] 
the relation between substance and accidents or the universal 
and the particular, but the associated argument, the Ontologic- al, for the existence of God from the idea of a perfect being. In this he says, we simply clothe the idea of God with the ideal or abstract qualities of human nature; eilnce/ 
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since man originally used the idea of 'being or lexiatencel as 
the idea of truth, he comer to reard what is true as actually 
existing. "Now God is the nature of man regarded as absolute 
truth.. the truth of man; but God, or what is the same thing re- 
ligion, is as various as are the conditions under which man con- 
ceived his nature, regards it as the highest being ... the qual- 
ities of God are nothing else than the essential qualities of man 
himself, and a particular man is what he is, has his existence, 
his reality only in his particular conditions. Take away from the 
Greek the quality of being Greek and you take away his existence. 
Being a Greek his gods are necessarily Greek and necessarily real 
existent. How can he doubt this, for it is essential to and iden, 
tical with his own nature." Or, in the reverse process, "Man ab- 
stracts more and more from God and attributes more and more to 
himself." (Vi C. p 31). 
Orly with philosophical abstraction arises the distinction 
or separation between subject and predicate, existence and nature 
. 
tbe fiction that the existence of the subject is something else 
L1:: the predicate, something immediate, indubitable, in distinct 
immfrom the predicate hich is held to be doubtful. But this is 
M I y a fiction. A God who has abstract predicates has also an 
ract existence. EXistence, being, varies with varying qualit- 
tae. 
Mt: 
There are two arinnts hereita The matter-of-tact one, 
trvith the progressive development of religion God is conceiv- 
variously, varying also with the country nationality and life 
cor 
2./ he philosophti rQeflt, a. jihat truth in idea 
216. 
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ion of a concept is a predicate which adds to and enlarges the 
conception. It must not therefore be contained in the conception." 
Being is evidently not a real predicate." "The real contains no 
the 
more than than/ pobbible. A hundred real dollars contain no more 
than a hundred possible dollars....But in reckoning my wealth 
there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars than in a 
hundred possible dollars, that is, in the mere conception of them. 
For the real object, the dollars, is not analytically contained 
in my conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my concept- 
ion (which, he adds strangely) is merely a determination of my 
mental state, although this objective reT-lity, this existence, 
apart from my conception, does not in the least increase the afore' 
said hundred dollars." 
The test of reality, it is declared by Kant, p 367, belongs en- 
tirely to the sphere of experience, "in the case of sensuous 
objects this is attained by their connection according to empir- 
ical laws with some of my perceptions; but there is no means of 
cognising the existence of objects of pure thought because it 
must be cognised completely a priori." The notion of a Supreme 
Being is in many respects, he admits, a highly 'useful' idea; 
but for the very reason that it is an 'idea', it is incapable of 
enlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things." 
It is evident that Feuerbach has material here suited to his 
theories. 
Two things require to be said however, before we pass from 
tAese quotations, the first has to do with Kant and the second 
with/ 
211' 
Chapter V. Section 4. Knowledge, 
with Hegel. 
We must remember the many and careful qualifications which 
Kant makes in K R V. in which he leaves room for other experience 
than sinsible or sensuous, and so far prepares the way for the 
other Critiques, Most unjustly the first of the three books has 
been taken to represent his complete message, whereas the intro- 
duction itself warns us expressly that his criticism is really in 
the interests of religion. He wishes to abolish knowledge to make 
room for belief. (pp XXXIII & XXXV). The conception of a nou- 
menon is not self-contradictory, becasue we are not entitled to 
maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. 
(p. 186) 
It must be carefully borne in mind, that while we surrender the 
power of cognising, we still reserve the power of thinking objects 
as things in themselves ( XXXIII) and a little later," while I 
cannot cognise, I can quite well think freedom, that is to say 
that my representation of it involves at least no contradiction.. 
The Ideas of pure Reason, though carefully set about by lim9 
iting descriptions are retained and apply to the Universe, the 
soul and God. The Idea is merely to be adopted as a point of view 
It does not determine an object to which it directly relates, 
( PP. 471,416). It is merely a regulative principle or maxim and 
provides us with no extension beyond the realm of experience.(p410 
In the "Critique of the Practical Reason" God, the soul, and 
Immortality are reinstated, and there is an interesting anticip- 
ation of this in a note at the foot of p. XXXIII KRV. Dealing 
Witt the difference between a possible thought and one which cor- 
responds/ 
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responds to a real object, he says,"Bomething more is required 
before I can attribute to such a conception objective validity, 
that is real possibility, the other possibility being merely log- 
ical. We are not however confined to theoretical sources of cog- 
nition for the means of satisfying this additional requirement, 
but mgy derive them from practical sources. " 
And again, looking beyond the division of theoretical and prac- 
tical reason, he writes, p 494, "But this systematic unity of ends 
in this world of intelligences,--- wk,c4 as mere nature is only 
a world of sense, but as a system of freedom and volition, may be 
termed an intelligible, that is, a moral world (regnum gratiae) 
leads inevitably also to the teleological unity of all things 
which constitute this great whole, according to universal natural 
laws - -- just as the unity of the former is according to universal 
and necessary moral laws - - -, and unites the practical with the 
speculative reason."... 
Feuerbach will not accept, however, this extension of reason 
al 
to the noumenal world. He accepts the principle of the Categoric/ 
Imperative, but it is limited to man and has no reference to a 
world of ends in which Nature plays her own part. Indeed reason 
as practical is for that very fact anthropomorphic. God so far 
from being unknown is so well known that he is none other than 
the Race, Man as infinite. 
Nor will Feuerbach accept Hegel's critical restatement of the 
Ontological argument, and this brings us to our second point. 
Hegel refused to be content with Kant's presentation of the 
case/ 
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case, and while acknowledging the destructive value of his words 
over against the old theology considered there was more to be said. 
Hegel rightly pointed out that Kant's view of experience was 
simply that of the world of the understanding or the categories 
of scientific thought, and so according to his premises his argu- 
ment was justified. Further Kant was arguing against proofs of 
God by means of a process of syllogising in which the conclusion 
was really more than was contained in the premisses, and God in- 
stead of being the ground of all was derivative and dependent. 
(logic,p 104.102) 
As for the famous illustration of the hundred dollars, the 
same in content whether real or merely conceived, this is a bar- 
barism of language, for God is not a 'thing' like a dollar. (108 -9) 
Philosophers, he pleads ironically, are not wholly ignorant of the 
difference between Being and Thought. The mark of everything fin- 
ite is just this difference, its being in time and place is dis- 
crepant from its notion. God on the contrary, expressly has to 
be what can only be 'thought as existing'. His notion involves bein 
It is this unity of the notion and being that constitutes the not- 
ion of God. - -- It would be strange, if the notion, the very in- 
most of mind, if even the Ego, or above all the concrete totality 
we call God were not rich enough to include so poor a category as 
Being, the very poorest and most abstract of all." (p. 109) . 
If this criticism goes off into the peculiar terminology of 
Hegel, that is so irritating to the uninitiated,he speaks in simpl- 
er language on page 103 of the Logic when he says, "What men call 
the proofs of God's existence are rightly understood, ways of de- 
describing/ 
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the abstract spirit, in short, not the reason in abstracte, 
but the actual complete being of man. Man is the measure of 
rea son. t° 
Again, Sensibility is the Mother of all knowledge. Thought 
is nothing more than a sensation which has been and is no more. 
There are thus different kinds of sensations. Thinking is only 
a sensation enlarged expanded to include the distant and the ab- 
sent, a sensation of something which is not properly felt or per- 
ceived. 
Arguing Against the intellectualism of Yiegel and with a cur - 
ous reminder of Descartes, he writes, par 37, The more recent 
philosophy sought something immediately certain. Consequently 
it rejected the "thought' of Scholesticsmwhich is without ground 
and foundation, it established philosophy upon self -consciousness 
i.e. it sets in the place of the Being which is only thought, in 
the place of God, the highest last Being of all scholastic philo- 
solahy, the thinking being, the Ich, the self- conscious spirit; 
for thinking lies infinitely nearer to the thinker, is more pre- 
sent more certain than what is thought. The existence of God can 
be doubted, so too in general that which I think; but indubitabl 
is the fact that I exist, I who think, I who doubt. But the self 
consciousness of modern philosophy is itself again only a being 
thought (conceived), mediated through abstraction, consequently 
doubtable. Indubitable, immediate, certain is only that v.ich is 
the object of sense, of intuitiòn, of perception." 
And again in the next paragraph, 38," True and divine is that 
only/ 
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only which requires no proof, which is certain immediately 
through itself.... But only the sensible is sun -clear; only 
where sensibility begins do all doubt and division cease." 
Bolin and Jodl, (pp 55,56, and pp 28 -30 respectively)protest 
that Feuerbach is not a vulgar sensualist of the pre -Kantian 
2,,s2 
school for he strives to preserve the right and thought and . 
the connectedness and meaning it gives). His interest is in 
the activity of scientific knowledge and the fact that its 
results are assured by sensible control of experiments. It is 
his ideal of science which leads to this emphasis upon the 
immediately certain which is given by the tests of sense - 
experience. Indeed in one of his notes, (v.Bolin,p 52) 
Feuerbach claims that he is the embodiment of modern science 
brought to its highest simplest and also philosophical expression; 
In paragraph 43 we are reminded that sensibility is not the 
immediate in the sense of the speculative philosophy as some- 
thing lying on the open hand and devoid of thought. Men see 
things at first only as they appear, not as they are, and so 
the task of philosophy and of science in general is not to turn 
objects into thoughts, but to come nearer to reality and to 
present as visible that which to the common eye is invisible. 
This hardly tallies with the assertion that only the sensible 
is .Sunclear and implies the activity of reason. 
Jodl refers to paragraph 48 for a fresh and sl nificant as- 
count of the relation of perception to thought. The real is 
capable of being represented in thought not in complete numbers 
but only in broken- parts...Thinking of the absolute kind,i.e., 
isolated from sensibility, does not pass beyond the identity of 
thought with itself . , .. 'ode are left with no other criterion of 
truth than that something does not contradict the thought, or 
idea consequently/ 
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consequently only a formal subjective criterion which does 
not give any decision. whether the truth conceived is also truth 
in reality. The criterion which does decide this is perception 
alone. Perception leaves things in their unhindered freedom, 
thought gives them laws but they are too often only despotic." 
In words which recall the famous phrase of Kant as to blind 
perceptions and empty conceptions, he says, "Perception for 
itself has no principles, thought in itself no life. The rule is 
the concern of thought, the exception from the rule the concern 
of perception. The circle is the symbol of speculative philosophy 
of the ghought which supports itself only on itself, the ellipse 
on the contrary is the mark of the sensible philosophy, of the 
thought which bases itself on perception and therefore takes into 
account the anomalies which come before it." 
This paragraph which I have not quoted in full Jodl interpret 
as an expression of the fact that it is impossible to rationalise 
reality wholly by means of thinking because reality is broken into 
inLividuals by perception. 
One may remark on this whole statement, 1st, it may be grant - 
8tiz and even Hegel does so in reference to the Ontological argu- 
t, that there is an admitted difference between Reality and 
I system of concepts of Reality, but it has to be remembered that 
ttawsnt itself, and no one can lay more stress on self-conscious- 
'tees mhen he wishes than Feuerbach, is also something real. It 
atbiguous to say as he does, "The world is not given us through 
1 til ig, but through life intuition and sense." The point is 
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what is the relation between the two and what are the limits 
of the action of thought in the use of sense for the represent- 
ations it forms of experiences which come to it in life but not 
through sense. Sense perception is only one part of experience 
and its definiteness or immediacy is helpful as a criterion of 
reality only when it enables us to express to ourselves other 
experiences which are also immediate. Religion does not surrend- 
er easily her claim to the reality of the spiritual and is not to 
be frightened off by being told it is mediated and therefore ab- 
stract. 
Further, with regard to sense -perception and the difficulty 
of a completed system such as Hegel sought to present, there are 
other experiences, such as the sense of sin, the fact of evil, IX 
the consciousness of moral freedom which warn us not to be 
presumptuous. Even the theologians have spoken of the ellipse 
rather than the circle as being the symbol of man's limitations. 
And few dispute that life and reality are richer than our thoi. ht. 
But this hindrance to a completely rational system does not 
mean that we cannot have ruling principles which give coherence 
to the variety of experience and make us believe that reality 
is a system, i.e., a rational unity. Our human intelligence 
is indeed too short to measure and to hold all things together. 
The defect of Hegelianism may be admitted in that it attempted 
too much definiteness, though Hegel could be vague enough at 
times and Feuerbach in his "Anti- Hegel" scoffs at the idea that 
this philosophy presented to man the Holy Ghost in three volumes. 
(v. Note F. & Hegel) 
At/ 
2n . Theog. W. 
Chapter V. Section 5. 
brim:, us closer to reality. 
3 / that there is an argement justifiable under certaincron- 
ditions from the sense of need to the reality of.the object. 
4 / but that metaphysics and not merely psychology must have 
its say in the matter. 
1/ As soon as we enter uson thls question, wo become aware 
that we are dealing not with a question of the past but of 
the present, for we breathe the atmosphere of modern thinking 
and find ourselves usinc its characteristic speech. 
Recent psychology has emphasised the dynamic and conative 
element in human life,e.., in such a books 'The :j'reudian 'Ash 
by Edwin B.Holt,1915. The so-called Wish,"says Holt, "is the 
unit of psychology replacing the older unit, comslonly called 
'sensation', which latter, it is to be noted, waa a content 
of consciousness unit, whereas the 'wish' is a elore dynamic af- 
fair." The whole book is most sugestive, both in its cor- 
respondences with and. its differences from the views of Feuer- 
bach. 
euerbach would. elree,e.g., that life as a whole is dyn- 
asic, though on the other hand his rationalistic doctrine of 
knowledge tends more to a fixed system of rigid law. He would 
?.:7;ree that 'wish generally considered "includes all that would 
tw.sasonly be so classed, and also whatever would be considered 
tendency,desire, purpose, attitude asd the like,' 
but he would include, as Holt does not, the emotional co,.ponent 
thereof/ 
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thereof. He is not sufficiently a "Behaviourist" to agree 
with Holt in what the latter calls an exact definition ,ftthat 
it is AtiMN cource of action which some mechanism of the body 
is set to cerry out, whether it actually does do or 
Suepressed wishes peed conflicts which work mischief have 
for hirn as for iolt and Freud a peculiar interest, since they 
represent the source of aberration from which religion seeks 
to deliver men. Also his treatelent of the subject may be 
considered as an atteept, which Holt outlines, to solve these 
difficulties by the method of 'Discrimination and Integration ' 
i.e., by getting at the facts rather than by compromise or sup- 
pression, and this not merely in regard to details of personal 
ethics (e.:. whether one should go to the theatre when all prep 
loin teaching in the home argues against going) , butin the 
larger matters of the reality of religion. "Let us find a new 
road, he woeld say," and discover the true meaning of religion 
in anthropology." 
Like the 'Freudian 'iii', which itself Gives us 'the Ethice 
from below ' Feuerbac!h's theory is resentful of the 'Ethics 
tromabove'si.e. from 'authority' natural or supernatural. he 
Categorical Imperative is from within man. 
But in one respect there is a marked difference. holt,p92-3, 
brings the 'wish' into closest relation with the whole world of 
fact. This la his doctrine of cognition. :Ashes are a functinn 
of environment, a reference or reseonse to it. Thusphe says, 
are/ 
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are brought to an end dualietic philosophy and psycho-physical 
parallelism, which were a complete imesapereheasion from the out-' 
set. It is not that we have two contrasted worlds, the sub- 
jective and the objective; there is but one world, the objective 
and that which we have it hitherto not underotood, have dub- 
bed therefore the subjective, are the subtler workings of in- 
tegrated objective mechanisms." 
Despite some curious sentences in erundsAze as to the de- 
pendence of thought on sensation, or thought being itself only 
sensation, leuerbach holds to the intellectualism where self- 
consciousness is the chief characteristic of man over against 
the animals 
ttneRANaix. L4en when he seeks to abolish dualism in his doctt 
rine of 'Organismus', he unifies mind and body by keeping them 
both. 
As for the use which 'euerbach himself Ipakes of 'Wish', I 
have said he employs it in a veey restricted form in reference 
to religion. 11e makes a sharp distinction between necessary 
and unnecessary wishes. The former are those which can be sat- 
isfied in accordance with Nature and Reason. the latter are so 
named because the barriers against which they cry out are barri- 
iers only to the imagination of man. "hy should a man,e.g. 
object that he is tied down to space and time. The imaginat- 
ion certainly strives to pass beyond them. art reason points 
out that tne limitations of soace and time sialply mean that man 
is bound up with earth. "Apart from earth i am a phantom. i 
essentiilly a being of earth. hatever calls for satisfact- 
L__ 
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ion contrary to Reason and Nature is .ere 
" This is indeed the crimo of Christianity that it has 
brought in the principle of unlioilted,extravagant fanatic, 
supernaturalistic subjectivity, a principle intrinsically op- 
posed to that of science and culture," ( W.C.p133) 
;A.s very definition of the religious wish as'unnecossary' 
and'mere wish'is a petitio principli. Nor does he better the 
case by further descriptions of it as "A will without poweri" 
A desire whose satisfaction is not in iv power . ( R p32) 
" ?1ünschen " is called in old German, he goes on to say,"gaube 
ern" 0 to bewitch or conjure )$ and to bless, in Luther's words, 
means nroporly to wish something good though we canoot give 
( V R p359) 
It is obvious that such a religious wIsh is at once linked 
LP with tAe supernatural and therefore with emptiness. The 
case has already been decided aLainst it. It is used Ina very 
definite and rostricted form. 
One may be permited to recall some of the sentences in 
Which this restricted definition finds embodiment. Boldly he 
declares,"ihe fundamental dogmas of reliion are realised wish- 
human 
es of the/heart."( 7.C. ch 15). "God is the Love that satis- 
fies our wishes, our emotions our wants.... He is himself the 
realised wish of the heart, toe wish exalted to the certainty 
of its own fulfilJent." p121). "The miraculous Redeemer 
is nothing else than the realised wish of feeling, to be free 
a 
from the laws of morality. (W.G.p143). "Dreaming is/double 
refraction of the rays of light, hence its indescribable charm.. 
t / 
